B.N. Misra, J.
1. This revision is directed against the order dated 22.7.1982 passed by learned Munsif, in M.J.C. No. 7 of 1982, dismissing the petitioner's application under Section 47 read with Section 151 C.P.C.
2. The following facts are not in dispute. The petitioner is a Monthly tenant under the opposite party in respect of a house in Jeypore town which belongs to the opposite party. The opposite party filed House Rent Control Case No. 11 of 1976 in the Court of the House Rent Controller, Jeypore, against the petitioner for eviction. The ground on which eviction was sought was that the petitioner was a willful defaulter in the matter of payment of house rent and as such liable to be evicted under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). On 10.8.1979 the petitioner and the opposite party filed the following joint compromise petition :
'COMPROMISE PETITION FILED BY BOTH PARTIES RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH:-
That both parties have agreed and compromised to the terms and conditions as laid down below:
1. That the O.P. Sri D. Tirupati Rao today paid the entire admitted arrear rents. The amount has been paid today.
2. The opposite party will continue to occupy the same house and pay the monthly rent of Rs. 103/- (One hundred and three only) per month. This will commence from 20.8.1979 and rent is payable in every month on or before of 20th of each succeeding month.
3. The deposit amount of Rs. 500/-will be with the petitioner and the said amount is refundable when the O.P. vacates the house and hand over the key to the petitioner on 20.8.1981.
4. The opposite party will occupy the house from 20.8.1979 to 20. 8.1981.
5. The O. P. is to use the common well and Kutcha latrine from. 20. 8.1979 to 20.8.1981.
6. The petitioner agrees to pay Rs. 20/-(Rupees twenty only) per year for white washing the said house.
7. The both parties agreed to this and pray the Honourable Court to pass a compromise decree accordingly.
8. The petitioner has the liberty to execute the eviction proceedings if the O. P. default, any of the conditions laid down above.Sd/- D. Tirupati Rao Sd/- B. Gopal Rao20.8.1979 20.8.1979opposite party petitionerSd/- B. Ch. Ponda, Sd/- Illegible20.8.1979 20.8.1979Advocate for O.P. Adv. for the petitioner.'
On the same day the learned House Rent Controller passed the following order :
'Both the parties arc present. They filed a joint petition for compromise, the petition is read over and explained to the parties to which they admit to be correct in terms of compromise the petition is allowed. Compromise petition to from a part of this order.
Sd/- S.C. Misra,
As the petitioner did not vacate the house on 20.8.1981 as per his undertaking in the joint compromise petition, the opposite party filed Execution Proceeding No. 102 of 1981 in the Court of the learned Munsif, Jeypore, seeking eviction of the petitioner. During the pendency of the execution case, the petitioner filed an application under Sections 47 and 151, C.P.C, praying for dismissal of the execution proceeding on the ground that the order of compromise recorded by the learned House Rent Controller in H.R.C. Case No. 11 of 1976 was void and illegal as it did not indicate the satisfaction of the learned Controller that the grounds of eviction laid down in Section7 of the Act existed. This application of the petitioner was registered as M.J.C. No. 7 of 1982. The opposite party in his counter stated that the order of the learned Controller passed on the joint compromise petition filed by the parties fully met the requirements of Section 7 of the Act. After hearing the parties, the learned Munsif overruled the objection of the petitioner and dismissed his application. That order is under challenge in this revision.
3. Mr. S.K. Padhi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, assailed the order of the learned Munsif mainly on the ground that the order on the face of it did not indicate the satisfaction of the learned Controller as to the grounds of eviction provided in Section 7 of the Act. On the other hand, Mr. P.V. Ramdas, learned counsel for the opposite party, submitted that the impugned order was not in violation of the Act and on the face of it showed that the landlord' was entitled to eviction under Section 7 of the Act.
4. In this context it would be useful to refer to the following decisions of the Supreme Court where points similar to the ones arising in this case had been considered and decided. The first case is A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838-Smt. Kaushalya Devi and Ors. v. K.L. Bansal.
In that case on the basis of a compromise petition filed by the parties, the Court recorded the following order :
'In view of the statement of the parties' counsel and the written compromise, a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant'
Relying upon an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1969) 1 SCWR 51 the Supreme Court held that the decree passed by Court was in contravention of Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act because the Court had passed the decree in terms of the award without satisfying itself if the ground of eviction existed.
In A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2130-Roshan Lal and Anr. v. Madan Lal and Ors. the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was noticed and it was observed.
'In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant whose tenancy is governed by any Rent Restriction or Eviction Control Act the suitor must make out a case for eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Act. When the suit is contested the issue goes to trial. The Court passes a decree for eviction only if it is satisfied on evidence that a ground for passing such a decree in accordance with the requirement of the Statute has been established. Even when the trial proceeds ex parte, this is so. If however, parties choose to enter into a compromise due to any reason such as to avoid the risk of protracted litigating expenses, it is open to them to do so. The Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In other words, parties, cannot be permitted to have a tenant's eviction merely by agreement without anything more. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law.'
In A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 22-Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan and Ors. it was observed :
'......It is also well-settled that if the Court does not find the permissible grounds for eviction disclosed in the pleadings and other materials on the record no consent or compromise will give jurisdiction to the Court to pass a valid decree of eviction.'
* * * *
'When a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity in the course of its execution the executing Court can examine relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law. If the pleadings and other materials on the record make out a prima facie case about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction a compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid and the executing Court will have to give effect to it.'
5. The principles enunciated in the aforesaid decision must govern the present case. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party has referred to the first and eighth paragraphs of the joint compromise petition filed in H.R.C. Case No. 11 of 1976. In the first Paragraph it is stated that the present petitioner has paid to the opposite; party the entire admitted arrear rent and in the eighth paragraph it is noted that the opposite party may execute the eviction proceeding if the petitioner defaulted in performing any of the conditions laid down in the compromise petition. It is submitted that the entire compromise petition was directed to form a part of the final order passed by the learned House Rent Controller. In para one of the compromise petition the petitioner clearly admitted that he was in arrears and at default in the matter of payment of house rent. This position he accepted, then agreed to pay and did pay the arrears on the date the compromise petition was filed in Court. This contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party must be upheld. In the compromise petition there is clear admission by the opposite party that he was in arrears in the matter of payment of rent and he confirmed his own admission by actual payment of the defaulted amount of rent and the H.R.C. case was disposed of on the basis of this compromise.
6. The impugned order shows that the learned Munsif considered the respective cases of the parties, applied his mind to the materials available on record and came to the conclusion that the objection of the petitioner as to the maintainability of execution proceeding must be rejected. The said order of the learned Munsif does not suffer from any jurisdictional error and as such does not call for interference by this Court in, exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
7. In the result, this revision which has no merit is rejected with costs. The order of the learned Munsif is confirmed.