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Deputy Director, Administration, Aviation Research Centre, Government of India Vs. Birendra Kumar Mohanty and ors., Etc. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty;Civil
CourtOrissa High Court
Decided On
Case NumberOriginal Jurn. Cases Nos. 311 and 312 of 1985
Judge
Reported inAIR1985Ori213; 1985(I)OLR391
ActsConstitution of India - Article 226; Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 12
AppellantDeputy Director, Administration, Aviation Research Centre, Government of India
RespondentBirendra Kumar Mohanty and ors., Etc.
Appellant AdvocateStanding Counsel (Central) and ;C.K.K. Murty, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateAdv. General for Respondent Nos. 2 to 5
DispositionApplication dismissed
Cases ReferredIn Udey Singh Todar Singh v. State of Haryana
Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act, 1988 [c.a. no. 59/1988]section 173(1) proviso; [d. biswas, amitava roy & i.a.ansari, jj] appeal without statutory deposit but within limitation/or extended period of limitation maintainability - held, if the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal cannot be admitted to consideration unless other requirements are complied with. the provision of sub-section (1) of section 173 permits filing of an appeal against an award within 90 days with a rider in the first proviso that such appeal filed cannot be entertained unless the statutory deposit is made. the period of limitation is applicable only to the filing of the appeal and not to the deposit to be made. it, therefore, appears that an appeal filed under section 173 cannot..........170 of 1977and 100 of 1979 giving rise to the first appealson references under section 18 of the landacquisition act and to the awards of thecollector against which the references havebeen made. 2. the main thrust of mr. c v. murty,the learned standing counsel for the union of india, is that the reference is invalid inasmuch as no notice under section 20 had been served on the petitioner, who was the person interested, by the court after the reference under section 18. he relies on air 1978 madh pra 218, town improvement trust, gwalior v. sahajirao angre. the learned advocate general has raised two formidable objections. firstly, the jurisdiction of this court under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of india does not extend to issue writs to itself acting judicially and,.....
Judgment:

R.C. Patnaik, J.

1. These two writapplications are disposed of by this commonorder as identical questions are, involved. Inthese writ applications under Articles 226 and227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner,the Deputy Director, Administration, AviationResearch Centre, Charbatia, Cuttack, seeksthe quashing of the decisions of this Court inFirst Appeals Nos. 323 and 458 of 1980 andthe awards of the learned Subordinate ludgein Land Acquisition Cases Nos. 170 of 1977and 100 of 1979 giving rise to the first Appealson references under Section 18 of the LandAcquisition Act and to the awards of theCollector against which the references havebeen made.

2. The main thrust of Mr. C V. Murty,the learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India, is that the reference is invalid inasmuch as no notice under Section 20 had been served on the petitioner, who was the person interested, by the Court after the reference under Section 18. He relies on AIR 1978 Madh Pra 218, Town Improvement Trust, Gwalior v. Sahajirao Angre. The learned Advocate General has raised two formidable objections. Firstly, the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India does not extend to issue writs to itself acting judicially and, secondly, the petitioner has no locus stand! to institute the action.

3. In the Madhya Pradesh case, it was held that an award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer is available to be assailed by a person for whose benefit the land was acquired and who bore the burden of compensation for acquisition in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The case is not on all fours. In the present cases on a reference awards were passed in Land Acquisition Cases Nos. 170 of 1977 and 100 of 1979 and on further appeal, this Court enhanced the compensation and passed the decree in First Appeals Nos. 323 and 450 of 1980. The awards passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Subordinate Judge have merged in the decrees passed by this Court. The awards passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Subordinate Judge do not have a separate existence any more. The rights or liabilities flow from the decrees passed by this Court. So long as the decree of this Court subsist, it is futile to assail the awards passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Subordinate Judge. Therefore, the pertinent question is if the decrees passed by this Court are available to be assailed in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The decrees are judicial decisions of this Court. A judicial decision of this Court, whether of a single Judge or of a larger Bench, is not available to be questioned in the writ jurisdiction. Mallick, J. in Arati Paul v. Registrar, High Court, Original Side : AIR 1965 Cal 3 (at p. 11) observed :

'To recognise the right of a party to challenge an order or decree passed by a Judge of the High Court in a Judicial proceeding pending before him, by an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, is unheard of and unprecedented....................Ifthe decree or order is wrong, the aggrieved party may take the matter to the Court of Appeal for correcting the order. .............Ifthe decree or order is a nullity, the parties are free to take such steps they may be advised., They may sit tight on it, treating the decree as a nullity -- as a mere scrap of paper -- or they may have it declared to be a nullity in an appropriate proceeding.'

In Santosh Kumar Ganguly v. Registrar, Appellate side, High Court, Calcutta . AIR 1959 Cal 317, the decision of the Registrar of the High court under Section 5 of the Court-fees Act was assailed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. P.N. Mookerjee, J. speaking for the Division Bench observed (Para 5):'

'It is really the Court which acts through the Registrar as its Taxing Officer hi the matter of determination of proper Court-fees, payable on documents, filed before it. The function may not be strictly administrative, and it may be quasi judicial or even judicial, but whoever discharges it does so as part of and/or for or on behalf of this Court. If that be so, the authority concerned cannot be regarded as a tribunal, amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227. Under this Article the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over itself and the tribunal, amenable to it under that Article, must be a part from it. That Article was never meant to authorise the High Court to revise its own decision or the decision of a tribunal, acting for it or as part of it.'

In Udey Singh Todar Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1971 Punj & Hary 284, it was observed by the Division Bench (Para 14) :

'......no such petition under Articles 226and 227 of the Constitution is competent in this Court against a judgment of this very Court by a learned Single Judge against which this petitioner filed his petition. No direction could be issued in connection with a judgment of a learned Single Judge in this very Court. The petition under those Articles of the Constitution could not proceed to review the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. But if a review application was intended by this petitioner of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, then it should have been filed in the form of such application which would, in the normal course, have been placed before the learned Single Judgeconcerned, or, in his absence, before another single Judge.'

We are, therefore, of the view that the applications assailing the decisions of this Court are not maintainable.

4. The second objection of the learned Advocate General has also substantial force. The land was acquired for the purpose of the Union of India, who is not the aggrieved party before us. Any employee of the Union of India cannot institute the proceedings. The petitioner before us is not the aggrieved party. He does not, therefore, possess the standing to initiate the action. Both the objections, therefore, prevail and we dismiss the writ application, but without costs.

S.C. Mohapatra, J.

5. I agree.


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