1. The goods which are the subject-matter of controversy in the present appeal, are described by the appellant, who is the manufacturer thereof, as "Hub-Bolts and Nuts". Prior to 1-3-1979, Tariff Item 34A of the Central Excise Tariff, as then prevailing, covered "all parts and accessories of motor vehicles not otherwise specified". However, by virtue of Notification No. 99/71-C.E., dated 29-5-1971, as amended from time to time, that enumerated 12 items, as specified motor vehicle parts, excepting the items covered by the said Notification, all others were exempt from duty. The appellant went on clearing the subject goods accordingly, availing benefit of the said Notification.
2. However, by means of the Finance Bill covering 1979 Budget, a change was brought in the T.I. 34A inasmuch as it was made to relate to specific items (15 in number), which change became effective with effect from 10-5-1979. The genesis of the dispute giving rise to the present appeal can be traced to this change in the Tariff.
3. The Department appears to have taken the view that T.I. 34A having become restrictive, covering 15 specified parts, the entry which would now be attracted to these goods manufactured by the appellant; namely, "hub-bolts and nuts", required re-classification which would be T.I.52, which applied, to all 'bolts and nuts', which entry, in their view, was more specific as compared to the general entry of T.I. 68 which was a residuary item, and could be considered only when the specific entry positively excluded the goods in question.
4. Consequently, a Show Cause Notice dated 3-6-1981 was issued to the appellants requiring them to show cause as to why these goods which they were classifying under T.I. 68 be not re-classified with reference to T.I. 52 and as to why differential duty amounting to Rs. 1,75,404.86 covering the period 1-11-1980 to 30-4-1981 be not recovered. The Department invoked Section 11A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) while issuing the said notice. Another notice dated 5-9-1981 covering the earlier period 1-6-1979 to 31-10-1980 was issued on the same assertions and a demand on account of differential duty for clearances effected during this period amounting to Rs. 4,14,363,24 was made, again by reference to Section 11 A. The appellants contested both these notices, vide their reply filed on 4-6-1981 and 7-9-1981 respectively. While resisting the view of the Department on merits by urging that T.I. 52 applied to bolts and nuts of general use and character, and could not be attracted to their special items which were built specifically for motor vehicles with given specifications and a positive functional use to be fitted only with hubs of motor vehicles, it was contended that T.I. 52 was not applicable, and since T.I. 34A covered only specified items, that too would not apply and consequently, these hub-bolts and nuts which they characterised as motor vehicle, parts, would go under the residuary Item 68 only. They placed reliance on Budget instructions issued immediately after the change in the Tariff Heading while introducing amendment to Item 34A of the Tariff in the Finance Bill of 1979 and the subsequent notification issued by the Government of India, being Notification No. 76/79, dated 1-3-1979, exempting all motor vehicle parts which were not covered by Item 34A, as proposed to be amended, were to be charged to duty @ 8 per cent only, and it was pleaded that the intention was thus made clear that all other auto parts other than those specified under Item 34A would go under T.I. 68.
5. It was further asserted that the motor vehicle parts under reference had essential functional utility other than that of mere fastening; so much so, that this fastening was only incidental. Reliance was placed in this connection on the advice issued by the Central Board of Excise & Customs (hereinafter referred to as the Board) vide Tariff Advice No.5/77, dated 25-2-1977. They further asserted that these hub-bolts, apart from discharging the function of fastening, had other engineering features which help in transmission of motion to the wheels through the axle shaft and thus it was an erroneous assumption on the part of the Department to treat them at par with bolts and nuts of general character.
6. In addition to contesting the view of the Department on the basic question of classification, they further asserted that the notices which were issued to them with reference to Section 11A of the Act, were barred by time inasmuch as this section came into existence with effect from 17-11-1980 and in no case could be invoked for the period prior to said date; besides pleading, that there was no suppression of facts and that they have been openly clearing goods after submitting classification lists showing these items as falling under T.I. 68, which lists were duly approved by the Assistant Collector and further R.T. 12 Returns which were submitted regularly by the party showing clearances of the said goods under T.I. 68, were also passed after assessment of duty with reference to said entry and consequently the demand could not now be raised covering the past clearances.
