B.K. Behera, J.
1. The petitioners invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure (the 'Code', for short) to quash the charge framed against them under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Sub divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bargarh, after examination of three witnesses for the complainant-opposite party and the revisional order passed by the learned Additional. Sessions Judge upholding the order framing charge against the petitioners, while annulling the charge against the co-accused Mahabir Prasad Jajodia, the proprietor of Shree Hanuman Rice Mill at Sasan in the district of Sambalpur. The petitioner Dinesh Kumar is the son of Mahabir Prasad while the other petitioner Lalit Kumar is his brother.
2. Shree Hanurnan Rice Mill entered into an agreement with the opposite party for the purchase of oil out of bran manufactured by the latter in its granular fertiliser plant at Bargarh. According to the terms, the rice mill was to deposit ten percent of the price or the oil in the shape of a Bank Draft with the General Manager of the plant. After wagons were made available, bran oil was to be loaded and out of the balance price, eighty percent was to be paid by the rice mill in the shape of a Bank Draft and thereafter, the Railway Receipt was to be handed over to the rice mill. The balance ten percent was to be paid within seven days after finalisation of the report of the analysts. The General Manager of the opposite party dispatched the bran oil in two wagons and obtained two Railway Receipts dated 29. 12. 1978. The rice mill sent a cheque for Rs. 1. 48, 000/- through the petitioners and on 28. 12. 1978. The petitioners met the General Manager of the plant and made over the cheque representing the same to have been signed by Mahabir Prasad Jajodia to be drawn on the Union Bank of India, Sambalpur, in favour of the opposite party towards the price of eighty percent of the bran oil loaded in the two wagons and gave out that as the Bank employees were on strike, it was not possible to obtain a Bank Draft for the amount payable to the opposite party. Believing the statements made by the two petitioners to be true and on their inducement, the General Manager of the opposite party, in good faith, accepted the cheque and handed over the Railway Receipts to the petitioner Dinesh Kumar. When the cheque was presented for collection, the Bank returned it with the remark that the drawer's signatures differed from the signature on the cheque and it could not be encashed. There after, the General Manager of the opposite party requested the petitioners and Mahabir Prasad Jajodia for payment of money and did not succeed to get its dues in spite of many reminders. It was learnt that the petitioners and Mahabir Prasad Jajodia did not have to their credit the amount of Rs. 1, 48, 000/- in the Union Bank of India at the time of issue of the cheque. These were the allegations made against the petitioners and the co-accused Mahabir Prasad Jajodia.
3. After examination of three witnesses, a charge was framed against all the three accused person. According to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mahabir Prasad Jajodia could not be said to have had a hand in the commission of the offence as he had not signed the cheque. He observed that although the petitioners did not have to their credit an amount of Rs. 1. 48, 000/- for which the cheque had been issued, it could not be of much help to the prosecution as the evidence of P. W. 3 was that the petitioners could draw a cheque upto a limit of Rs. 3. 00, 000/- by way of over draft. With regard to the subsequent demand for payment of the amount, the evidence was too vague, as observed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Taking in to consideration the fact that the two petitioners had handed over the cheque which did not contain the signature of Mahabir Prasad Jajodia and the Railway Receipts had been handed over to them on the false representations made by them, it was he'd that the charge framed against these two parsons could not be said to be groundless and the truth could be ascertained at the time of trial.
4. Mr. B.B. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the materials placed before the learned Sub divisional Judicial Magistrate by the opposite party could not sustain a criminal charge under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the two Petitioners and it is a fit case in which the impugned order of charge framed against them and the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge maintaining the charge should be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. K. C. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the opposite party, has invited my attention to the evidence on record and has contended that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a charge and this is not a fit case in which this Court should, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, quash the impugned charge.
5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has rightly found that an order framing a charge is not an interlocutory one and a revision against such an order is maintainable. (see AIR 1980 Supreme Court 962 V.C. Shukla v. State through C. B. I., 1983 (1) Crimes 357 Khirod alias Khirodra Debata v. State of Orissa and 55 (1983) C. L. T. 565 Kamaljit Singh v. State of Orissa). After holding that the revision was maintainable, the learned Additional Sessions Judge considered the contentions raised by both the side in the light of the evidence on record and held that there were materials against the two petitioners for framing a charge. The fact remains that the two petitioner's presented a cheque which contained the signature of a person whose admitted signatures did not tally with it. No doubt, P. W. 3 had made a statement that at times, even the genuine signature appeared not to be tallying with the specimen one. These are, however, matters to be gone in to after the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. The order framing a charge is, no doubt, an important and sacrosanct act and it should be framed after due and proper consideration of the materials placed against an accused person before the court. But at the stage of charge, the court is not to enter into a meticulous consideration of the evidence and the materials placed before it. The test which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not to be applied at the stage of deciding as to whether a charge is to be framed. At that stage, the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused. If there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (See AIR 1977 Supreme Court 2018 State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh) The Supreme Court has reiterated the same view in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 52: 1979 Cri. L. J. 1390 Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja and others and has held that at the stage of framing a charge, even a very strong suspicion founded upon the materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of the charge against the accused in respect of commission of that offence. The same view has been taken in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1548 Mahd. Akbar Das and Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors., by observing that at the stage of charge, the court canny; enter into a meticulous consideration of the evidence and the materials keeping in mind these principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the learned Sub divisional Judicial Magistrate had no jurisdiction of justification to frame a charge against the petitioners.
6. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court is to be exercised to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court or for the ends of justice. The petitioners, 'after unsuccessfully moving the Court of Session, have prayed for the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court because a second revision by the same party does not lie. A statutory bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Code barring a criminal revision against an interlocutory order of the provision contained in Section 397(3) of the Code barring a second criminal revision by the same person may not stand in the way of the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code. This power is, however, to be exercised in rare and exceptional cases where it is necessary in the interests of justice. In view of what has been stated above, it is not a fit case in which this Court should, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction quash the charge and the impugned orders passed by the learned Sub divisional Judicial Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge.
7. In the result, the application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is rejected and the Miscellaneous case stands dismissed.