G.B. Pattnaik, J.
1. This is an application invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to expunge a portion of the judgment of the learned Magistrate dated 8. 11. 1982.
2. On an application filed by one Asali Dei and her minor son under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same was registered as Criminal Misc. Case No. 1 of 1979 in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rairakhole. In the said application, the petitioners claimed maintenance from the opposite party-husband, Chakradhar Pradhan. The present petitioner is the counsel appearing for the said Chakradhar Pradhan in the aforesaid case. The learned Magistrate who tried the case while delivering judgment has made certain remarks in the judgment against the present petitioner. The petitioner has, therefore, filed this application praying to expunge the said remarks.
3. Mr. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the 'earned Magistrate has made some sweeping and disparaging remarks against the counsel appearing for the husband in the maintenance case which have no relevance to the point in issue before the Magistrate and for which the evidence on record does not justify. He relies on several authorities of this Court as also of the Supreme Court on this point. I would, however, refer to two of them for the purpose of this case.
4. In the case of The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 703, their Lordships have observed that the High Court can in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction expunge remarks made by it or by lower Court if it be necessary to do so to prevent abuse of process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held thus :
'...If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this : the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody even by this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made, It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself ; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks ; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must, be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.'
In the case of Harihara Bahinipati v. State of Orissa, 40 (1974) C. L. T., 434, a learned Judge of this Court held :
'Judges of all categories while writing out judgments have to express their opinion regarding the veracity, conduct and character of a witness as borne out by the evidence on record. They should be able to freely express their reaction to any unusual conduct of a witness in relation to matters in question. But while expressing their opinion on such matters they should not indulge in making unnecessary references about facts which do not at all require consideration for deciding the case before them. Remarks, observations or reference to facts, which are absolutely not necessary for the decision of the matter before the Judge, should be scrupulously avoided. Judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and anything which does not directly arise for the consideration of the case before the Court, need not be mentioned in the judgment. Judges are not expected to play to the gallery and to express anything in their judgments and orders which are absolutely of no relevance for the decision of the case. At times of course the unusual conduct or underserving of unbecoming attitude of certain witnesses, specially when they belong to the public services, have to be highlighted in the judgments, may be in a manner not strictly necessary for the decision of the case, but that can be done only with the sole intention and the salutary purpose of preventing repetition or recurrence of such reprehensible conduct or attitude on their part affecting administration of justice'
5. Applying the tests laid down in the aforesaid two decisions to the impugned judgment of the learned Magistrate, I find that the remarks made by the Magistrate in third sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 of his judgment, to the effect :
'Presently, a middle aged lawyer with a protruding mouth, wide and snubbed nose popped up and roared out something of something like a meteor blazing in the darkness and turning into cold, lightless ashes. When nobody took in his words, he fell on his seat trying not to look offended. Mumbling some thing to himself in dissatisfaction he looked about = his face bobbing up and down = sneaked a look at his wrist watch, upped and then walked off, limping.'
are wholly unwarranted, unnecessary and irrelevant and have no nexus with the point in issue. In fact, when this matter came up for admission, by order dated 23.3. 1983, this Court had directed the learned Magistrate to explain how the portions quoted in the petition were relevant in the disposal of the case and the learned Magistrate had replied to the effect that he had given the description of the Court scene as he found for the day. He further stated that with no malice towards anybody he had given a small sketch of the Court drama spiced with humour with a feeling that the observation would make the judgment gay and cheerful. A Magistrate is required to apply his mind to the points of dispute before him and try to answer the points raised by appreciating the evidence adduced before him keeping in mind the law on the subject. He must realise that he is pronouncing a judgment and not writing a drama and, therefore, depiction of the Court scene or sketching the character of the counsel appearing for the parties is wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and is absolutely unwarranted. The Magistrate must know that the weight of his judgment depends upon his analysis of facts his appreciation of evidence and his clarity of thought and not upon the language used by him which at times does not convey any meaning. An advocate appearing for a party is neither a party to the proceeding nor a witness and, therefore, the Magistrate should not cast any aspersion as to how he conducted himself in the proceeding particularly when it has no relevance to the points in issue. The portion of the judgment of the Magistrate quoted by me supra, in my opinion, is uncalled for and unjustified and, therefore, must be expunged in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court.
5. In the result, therefore, I would expunge the portion of the judgment in the third sub-paragraph of paragraph 22 of the judgment of the learned Magistrate beginning from 'Presently a middle aged lawyer...' and ending with '... and then walked off, limping.'
This Criminal Misc. Case is accordingly allowed.