7. These notices were disposed of by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Kakinada by order dated 21/24-8-1982 whereby he considered the replies filed by the party to both the Show Cause Notices and after giving due consideration to the submission made during personal hearing, came to the conclusion that the basic function performed by these hub-bolts and nuts was that of fastening and that they did not have any other utility than to act as fasteners, and that so was the understanding of these articles in the commercial sense. He further observed that those dealing in such goods treated them only as bolts and nuts and did not advert to any engineering features, and whatever those might be, they were only with a view to ensure that these hub-bolts and nuts perform the required function of fastening, and that they were, duly threaded or tapped for the purpose of acting as fasteners, and that they had to be classified only under T.I. 52 which covered generally all bolts/nuts and that this specific entry has to get preference over the general residuary Item 68. He thus sonfirmed the view as expressed by the two notices to the effect that after the change in T.I. 34A in the Budget for 1979, these articles were specifically covered by T.I. 52.
8. He, however, partially conceded the contention of the party on the question of limitation by taking note of the fact that Section 11A had come into operation with effect from 17-11-1980 and it could not have retrospective operation in the absence of any indication to the contrary and in that view of the matter, the period covered by the second notice dated 5-9-1981 from 1-6-1979 to 31-10-1980, was barred by time. Accordingly, the demand for differential duty made by this notice was completely dropped. For the period 1-11-1980 to 30-4-1981, he observed that even the duty which was payable for the clearances made in October 1980 was payable under the rules in the first week of November 1980 and in that view of the matter, the relevant time for making demand for differential duty commenced in November 1980 and consequentially, the period covered by the first notice, namely dated 3-6-1981, could be completely coveted by reference to Section 11A of the Act and thus the demand for differential duty amounting to Rs. 1,75,404.86, for the period 1-11-1980 to 30-4-1981 was confirmed.
9. The party went in appeal against this order, to the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Madras who disposed of the same by order dated 10-1-1983 whereby he dismissed the appeal holding that party's contention that the function of fastening was only incidental, could not be accepted and observed that even if it be assumed that these goods possessed essential utility for transmission of revolution to the wheels and final movement of a motor vehicle, they had first to be securely fastened in order to achieve the desired object and so they could be treated nothing else as fasteners. He further noted that T.I.52 did not recognise any distinction between bolts, nuts and screws used for a motor vehicle as against those bolts and nuts which the appellant described to be of general use, holding further that this T.I. 52 was more specific with reference to bolts and nuts as against the general residuary Item 68, there was thus no further pi ace for considering the test of common parlance. As a result, the order of the Assistant Collector was upheld.10. It is against this order that the party has filed the present appeal to the Tribunal under Section 35P of the Act assailing the order passed by the Appellate Collector, confirming the classification of the goods under T.I. 52. The statement of facts reproduced the history of T.I. 34A read with notifications issued from time to time as also the change brought into effect by the amendment in 1979. It was contended that prior to this amendment, these goods were treated as "auto parts, not elsewhere specified", and that this was in spite of the fact that T.I. 52 existed even at that time, in the same form as at present, and irrespective of the existence of this entry. It was thus contended that the Budget of 1979 could not be considered to have brought about any change in the position and thus hub-bolts and nuts remain still as auto parts but not being not covered by the 15 times specifically enumerated in T.I. 34A, they would go to the residuary Item 68. Reliance was placed on the Budget instructions issued as a sequel to the amendment, as also notifications Nos. 76/79 and 77/79 and also a note recorded by the then Chairman of the Board in F. No. 16/17/80-CX. I, dated 14-7-1981, following the meeting held with the representatives of the Punjab Auto Parts Manufacturers Association. The relevant portion of the said Note was also reproduced, which reads as under : - "If they were fasteners the fact that they had special sizes or characteristics, or had been specially manufactured for use in motor vehicles, 4 would not save them from assessment under T.I. 52. If an article had some of the characteristics of a bolt nut or screw, but the essential functional utility was other than as a fastener, and the fastening was incidental, it would not be classifiable under Item 52 and would therefore in the absence of any other specific item fall under T.I. 68." Repeated emphasis was placed on the distinct functional utility of these hub-bolts and nuts as automobile parts, pleading that their role as fasteners was only incidental. It was asserted that the essential utility of these goods was transmission of revolution to the wheels, and final movement of the motor vehicles and that even the Appellate Collector has recognised this position by making specific observation to that effect. The appellant thus plead that once it was conceded by the Appellate Collector himself that these hub-bolts and nuts possessed the essential utility of transmission of motion to the wheels and finally to the vehicle, there was error in his conclusion that they still remain basically fasteners, as, in their view, the essential functional utility could not be ignored.
