G.K. Misra, J.
1. Plaintiff's are the petitioners The suit was for recovery of possession and for subsequent mesne profits and for recovery of future mesne profits till the delivery of the suit land Shorn of irrelevant details, the relevant facts are The suit was dismissed by the trial Court The lower appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the plaintiffs' suil with cost The exact decretal order is to the effect 'plaintiff's suit stands decreed with costs'. The second appeals filed against the appellate decree were dismissed. On the basis of the decree obtained, plaintiffs filed an application under Order 20 Rule 12, Code of Civil Procedure for determination of mesne profits from the date of the suit till 22-1-57 when they obtained delivery of possession A counter was filed by the defendants alleging, amongst many other grounds that the relief of mesne profits claimed in the plaint was not expressly granted by the decree and shall be deemed to have been refused. The trial Court rejected this objection. In apppeal the learned District Judge unheld the defendants' objection and reversed the judgment of the trial Court. The Civil Revision is against the order of the learned District Judge.
2. Mr Tripathy advanced two contentions:
(i) No appeal lay to the District Judge against the order of the trial Court: and
(ii) Plaintiffs' suit having been decreed, the relief of future mesne profits shall not be deemed to have been refused.
3. Mr. Panda contends that the order passed by the trial Court was not appealable. The application under Order 20 Rule 12 for determination of future mesne profits had been granted. Until mesne profits are determined and final decree is passed on such determination, the order does not amount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2). C P. C. finally and conclusively determining rights of the parties. Under Order 43, C. P. C. also, no appeal lies against such order Mr. Patnaik's contention is well founded in law On this ground alone, the judgment of the learned District Judge is liable to be quashed.
On merits also the view of the learned District Judge cannot be supported. Law is well settled that where there is no ambiguity in the terms of a decree. Court is bound to interpret it according to its plain meaning and cannot ignore its terms. Where, however there is any ambiguity in the decree, court may and should construe the decree in order to ascertain its precise meaning. For this purpose, it may refer to the judgment and pleadings in the case (See AIR 1951 SC 189 and AIR 1960 SC 388'
4. In this case, the decree is very clear. It is in general terms that the suit stands decreed. It only means that all the reliefs asked for in the plaint, have been decreed There is no room for referring to judgment in such cases.
Mr. Patnaik very strongly contended that in the body of the judgment there is at all no discussion regarding future mesne profits. In order to grant a decree for future mesne profits, it is not always and in every case necessary to have an express discussion (sic) in the body of the judgment for that purpose. Plaintiffs' case of defendants being in unlawful and forcible possession having been accepted, they are entitled to past mesne profits and future mesne profits from the date of the suit till the date of recovery of possession. The legal position being absolutely clear, a Court of fact need not discuss in the body of judgment-that the plaintiffs are entitled to future mesne profits The relief of future mesne profits directly flowed from the conclusion of unauthorised and unlawful possession.
5. Mr. Patnaik placed strong reliance on certain observations in AIR 1958 Pat 448 and AIR 1960 Pat 260. Those observations are of general nature and are clearly distinguishable in the facts of those cases. He also placed reliance on (1893) ILR 21 Cal 252 and AIR 1964 Orissa 202. In those two cases, possession and future mesne profits were prayed for. The decree in express terms granted the relief of possession. Their Lordships construed those decrees as having refused the relief of future mesne profits. In this case, the decree is of a general nature and does not differentiate between different reliefs asked for. If Mr. Patnaik's contention is accepted, it would necessarily lead to the irresistible conclusion that the relief of possession shall be decreed to have been refused even though the suit has been decreed. Despite sufficient opportunity having been given, Mr. Patnaik was unable to cite a single decision wherein a certain relief was construed to have been refused when it was granted in general terms.
6. Mr Patnaik placed strong reliance on Explanation V to Section 11, C. P. C. The Explanation says that any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purpose of this Section be deemed to have been refused. The underlined expression unequivocally says that the Explanation is to be confined to question of res judicata covered by Section 11. This Explanation throws no light on the principle of construction of a decree. If any particular decree expressly grants certain reliefs and is silent about the other reliefs the Explanation can be invoked in a subsequent proceeding in respect of a defence of res judicata. About that principle there is no doubt.
7. Order 20 Rule 12, C.P.C. deals with decrees for possession and mesne profits. Rule 12 (1) (c) (1) lays down that the Court may pass a decree directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until the delivery of possession to the decree-holder. In this case, the decree does not give such express direction in accordance with the terms of Order 20, Rule 12(1) (c) (i) though the decree grants future mesne profits. The omission of a direction in accordance with Rule 12 does not affect the validity of the decree granting future mesne profits. The direction for an enquiry merely amounts to an act of ministerial nature and would not affect the validity of the decree or the jurisdiction of the Court to give such direction in the final decree proceedings.
8. I accordingly uphold both the contentions of the petitioners, set aside the judgment of the learned District Judge and restore that of the trial Court,
9. The Civil Revision is allowed with costs througout. Hearing fee Rs. 50/- (fifty rupees only).