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Padma Charan Mohapatra Vs. Superintendent of Police, Cum Taxing Authority of Phulbani - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectOther Taxes;Motor Vehicles
CourtOrissa High Court
Decided On
Case NumberO.J.C. No. 273 of 1963
Judge
Reported inAIR1965Ori71; 30(1964)CLT271
ActsBihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930 - Sections 12A(1); Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1962; General Clauses Act, 1897 - Sections 9
AppellantPadma Charan Mohapatra
RespondentSuperintendent of Police, Cum Taxing Authority of Phulbani
Appellant AdvocateR.N. Misra and ;R.C. Patnaik, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateAdv. General
DispositionPetition allowed
Cases ReferredBardi Nath v. State of Pepsu
Excerpt:
.....provision of sub-section (1) of section 173 permits filing of an appeal against an award within 90 days with a rider in the first proviso that such appeal filed cannot be entertained unless the statutory deposit is made. the period of limitation is applicable only to the filing of the appeal and not to the deposit to be made. it, therefore, appears that an appeal filed under section 173 cannot be entertained i.e. cannot be admitted for consideration unless the statutory deposit is made and for this purpose the court has the discretion either to grant time to make the deposit or not. no formal order condoning the delay is necessary, an order of adjournment would suffice. the provisions of limitation embodied in the substantive provision of the sub-section (1) of section 173 of the act..........12-a (1) of the said act would include the day on which the tax became due or would mean 15 clear days excluding that day. this point is concluded by a division bench decision of this court reported in markanda sahu v. lal sadananda singh, air 1952 orissa 279 where it was held that the words 'within a month' should ordinarily be construed as excluding the date on which the order was passed and would mean an interval of one clear month. the same view has been taken in bardi nath v. state of pepsu, air 1957 pepsu 14. following these two decisions we must hold that the expression 'within 15 days' in section 12a (1) of the act means 15 clear days which would necessarily exclude the due date of payment. here, therefore, 10-10-1962 must be excluded and then the payment of the tax made.....
Judgment:

Narasimham, C. J.

1. This is a petition by the owner of a transport vehicle ORS. 2392 against an order under Section 12-A of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Act as amended by Orissa (Act XXIII of 1962) levying a penalty of twice the amount of the tax on the petitioner on the ground that he did not pay the tax due on the said vehicle within the period of 15 days from the due date of payment. The order was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police who has stated in his order that the due date of payment of the tax in respect of the said vehicle was 10-10-1962 and that the tax was actually paid only on 25-10-62. He however held that under Section 12-A of the said Act the period of 15 days would end by 24-10-1962 and that consequently there was a delay of one day.

2. The question for consideration is whether the words 'within 15 days from the due date of payment' occurring in Section 12-A (1) of the said Act would include the day on which the tax became due or would mean 15 clear days excluding that day. This point is concluded by a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Markanda Sahu v. Lal Sadananda Singh, AIR 1952 Orissa 279 where it was held that the words 'within a month' should ordinarily be construed as excluding the date on which the order was passed and would mean an interval of one clear month. The same view has been taken in Bardi Nath v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1957 Pepsu 14. Following these two decisions we must hold that the expression 'within 15 days' in Section 12A (1) of the Act means 15 clear days which would necessarily exclude the due date of payment. Here, therefore, 10-10-1962 must be excluded and then the payment of the tax made on 25-10-1962 would be within 15 days for the purpose of the said section.

Hence the D.I.G. of Police had no jurisdiction to impose penalty. The petition is allowed and the order of the D.I.G. of Police in Motor Vehicles Appeal No. 1 of 1963 levying penalty on the petitioner is set aside.

There will be no order for costs.

3. Barman, J. : I agree.


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