11. The appeal also made reference to the advice given by the Development Officer, Directorate General (Technical Development), on being consulted by the Board to the effect that these hub-bolts and nuts were vital parts which transmit motion to the wheels and certain engineering features were incorporated into these bolts and nuts, and that they could not fall under the general definition of a bolt and nut. It was urged that it was in view of this clear advice that the Board had given the ruling that they were to be classified with reference to T.I. 68. The appellant also relied on some previous Orders-in-Appeal, one being that passed by the Appellate Collector, Madras in his Order-in-Appeal dated 27-11-1973 holding that these hub-bolts and nuts had a distinct functional utility, as automobile parts, and could not be treated exclusively as fasteners, and also to another order passed by the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi in 1972 holding the same view. It was pointed out that these two Appellate Collectors had decided the issues on the same principles as enunciated by the Chairman of the Board in his note dated 14-7-1981.
12. The appellant further pleaded that the only effect of the amendment was that the parts which were first enumerated in Notification No.71/79, dated 29-5-1971 came to be brought under the Tariff Entry itself, with the result that the remaining parts of motor vehicles which were previously entirely exempt from duty by virtue of said notification had to be re-classified and since they remain a category of motor vehicle parts, "not anywhere else specified", they had to be taken to T.I. 68, and so was the clarification given by the Government; firstly, by Budget Instructions, followed by Notification No. 76/79 issued on 1-3-1979. They further pleaded that the Appellate Collector had erred in holding that in view of the existing T.I. 52 which, according to him, was very specific with reference to bolts, nuts and screws etc., the test of common trade parlance was not relevant inasmuch as it had always to be kept in view, and since these hub-bolts and nuts could never be understood in ordinary commercial parlance as anything other than automobile parts; they had wrongly been held to be classifiable under T.I. 52. Reference was made to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts as well as of Government of India laying stress on common parlance test. They thus asserted that the correct way of classification of goods was to keep in view the fact as to how those particular goods were known to the trade and to people who deal in them, and asserted that in case a person had to purchase hub-bolts/nuts, he will have to approach a dealer in motor vehicle parts and that it will not even strike to him to go to a hardware shop dealer for purchasing this particular item. This, they pleaded, was the common trade parlance test, and the lower authorities have fallen into error in ignoring the same. The appellant pleaded that even the very name of these items signified that they were having a distinct character as parts of motor vehicles, and consequently, they could not, by any test of usual commercial parlance, be treated to be of such general character, as nuts and bolts covered by T.I. 52.
13. On the appeal being taken up for hearing, Shri L.C. Mittal, Advocate appearing for the appellants, reiterated all these contentions, as reproduced above. Although he made it clear at the outset that he was not relying on the letter dated 15-7-1981 enclosing an extract from a Note, purported to have been recorded by the Chairman of the Board, and not even on the enclosures appended with the said letter, and conceded that they may be ignored but he very strenuously argued that the departmental view that these hub-bolts and nuts were classifiable under T.I. 52 was wholly unsustainable. He explained that the appellant was manufacturer of a number of automobile parts, including hub-bolts and nuts, which are being treated exclusively as auto parts. In this connection, he made reference to the cataloogue issued by the appellant in respect to the products manufactured by them, including these goods, a copy whereof was placed on record, duly authenticated by him, and contended that the very specification and descriptions of these items which figure at pages 4, 8 and 11 of the said catalogue made it manifest that they were correlated only to automobiles, and had no other significance. He further emphasised that they were such specific items that even the front hub-bolt had separate specifications than that of the rear and even the one for the right wheel was different from that of the left, and that although they were threaded and tapped, they had other special engineering features which took them out of the general category of bolts and nuts, and lent them the essential character of being part of automobiles.
14. The learned counsel further laid stress on the test of common parlance, as recognised by judicial authorities, and contended that the trade dealing with subject goods had a distinct notion about functions of these goods; namely, as parts of the motor vehicles only, and that neither a hardware shop dealer would stock such articles nor any person wanting to purchase the same would even think of going to such a dealer. He invited pointed attention to the fact that Tariff Item 5.2 which the department is now applying to these items, was in existence since 1971 but nevertheless these hub-bolts and nuts had been classified throughout with reference to Item 34A, and that the view was sought to be altered only as a consequence of the change brought by Budget of 1979 but that, according to him, did not make any material change inasmuch as the parts which were previously specified in Notification No. 99/71 came to be enumerated in the Tariff Item itself but this would not entail any change for the other unspecified parts, and that they have to be continued to be treated as auto parts as before.
