B.K. Chaturvedi, J.
1. This is second appeal by defendant No. 3 Sitaram against whom the plaintiff's suit has been decreed for Rs. 156/8/-.
2. The learned District Judge, Nimar (Khandwa), came to the conclusion that the appellant (defendant No. 3) must have instigated defendant No. 1, Jangoo, who is respondent No. 2 in this appeal, to give up the plaintiff's service. It has also been found that the appellant has been on inimical terms with the plaintiff.
3. The facts found are as follows : Defendant No. 1 Jangoo (respondent No. 2 in this appeal) entered into a contract with the plaintiff for taking a loan of Rs. 225/- and in lieu thereof executed a Naukrinama on 2-1-1948 to serve the plaintiff on a petty sum of Rs. 2/- per month till the repayment of the loan. In other words, he entered into a contract for serving the plaintiff on this meagre salary for a period of 112 months and a half. Defendant No. 1 Jangoo served the plaintiff for 2 years 1.0 months and 8 days, that is, he remained in the service of the plaintiff on Rs. 2/- per month from 2-1-1948 to 10-11-1950.
Then, he left his service. Subsequently, he took up service as a watchman with the appellant Sitaram, presumably on more advantageous terms. The plaintiff filed a suit against Jangoo and his surety, the appellant and one Habbuji. The appellant alone contested the suit, but his contention has been overruled and a decree for Rs. 156/8/- has been passed against the appellant and defendant No. 1. The appellant comes in second appeal to this Court.
4. Shri J. V. Jakatdar, learned counsel for the appellant, rightly contends that there is no evidence on record to show that the appellant instigated defendant No. 1 Jangoo to give up the plaintiff's service. The only circumstances found are three, viz., :
(1) That defendant No. 3 (i.e. the appellant here) was cognizant of the Naukrinama and be had attested it as a witness;
(2) That the appellant was not on good terms, with the plaintiff; and
(3) That after leaving the service of the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 joined the service of the appellant.
The question is : Are these circumstances sufficient to draw an inference that the appellant instigated defendant No. 1 to give up the service of the plaintiff? In my opinion, the inference is not possible. There ought to be some evidence, besides the circumstances, to predicate active association of the appellantwith the breach of contract by defendant No. 1. Any active step taken by the appellant facilitating a breach would be enough. But even this has not been proved by any evidence on record. In such cases, it is necessary to analyse the circumstances, and in analysing them or in considering them regard might be had to the nature of the contract broken; the position of the parties to the contract; the grounds for the breach; the means employed to procure the breach etc.' Glamorgan Coal Company v. South Wales Miners' Federation, Per Romer L. J. at p. 574: (1903) 2 KB 545 (A).
From the circumstances of the instant case the only inference that can be drawn is that the terms of the contract being unconscionable, the defendant No. 1 was completely tired of his service on that meager salary and himself left the plaintiff's service and took up a better service elsewhere without anybody asking him to do so. I would, therefore, hold that in this the finding has been given by the Courts below with out any evidence about the instigation by the appellant or his procuring the breach of contract of service by defendant No. 1.
5. Shri Jakatdar has taken me through the decision in South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., 1905 AC 239 (B); Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, pages 320-322; Harper and James : The Law of Torts. Vol. I, page 492; and other cases. In my opinion, the principles enunciated therein can hardly be said to be applicable to the facts of the instant case. It will be obvious that in the present case the contract was to serve on a meagre sum of Rs. 2/- per month for about ] 12 months, If I may be allowed to say, this was nothing short of a contract of serfdom.
In my opinion no action lies for dissuading one (even if the finding be that the appellant was responsible for such act) from performing a contract which must be regarded as contrary to public policy. To expend the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 2 E & B 216 (C) or of 1905 AC 239 (B), to cover such cases would, in my opinion, be as preposterous as it would be unjust.
6. I would, therefore, allow this appeal withcosts, set aside the decrees and judgments against thisappellant of the two Courts below; and so tar as therespondent is concerned, I dismiss this suit withcosts throughout.