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Wealth-tax Officer Vs. Raja Tej Kumar Bhargava - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtIncome Tax Appellate Tribunal ITAT Allahabad
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1983)5ITD513(All.)
AppellantWealth-tax Officer
RespondentRaja Tej Kumar Bhargava
Excerpt:
1. as a common point is involved in all these appeals, they are disposed of together for the sake of convenience.2. the assessee is a huf. the assessment years are 1968-69 to 1978-79 and the relevant valuation dates are 30-9-1967, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977 respectively.3. the common point in dispute is whether the damages awarded by the civil judge for injuries affected to the property not acquired under the land acquisition act, 1894 and the solatium granted by the hon'ble high court of judicature at allahabad under section 23(2) of the land acquisition act, could form part of the net wealth of the assessee. (a) the assessees, smt. kamla bhargava and raja ram kumar bhargava, own a free-hold property nos. 61 and 62 on the butler road, lucknow, raja ram kumar.....
Judgment:
1. As a common point is involved in all these appeals, they are disposed of together for the sake of convenience.

2. The assessee is a HUF. The assessment years are 1968-69 to 1978-79 and the relevant valuation dates are 30-9-1967, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977 respectively.

3. The common point in dispute is whether the damages awarded by the Civil Judge for injuries affected to the property not acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the solatium granted by the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, could form part of the net wealth of the assessee.

(a) The assessees, Smt. Kamla Bhargava and Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava, own a free-hold property Nos. 61 and 62 on the Butler Road, Lucknow, Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava had 50 per cent interest in the said property, while the assessee and Smt. Kamla Bhargava have two-thirds and one-third share, respectively, in the other 50 per cent.

(b) The total area of the said property is 2,23,423 sq. ft.

consisting of the Northern strip facing the road and the Southern strip in the back side.

(c) On 5-7-1962, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, was issued with a view to acquire a portion of the said property mostly the Northern strip.

(d) On 31-10-1962, a declaration under Sections 6 and 17(1), (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, was issued to acquire 98,408 sq. ft. of the said property.

(e) Before the Land Acquisition Officer, the assessee as well as the other co-owners ('the owners') of the said property made the following claims : (i) compensation of the rate of Rs. 4 per sq. ft. should be paid for the portion of the land acquired ; (ii) interest should be paid from 3-8-1963 as there was evidence that the possession was taken from that date ; (iii) damages at the rate of Rs. 4 per sq. ft. should be paid in respect of the injuries affected to the 1,25,015 sq. ft. of the said property not acquired under the Land Acquisition Act ; (iv) solatium should be paid as contemplated under Section 23(2) of theLand Acquisition Act ; (f) On 8-11-1966, the Land Acquisition Officer gave his award wherein he rejected the owners' claim at serial Nos. (ii) to (iv) above. The officer awarded the compensation at the rate of Re. 1 per sq. ft. in respect of 98,408 sq. ft. of the property acquired under the Land Acquisition Act.

(g) Thereafter, a reference was made to the Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

The owners of the property reiterated the claim which was made before the Land Acquisition Officer. On 15-7-1969, the Civil Judge gave his decision on the issue raised before him as under : (i) the owners should be paid compensation at the rate of Rs. 3 per sq. ft. for the property acquired ; (ii) the owners should be paid damages at the rate of Rs. 3 per sq.

ft. for the property not acquired, on account of injuries affected to it ; (iii) interest at the rate of Rs. 6 per annum should be paid to the owners with effect from 24-11-1966; The Civil Judge rejected the owners' claim for solatium as contemplated under Section 23(2).

(h) Against the order of the Civil Judge, both the State of UP and the owners preferred appeals to the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

(i) Pending the appeals before the Hon'ble High Court, the State of UP applied for the stay of the execution of the decree of the Civil Judge. On 4-8-1970, the Hon'ble High Court passed the following order : After having heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length and giving the matter our most anxious consideration, we have come if the to the conclusion that the interests of both the parties will be safeguarded execution of the decree under appeal is stayed on the applicant depositing the decretal amount including the costs payable, if any, in the execution Court within a week from today and we order accordingly. In case of default the stay granted herein will stand automatically vacated.

The amount, if deposited by the applicant, will not be paid to the opposite parties unless they furnish a bank guarantee for the same to the satisfaction of the execution Court.

(j) Thereafter, security bond and counter guarantee were executed by the owners.

(k) On 16-4-1976, the Hon'ble High Court pronounced its judgment in the appeals filed by the State of UP and the owners. The Hon'ble High Court was pleased to uphold the decision of the Civil Judge in respect of the rate per sq. ft. fixed by him for both the acquired and unacquired portions of the property in question. Similarly, it upheld the rate of interest and the date from which it was payable, as fixed by the Civil Judge. Further, the Hon'ble High Court was pleased to grant 15 per cent solatium under Section 23(2).

(l) Having been dissatisfied with the decision of the Hon'ble High Court, the State of UP moved a petition for leave to appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 17-5-1976 the Hon'ble High Court rejected the petition.

(m) Thereafter, petition for special leave to appeal was moved by the State of UP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, vide its order dated 22-8-1977, was pleased to grant such leave limited to 'the question as regards damages to be paid for severance and the question of solatium.

(n) The total damages for the unacquired portion of the property in question awarded was Rs. 3,75,045. The assessee's two-thirds share in 50 per cent of the said amount worked out to Rs. 1,25,015.

