A.H. Khan, J.
1. The facts leading to this appeal in short are that the judgment of the trial Court was pronounced on 25-1-1957. It is admitted that 26th and 27th January, 1957 were public holidays. After the reopening of the Courts the judgment-debtor applied for copy of the judgment which was given to him in four days. He filed the appeal on 1-3-57. This appeal after excluding the days spent in obtaining a copy i.e. four days is admittedly beyond time if period of limitation is computed from 26th January 1957, and on this ground the learned District Judge, Gwalior, has dismissed it.
2. The question for decision in this case is whether in computing the period of limitation, two days i.e. 26th and 27th January on which the courts admittedly remained closed, because of the public holidays, should be excluded or not. It seems there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the point. On the one hand the view taken in Puttulal v. Bhagwan Dass, AIR 1938 All 106 and Subramanyan v. N. Narasimham, AIR 1920 Mad 359(2) is that where a judgment is pronounced on a day prior to the vacation of the Court and an application for a copy is not made till several days after the reopening of the Court, the applicant cannot be entitled to deduct the period of vacation. On the other hand I have been referred to Debi Charanlal v. Mehdi Hussain, AIR 1916 Pat 317 which has taken a contrary view.
3. With great respect to the learned Judges, I find myself in accord with the Patna view. The determination of the question really depends upon the interpretation of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, and particularly in determining the meaning of the expression 'the time requisite for obtaining copy of the decree'. The judgment in this case was pronounced on 25th January and ordinarily the time would run from the 26th January. But where the 26th and 27th January were admittedly public holidays, no application for a copy would be presented because the Court was closed. In the circumstances it is just and proper that these two days should be excluded in computing the period of limitation.
4. In construing the expression 'the time requisite for obtained a copy', emphasis is both on the words 'requisite' and 'obtaining'. I suggest that the word 'requisite' means the time properly and reasonably required. During the two days when the Court was closed (26th and 27th January) it was impossible to obtain any copy or even to apply for it. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar Firm, ILR 6 Rang 302 : (AIR 1928 PC 103) have observed that 'the word 'requisite' means properly required and throws upon the appellant's legal advisers the necessity of showing that no part of the delay is due to their fault'.
5. It was no fault of the appellant and 'he could not possibly apply for a copy if the court was closed on the 26th and 27th January, becauseboth days were holidays. In AIR 1928 PC 103, their Lordships again expressed the same view and further explained the meaning of the word 'requisite'.
6. I, therefore, hold that if a judgment is pronounced on such a date that the day or days following it are holidays, during which the appellant cannot apply for a copy, then in computing period of limitation prescribed for appeal, such holidays would be excluded.
7. It is admitted that if the 26th and 27th January are excluded, the appeal before the Court below is within time.
8. For reasons stated above, I should allow the appeal and send the case back to the first appellate Court for hearing the appeal on merits. Costs to abide the event.