1. This petition is by K. C. Sharma who challenges before us an order made by the Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur on 7th September, 1957 in election petition No. 270 of 1957. By that order the Election Tribunal partly allowed an application for amendment of particulars in the election petition filed by the present petitioner. By the present petition the petitioner challenges that portion of the order by which amendments sought to be introduced were disallowed.
2. The election petition contained allegations of corrupt practices indulged by the returned candidate. It purported to set out particulars of the corrupt practices in three schedules which are numbered, A, B and C. By the application for amendment the petitioner sought to introduce details of the corrupt practices in all the three schedules.
Some of these amendments were allowed and the others rejected. It is not necessary to refer to the various amendments which are quite numerous and are not capable of being briefly summarised. We have, however, examined, the original schedules, the proposed amendments and the orders thereon by the Election Tribunal carefully. Having considered these amendments and the reasons therefor, we think that we should not interfere by way of our extraordinary powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution at this stage in this case.
3. To begin with, the Full Bench decision given by Krishnan, J. and us in Babulal Sharma v. Brijnarayan Brijesh, Misc. Petn. No. 249 of 1957, D/- 22-1-1958: (AIR 1958 Madh Pra 175) (A), was cited before us in support. In that case, as also here, the learned Election Tribunal had taken the view that particulars of a corrupt practice already given in the election petition could be amended and amplified, but that particulars could not be given for the first time of a corrupt practice alleged in petition.
We pointed out in the Full Bench case that the ruling of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh, (S) AIR 1957 SC 444 (B), was applicable to the interpretation of Sub-section (5) of Section 90 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. We, however, did interfere in that case, because the decision of the Tribunal proceeded upon a wrong assumption of the law and the reasons for rejecting the amendments were not fully or convincingly given.
4. In the present case, though the election Tribunal took an identical view of the law which, as we have pointed out in the Full Bench case, is wrong, the Tribunal proceeded to examine the merits of the allegations and disposed of the case on the ground that sufficient cause was not shown why the details could not he included in the election petition itself as required by Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. That puts a different colour upon the matter here.
The Tribunal may be right or wrong in allowing or disallowing an amendment, but itacts with jurisdiction; and its discretion, if prima facie exercised, will not be interfered with by way of a writ petition and is a master which may properly be taken in an appeal that may be filed against the final decision. Having considered the petition from this point of view, we are of opinion that we should not interfere in the present case which is distinguishable from the other case because of the manner in which it was approached by the Election Tribunal.
5. We cannot leave this case without pointing out that in schedule 'C' attempt has been made to use the sixth sub-section of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for a purpose for which it is not meant. The words of 'that sub-section are:
'The incurring or authorising of expenditure in contravention of Section 77.'
This does not mean that omissions in the accounts can be pointed out and the Election Tribunal is made to embark upon an enquiry as to what was actually spent or not. The practice of the accounts is really a matter for the Election Commission, though suppression of items of expenditure may result in the exceeding of the prescribed maximum.
Where instances are cited to show that the prescribed maximum has been exceeded, there may be a case under Sub-section (3) of Section 77, of the Act, but the words : 'the incurring or authorising of expenditure' do not lead to the application of Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (1) of Section 77, in the context of an election petition. No doubt, the accounts have to be correct under Sub-section (1) of Section 77, but the incurring or authorising of expenditure in contravention of the rules has to be shown and not merely the making of an allegation that the accounts were not correctly maintained. The learned Tribunal has taken a similar view of the matter and we find ourselves in full concurrence with it.
6. With these remarks, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 50/-.