S.K. Ray, J.
1. This is an application for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the final order passed in O. J. C. No. 608 of 1971 = (Reported in (1973) 1 Cut WR 121) under Article 133(1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. Mr. R. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the applicant stated that he would not press this application under Clauses (a) and (b), conceding that the valuation test involved in those two clauses was not satisfied in the present case. He has confined this application to Clause (c).
2. The petitioner had filed O. J. C. No. 608/71 for a writ of certiorari to quash the judgments of the House Rent Controller and of the A.D.M. (J), Cuttack, who heard the appeal from the decision of the House Rent Controller and confirmed it, whereby an order of eviction had been passed against him. The landlord's case was that he had let out his house to the petitioner under a tenancy agreement dated 6-8-65 on certain conditions, and the petitioner, in violation of those conditions, had sub-let the house without his written consent and had wilfully defaulted to pay house rent. The petitioner's defence. Inter alia, was that the tenancy was for a period of 10 years commencing from 6-8-65 and terminating on 6-8-75 and that he, being a periodical tenant, was governed by Section 11 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act and, accordingly, was not liable to be evicted under the provisions of Subsection (2) (i) of Section 7 of that Act. It was held by this Court that the petitionerwas a tenant as defined under Section 2 (5) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act notwithstanding that he was a periodical tenant and he having sub-let a part of the house without written consent of the landlord, namely, the opposite party and having wilfully defaulted in payment of rent was liable for eviction under Section 7 of that Act.
3. The sole problem at this stage is whether the question that a periodical tenant governed by Section 11 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act enjoys an immunity from eviction under Section 7 (1) thereof is of such general public or private importance as to justify a certificate of fitness under Clause (c).
4. The scope of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c), as has been held by the Supreme Court, is limited to the question whether a substantial question of law of great private or public importance arises and whether having regard to all the circumstances of the case it is a matter worthy of consideration by the Supreme Court to lay down an authoritative precedent binding on all courts. In the case of Brejendra Nath Purkait v. Dabendra Nath Bhattacharjee, 1968 SCD 229, Part I, it has been laid down that the High Courts should not lightly grant a certificate under Clause (c) where the value of the subject-matter at stake is too small to give a right of appeal under Clauses (a) and (b).
5. In the instant case, the point raised indeed relates to a construction of a few sections of the Orissa House Kent Control Act and the subject-matter of controversy relates to an ordinary claim to remain in the house as a tenant for about another 2,1/2 years. Thus the value of the subject-matter at stake is too small to give a right of appeal under Clauses (a) and (b). Cases of periodical tenancy claiming an immunity from the operation of Section 7 are also few and far between. The House Rent Control Act is a temporary Act, which will expire in 1974 unless further extended. Thus having regard to all the circumstances, we are of opinion that the case is not a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court and thus we are not inclined to grant a certificate that it is so.
Accordingly, leave prayed for is refused. Parties to bear their own costs of this application.
6. I agree.