T.C. Shrivastava, J.
1. This misc. appeal has been filed by the plaintiff against the decision of the Additional District Judge, Narasimhapur, dated 31-12-1.959, by which he has returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court under Order 7, Rule 10, C. P. C.
2. The respondent No. 1, Gram Pranchayat, Kaudia, held a decree against respondent No. 2, Dattulal, in execution of which he attached a house, The appellant Smt. Tejabai filed an objection under Order 21, Rule 58, C. P. C. On 18-9-1959, that objection was dismissed. The market value of the house in suit is Rs. 15,000/- according to the plaint. It was attached under a decree for Rs. 7,500/-. The respondent No. 3 Mulamchand is the vendor of the plaintiff.
3. After the dismissal of the objection, the plaintiff brought the present suit impleading the decree-holder, the judgment-debtor and her vendor. The prayer in the plaint is as follows:
'(a) The order, dated 18-9-1959 in Misc. Case No. 38 of 1959, of the Court of 2nd Civil Judge, Narasimhapur, be cancelled and it be declared that the house No. 146 belongs to the plaintiff.'
Shri J. P. Dwivedi for the appellant contends that the present suit is not merely under Order 21, Rule 83, but the prayer is wide enough to convert it into a suit regarding declaration of title to the property and therefore for the purposes of jurisdiction the value should be the market value of the property. Accordingly, he contends that the learned Additional District Judge erred in returning the plaint.
4. The first question to be decided in this appeal is whether the suit is under Order 21, Rule 63. It will be noticed that the plaintiff herself described it to be so in the cause title. The cause of action in the suit is stated to arise on 18-9-1959 when the objection was dismissed by the executing Court. No allegation against the judgment-debtor or the vendor is made and there is no cause of action against them. In the absence of any allegation that they have denied the plaintiff's title on any occasion, the suit is obviously a suit under Order 21, Rule 63. The plaint has to be read as a whole to find out the nature of the suit.
5. In Phul Kumari v. Ghanshyam Misra, ILR 85 Cal 202 (PC), the Judicial Committee had occasion to consider the nature of a similar suit. In that suit, the plaintiff had impleaded the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder. She had asked for a declaration about her title and also to the effect that the judgment-debtor had no interest in her property. She had also prayed for a permanent injunction against the decree-holder not to execute his decree against the property. It was held that the suit was in effect under Section 283 of the C. P. C., 1882, which corresponds to Order 21, Rule 63 of the present Code. It was observed that the nature of the prayer was merely a verbal or formal difference and it did not make a difference to the nature of the suit. Reading the present plaint in the light of the principles indicated in that decision, I have no doubt that the present suit falls entirely within the ambit of Order 21, Rule 63.
6. Although the decision, referred to in the preceding paragraph, dealt with the question of court-fees, the following observations were made by their Lordships on the question of jurisdiction:
'The value of the action must mean 'the valueto the plaintiff'. But the value of the propertymight quite well be Rs. 1,000/-, while the execution debt was Rs. 10,000/-. It is only if the execution debt is less than the value of the propertythat its amount affects the value of the suit.'
It is clear from these observations that where theexecution debt is less than the value of the property, the value of the suit for the purposes ofjurisdiction is the amount of the decree.
7. Reliance was placed by Shri J. P. Dwivedi on Narayan Ganesh Ghatate v. Bhioraj, 2 Nag LR 87. It has no doubt been observed in that case that in a suit brought under Section 283 of the C. P. C. of 1882, the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction depends on the value of the property. The question was considered by Pollock J. in Radhabai v. Madhorao, ILR (1944( Nag 783: (AIR 1944 Nag 308). The observations in Narayan Ganesh Ghatate's case, 2 Nag LR 87 (supra) were considered to be obiter. The cases on which the decision in that case was based were also considered. The conclusion reached was that in a case where the value of the property exceeds the decretal amount, the value for the purposes of (jurisdiction is the decretal amount. This case applies to the present case on all fours,
8. Reference was made by Shri J. P. Dwivedi to the decision in Gainda Lal v. Ram Singh, AIR 1954 ALL 782, where it has been held that a suit under Order 21, Rule 63, must be valued in accordance with the value of the property attached. That decision, however, is not helpful inasmuch as the question' was answered with particular reference to Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act, which has been amended in U, P. That section enjoins that the suit shall be valued for the purposes of jurisdiction at the market value of the property involved or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought. In a suit under Order 21, Rule 63, the title to the property attached is affected and therefore under the special provision the jurisdiction will depend upon the value of the property irrespective of the amount of decree in U. P.
9. In Renganatha v. Subrarnanian, AIR 1956 Mad 402, the question has been comprehensively considered, and it has been laid down that where the property is of higher value than the decretal amount, the decretal amount determines jurisdiction. In Nandlal v. Mt. Baratan, AIR 1960 Pat 82, also it has been observed that
'where the value of the property is more than the decretal amount, it is the decretal amount which will determine the value of the suit and upon that will depend the jurisdiction of the Court.'
10. The fact that the judgment-debtor and the vendor of the plaintiff have been made parties to the case makes no difference to the question of value for the purposes of jurisdiction. In Radha bai's case, ILR (1944) Nag 783: (AIR 1944 Nag 308), (supra) this question was examined and it was observed as follows:
'A distinction was drawn in Narayanan Singh v. Aiyasami Reddi, ILR 39 Mad 602 : (AIR 1916 Mad 858), where it was held that if the plaintiff in such a case asked for a declaration that the judgment-debtor had no interest in the attached property, the value to the plaintiff in his suit is his full interest in the property, the attachment of which he seeks to raise. As I have said above, J think it is very difficult, in view of the Privy Council decision in ILR 35 Cal 202 (PC), to draw any such distinction between one suit and another brought under Order 21, Rule 63.'
I find myself in respectful agreement with this view. As I have already said, there was no cause of action absolutely for asking for a declaration against the judgment-debtor or the vendor and in the plaint nothing was alleged as to why they were joined as parties. The plaint clearly shows that the occasion for the suit is the rejection of the objection under Order 21, Rule 58 and it is the effect of that order which is sought to be avoided by the suit. There are no other facts mentioned to show that the suit was of any wider import.
11. On the basis of the authorities cited, J. have no doubt that the value for the purposes of jurisdiction in the instant case was the amount of decree, and not the value of the property attached.
12. There is no substance in this appeal. Itis dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is fixed atRs. 50/- only.