15. He further contended that it was not open to the excise authorities to change the classification without any justification and without any material change, which, according to his submissions, has not been brought about, as earlier pointed out, and in this connection, he placed reliance on a Bench decision of the Tribunal reported as 1983 ELT 816 (CEGAT) in the case of Mukund Engineering Works v. Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad. According to him, the onus was on the Department to establish cogent reasons for changing classification which, they had failed to discharge in the present case inasmuch as in spite of the fact that no factual change had resulted from the amendment, the departmental authorities had taken upon themselves to reclassify the goods and that this they could not do, for which contention he again relied on a Bench decision reported as 1983 ELT 1170 (Indian Tubes Manufacturers Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Pune). He reiterated at the end that T.I. 52 would apply only to bolts and nuts of general use and character, but not to special goods, like the present ones, and that since they were not specifically covered by any of the other tariff items, namely 1-67, they would automatically go to the residuary Item 68. He further contended that wherever there was an intention to specify particular parts, separately, that has been done in the tariff itself, and in this connection, he referred to T.Is.
29 and 31 covering internal combustion engines and electric batteries respectively; the contention being that those parts of the automobiles, which have not been specified in any of the tariff heading, they had to be treated as goods "not elsewhere specified". He referred to the entries in the parallel tariff, namely, Customs Tariff Act, 1975 in support of his contention that a provision had to be made by way of explanation, in respect to entry 73.32, whereby the intention to include bolts and nuts used in the motor parts, also under that general heading, was made explicit and the very fact that this explanation was found necessary in the Customs Tariff, as revealed by Explanatory Notes to Chapter XV, makes it unmistakably clear that they would not be so treated but for this provision having been made in the relevant tariff itself.
16. He also placed reliance on Explanatory Notes to CCCN, Chapters 73 and 87 in support of his assertion that these hub-bolts and nuts could not be treated, as general items, but were essentially parts of the automobiles and urged that where the tariff does not define any expression used therein, reference to the CCCN, by way of guidelines was expedient, and in support of this contention, he referred to another Bench decision of the Tribunal; namely, 1983 ELT 1192(CEGAT) in the case of Pyrites Phosphates & Chemicals Limited, v. C.C.E., Delhi He again made pointed reference to the Budget Instructions reproduced as A-39 clarifying that as a result of the change in T.I. 34A, unspecified goods would go under residuary Item 68.
17. Shri K.D. Tayal, SDR, while replying to the arguments of the learned counsel pointed out that the position which prevailed prior to the amendment of T.I. 34A, which was effective from 1-3-1979, was altogether different because at that time read with Notification No.99/71, Item 34A, by itself covered all parts of motor vehicles : 'not otherwise specified'. In that context, it could be argued that hub-bolts and nuts may also fall under this description. He contended that the position had entirely changed after the amendment and the question now is T.I. 52 versus 68, and since this Item 52 was of wide amplitude covering nuts and bolts, threaded or tapped of every type, and there being no dispute on facts that these hub-bolts and nuts were also theraded and were fastened to the hubs, they have been rightly held to be covered by the specific entry 52 as against the residuary and general entry 68. He contended that although these articles may be having specific functions but these are still marketed as bolts and nuts and he also controverted the contention that these goods were performing functions other than that fastening, and asserted that the function of transmission of power was not performed by these bolts or nuts and that it was the hub or hub drum that lent motion to the wheels.
18. He further argued that 'end use' was not material, unless the tariff item itself contemplated such requirement, and so long as the goods performed the basic function of fastening, they had to be treated as covered by T.I. 52. He pointed out that no literature to show the function or description of these hub-bolts had been placed on record and that the catalogue revealed that the emphasis was entirely on the character of the goods as 'bolts' and nowhere the alleged engineering features had been indicated. He strongly contented that in face of a specific tariff entry, the appellants' plea for taking them to the residuary item 68 was not tenable and deserved to be rejected. He distinguished the authorities cited by the learned counsel by urging that all that the Tribunal held in the case of Mukund Engineering Works was that unless there was any change in material facts or relevant tariff entry had undergone some modification, the previous classification could not be changed. He argued that this authority based on the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in J.K. Synthetics case (1981 ELT 328) would not apply to the facts of the present case where there has been admittedly a change in the tariff entry itself, and departmental action for reclassification ensued upon such a change.
