P.R. Sharma, J.
1. The appeal has been preferred by the State Government against the order dated the 29th of November, 1958 passed by the Second Addl. District Judge Gwalior, in Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1955 whereby he set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge First Class, Gwalior, in Civil Suit No. 21 of 1954.
2. The suit was for a declaration that the plaintiff is the 'Pakka' tenant of khasra Nos. 183, 2570 and 1848/1, for possession of the said lands and for damages, to the extent of 25 times the land-revenue, for the entire period during which the plaintiff was kept out of possession of the said lands. The plaintiff was served with a notice on 28 6-1953 by the Tehsildar stating that the plaintiff's possession of the land in dispute was that of a trespasser. Thereafter on 27-4-1954 the defendant No. 2 was placed in possession of the said lands. The plaintiff served a notice on the Government on 9-3-1954 and after expiry of the period of notice filed on 15-7-1954 the suit out of which the present appeal arises.
3. An objection was taken on behalf of the State Government that the notice under Section 80 C. P. C. did not contain the particulars required by the law. The trial Court upheld this contention and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal it was held that the suit in so far as it related to khasra No. 183 was maintainable. The suit was, therefore, remanded for trial and disposal in accordance with law.
4. In support of the present appeal it was argued by the learned Government Advocate that the notice under Section 80 C. P. C. did not contain anything in it to show that the plaintiff desired to sue the Government for a declaratory relief. It was also contended that there was no mention in the notice regarding the damages claimed in the suit.
In so far as the omission to make mention regarding the claim for a declaration in the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned. I am distinctly of the opinion that this omission cannot be considered as material. It was laid down by Grille J. in the case of Secretary of State v. Nagorao Tanko, (AIR 1938 Nag 415) that the Court should look at the wording of the notice and interpret it in the light of commonsense and that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to state in his notice the full details of his claim.
The object of the notice being to give the Government timely notice of the wrong which the plaintiff has suffered so as to enable it to grant adequate redress without recourse to a Court of law, this object is served if the notice states the bundle of facts which give rise to a right to sue. The various reliefs which can be claimed on the basis of the facts alleged in the notice is a matter governed by the substantive law and the Government cannot be heard to say that it had not notice of such claims as might under the law be founded on the facts alleged in the notice.
It is not the nature or extent of the claim which the plaintiff is likely to make in a Court which could determine the course to be adopted by the Government, but the facts which give rise to a right to sue. I am of the opinion that the plaintiff having stated in his notice that he was entitled to possession of the lands in dispute in his capacity as a 'Pakka' tenant thereof, he could sue for a declaration of his title as also for possession without being under any necessity to inform the Government that he intended to combine with his claim for possession a claim for declaration of his title.
5. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff having omitted to claim from the Government damages to the extent of 25 times of the land-revenue for the entire period during which he is kept out of possession, he is debarred from suing in this behalf. No issue was framed by the trial Court on this point and the matter is yet to be decided by the trial Court. I do not consider it proper in these circumstances to express any opinion on this point. The trial Court would be free to frame an issue on this question and to decide it in accordance with law.
6. Subject to the observations made by me above I do not see any force in this appeal. It is hereby dismissed. Costs incurred in this Court shall be costs in the suit.