In addition to the cited case being distinguishable, he argued that it was otherwise an established proposition that the principle or doctrine of estopple did not apply in taxation matters, and given sufficient reasons and after observing principles of natural justice, such as issue of show cause notice, etc., the classification could certainly be changed. He thus strongly defended the view taken by the lower authorities, which they did after affording all opportunities to the appellants to show cause against the proposed reclassification.
According to him, when the Central Excise Tariff was self-contained, reference to parallel tariff or to the CCCN was not desirable and in support of this contention, he relied on the decision of the Bomby High Court [1980 ELT 291 (Bom.)] in the case of Haldyn Glass Works Pvt. Ltd. v. M.L. Bhadwar where it was laid down that for interpreting entries of the CET, reference to BTN was not necessary, and distinguished the case of Pyrites Phosphates & Chemicals Ltd. decided by the Tribunal urging that it was decided entirely in different context, where the wording of the entries sought to be interpreted was identical word by word to the description given in the Explanatory Notes of the CCCN and where the CET did not provide any self-contained guidance unlike the present case where the tariff item 52, itself, was very specific and that in this situation, reference to parallel or external material was not necessitated.
19. Shri Mittal made a short rejoinder to these arguments by again reiterating that the amendment of 1979 had not brought about any material change except for enumerating some 15 parts specifically which were earlier covered by the notification but in view of the elucidation given simultaneously by means of Budget Instructions, and by issuance of Notifications, such as Notification No. 76/79 dated 1-3-1979, there was no room for entertaining any doubt that these hub-bolts and nuts had to be treated as parts of automobiles, as NES goods to be covered by the residuary Item 68, laying emphasis on the fact that without these bolts, hubs would have no use or function, and these had to be treated as parts or accessories of the motor vehicles.
20. We have given our earnest consideration to the matter, in view of the detailed arguments addressed by learned counsel for the appellants, making reference to Budget Instructions and notifications issued simultaneously with the budget change, and also the emphasis on common trade parlance test as enunciated by a number of judicial authorities referred to by him and the position highlighted by him to the effect that in spite of the existence of T.I. 52 on the statute since 1971, these goods were being treated as parts of automobiles and exempt from excise duty falling within the general description of such automobile parts as were not specifically enumerated in the notification, but nonetheless treated generally as 'NES' goods under T.I. 34A, as it then existed. We have also taken note of the stress laid by him on the fact that these goods are only meant to be fitted on hubs which are part of automobiles and which lend motion to the wheels and also of the fact that the appellant is a manufacturer of automobile parts and these hub-bolts and nuts are also being made especially for motor vehicles.
21. We have carefully examined all these aspects of the matter but we feel that the plea of the appellant that no change can be considered to have taken place after amendment of T.I. 34A, does not impress because it is apparent that an entry which was previously NOS has been now made very specific, and relatable only to specified parts of motor vehicles.
We find justification in the contention put forward by the learned SDR, namely that the contest now is between T.I. 52 which specifically covered bolts and nuts of every description as against the residuary or general entry represented by Item 68. We further find that though the function of these goods as fasteners is patently manifest, the supposed engineering features, whatever they may be, are latent, and neither the catalogue of the appellants contains any indication as to what those could be nor any other literature has been shown, much less produced on record. The Assistant Collector has rightly observed that these features have apparently been built in, so that these bolts and nuts can perform the specific functions as fasteners with the hubs. We do riot find any fault in this observation in the absence of any evidence or technical literature to show that these hub-bolts and nuts perform any function other than that of fasteners, or that they themselves transmit or lend motion to the wheels. In face of this situation and absolute lack of evidence to indicate any other special characteristics of these goods other than that of fasteners, we do not think that the mere passing observations of the Assistant Collector of the Appellate Collector that these goods contain some engineering features would have any bearing on the issue to be decided by us because even as bolts and nuts, these may have been built with some specific specifications, in view of the nature of the use to which they were put, and those specific features would not change their function of fastening, and to that extent the observations of the Appellate Collector are perfectly reconcilable.
22. We are, therefore, of our firm view that after the amendment in 1979, the position has changed materially and there was no bar in the way of departmental authorities to undertake reclassification, in face of the specific Tariff Item, covering bolts and nuts of every type and shape, namely, Entry 52, and examine the assessee's claim for taking them under the residuary Item 68. The case thus falls within the situation as recognised by the decision of the Tribunal in Mukund Engineering case, as well as the basic authority of Delhi High Court in the J.K. Synthetics case, referred to above.
23. Although, we have consistently taken the view that the Tribunal has to come to an independent finding on matters of classification, and not to go by tariff advices, whether issued by the Board or some Collectorates, but since the learned counsel laboriously referred to number of such trade advices and even to a note recorded by the Chairman of the Board and some opinion rendered by the DGTD and also to the Budget Instructions issued immediately after the introduction of the amendment, we feel it our duty to examine the implication of the said material.
24. It is observed that so far as the opinion of the DGTD is concerned, on which the appellants have placed emphatic reliance, it is not indicated in detail as to on what technical data, it could have been based, or which the appellants might have produced before the said authority. In the absence of any material to' indicate as to in what context the said opinion might have been recorded, we do not find it possible to go by the same, on its face value.
25. The Budget Instructions as well as the note of the Chairman of the Board and even the Notification No. 96/79, all proceed on the assumption that the goods have to be parts of the motor vehicles, and in the case of bolts and nuts, the ones which perform a function other than that of fasteners, they could be treated as parts of the motor vehicles. It is to be noted that the burden of establishing this basic requirement was on the appellants; namely, that these particular goods were capable of performing functions, other than that of fasteners and that burden has not been discharged in this case, as already indicated.
We do not think that the appellants could take advantage of any of the above said material. The trade notices of different Collectorates which were of early dates, and some even prior to the amendment, have been superseded by the trade advices issued by the Board itself, reported as 1981 ELT at page 100 and 1982 ELT at page 31. Even the Explanatory Notes to the CCCN do not lend any assistance to the appellants, assuming as observed by the Tribunal in the case of Pyrites Phosphates that in the absence of express definition in the Tariff itself, these could furnish guidelines in understanding the real import of a tariff entry, as understood by the trading public, a reference to Chapter 87 (Volume 4 at page 1500) reveals that in Part 87.06, numerous articles have been detailed as parts and accessories of motor vehicles, so much so that even 'safety belts' designed to be permanently fixed into motor vehicles for the protection of persons have been included, (in Clause B) amongst such parts, but these hub-bolts and nuts do not find any mention anywhere, though the 'bubs' have been included. In case, these hub-bolts were also to be deemed to be essential parts of the motor vehicles, there was no reason as to why they would not have been mentioned alongwith the hubs. It is further interesting to note that in this Chapter, the parts which are shown to be lending transmission to the vehicles are detailed as "propeller shafts, gears, bearings, etc.".
There is another entry in this Chapter which reveals the real intention as to what could be considered as motor parts by excluding even the internal parts of engines and motors (Clause D). It is further found on reference to Chapter 73 of Volume 3 of the said Explanatory Notes at page 1023 that heading 73.32 which is couched in identical language, as T.I. 52 of the CET, is shown to be including all types of fastening bolts and metal screws regardless of shape and use, including "U-bolts, bolts ends, screw studs and screw studding, etc." 26. Accepting thus the arguments of the learned counsel that the Explanatory Notes to the CCCN be taken as a guidance, it is apparent that these hub-bolts and nuts would be covered by T.I. 52.
27. We further feel that nothing turns on the fact that these hub-bolts and nuts can be available only at the shop of an automobile dealer, and that no hardware shop would stock them because it is a matter for almost judicial note that all articles supplemental to, or required for assembly of a machine, are kept by the dealer of the principal goods, but that would not make them as 'parts' of that machine. For instance, even an ordinary nut will have to be of a given shape and size as well as specifications, depending upon whether it is to be fitted in a refrigerator or television set, but that would not convert them into "refrigerator" or "T.V. Parts".
28. We also find that the authority of the Bombay High Court reported in 1982 ELT 237 (Bom.) in the case of Swadeshi Mills Company Ltd. v.Union of India & Others, dealing with the case of "wind screen for motor vehicles" was based entirely on different proposition because in that case, the entry under consideration was 23A(4) which deals generally with 'glass and glassware'. It was in this context that it was held that there was distinction between the raw material which was the glass in this case and the end-product which was apparently wind screen, meant for motor vehicles. We are not faced with such type of wide sweeping general entry in the present case but a very specific entry dealing with specified goods of the description covering the present goods and in face of this situation, the ratio of that decision can be of no avail to the appellants.
29. We, therefore, are of the considered view that the classification as now determined by the lower authorities as a sequel to the change of the tariff entry of the subject goods, holding hub-bolts and nuts as under T.I. 52 is fully justified. The appeal thus merits dismissal, and is dismissed accordingly.