Similarly, the total solatium awarded was Rs. 44,250 and the assessee's two-thirds share in 50 per cent of the said amount worked out to Rs. 14,750.

5. The assessee did not show the aforesaid two amounts in its wealth-tax returns on the ground that the State of UP had not accepted the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in this regard and an appeal was pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Till the Hon'ble Supreme Court pronounced its decision in the said appeal, it had no right, title or interest in the said amounts. The WTO, however, did not accept the assessee's contentions for the reasons stated in his order for the assessment year 1967-68, which read as under: With regard to the damages, it has been stated that right to receive damages for injury is merely a right to sue and the right to sue is not a property. With regard to the solatium, it has been stated that the State of Uttar Pradesh has contested the award of solatium by the High Court on the ground that provision to grant solatium was deleted in 1954. The assessee has also relied on certain case laws in support of his claim. The assessee's contention is not acceptable, in my opinion, on the parity of the reasonings given by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha v. CWT [1973] 90 ITR 97, the damages and solatium both are includible as taxable wealth. The High Court of Allahabad have directed the payment of damages and solatium to the assessee. Till the High Court's order is reversed, these two items are undoubtedly the assets of the assessee.

(i) since the right to receive damages/solatium depended on the fiat of a Court and not a consequence of any existing obligation which was unsettled due to appeal pending in the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the same could not form part of the net wealth exigible to tax (ii) since the right to receive damages/solatium was unconnected with the property, it was nothing than a mere right to sue which is not transferable in terms of Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and as such it had no price on the relevant valuation date(s) with reference to sale in the open market as envisaged by Section 7(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 ('the Act'); (iii) the ratio laid down in the case of Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha v. CWT [1973] 90 ITR 97 (SC) was not applicable in its case as the facts and circumstances in its case were clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha's case (supra); (iv) like the income-tax Act, under the Wealth-tax Act also, the actual/real wealth in its hand was liable to tax and not something else which was in jeopardy depending on the final decision of the highest Court of the land; (v) the money deposited in the bank on the directions of the Court had no consequence as till the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the appeal filed by the State of UP, it had no right, title or interest in the said money; (vi) the two amounts of damages and solatium should be deleted from its net wealth.

The assess relied on a number of reported cases mentioned in the order of the AAC.7. The AAC in her consolidated order for the assessment years 1968-69 to 1975-76, accepted the contentions of the assessee as under: I have heard the learned counsel and gone through the various rulings cited by him. On a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the cases relied on by the WTO, i.e., Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha v. CIT [1973] 90 ITR 97 is distinguishable from the case under consideration inasmuch as in that case it was held as under: Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, as soon as the estate or tenure of a proprietor or tenure-holder vests in the State, he becomes entitled to receive compensation.

Therefore, to my mind, the ratio of the case would be applicable only to those cases where the compensation is receivable under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and although it has been further held in the above-mentioned case that, the right to receive compensation from the State is a valuable right. The fact that the compensation is not payable immediately and its payment might be spread out over a period of 40 years, would be relevant only for the purpose of evaluating the right to compensation. The right to receive compensation, even though the date of payment is deferred, is property and constitutes an 'asset' for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, yet I feel, it relates to only those cases where the right to receive compensation itself is not in dispute or in jeopardy and only the periodicity of payment is in dispute. In the case under consideration the right to receive damages and solatium, is very much in jeopardy since the State of Uttar Pradesh has not accepted the decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court and special leave petition had been granted to appeal to the Supreme Court where the case is still pending. The appellant has a very valid point that till such time that the Hon'ble Supreme Court awards its judgment, these amounts cannot be included in the wealth of the appellant since he may or may not receive the amounts under dispute or may receive enhanced or reduced compensation and in any case till then he has no right or title over the same. The bank guarantee also does not give him any right to operate the said amount and, therefore, I feel that the amount of damages for severance to the tune of Rs. 1,25,015 and solatium to the tune of Rs. 14,750 are not includible in the wealth of the appellant. These amounts would be excluded from the wealth of the appellant.

Similarly, the appeals for the assessment years 1976-77 to 1978-79 were disposed of by her in favour of the assessee on the point involved.

8. Being aggrieved by the orders of the AAC, the revenue has come up in appeal before the Tribunal. The learned representative for the department strongly relied on the orders of the WTO and submitted that the AAC was not justified in deleting the two amounts in question, from the net wealth of the assessee. According to the learned representative for the department, the assessee's case is fully covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha's case (supra). In that case, the issue was about the compensation while in the present case it is about the damages/solatium, which partake the character of compensation in a different way. In this connection, he submitted that but for the acquisition proceedings and taking over of 98,408 sq. ft. of the property, the assessee could not have got the damages/solatium. He further submitted that even though such damages/solatium were awarded by the Civil Judge or the Hon'ble High Court, still the character and nature thereof was nothing but compensation on the acquisition of the property. In this connection, he invited our attention to Section 23 and submitted that the items mentioned as firstly, secondly, etc., were the components of the compensation payable to the person whose property was being acquired.

He, therefore, urged that the doctrine of the fiat of the Court had no application. Again, the fact that the State of UP has not accepted the decision of the Hon'ble High Court was, according to the learned representative for the department, of no consequence. The learned representative for the department submitted that the crucial date for deciding the appeals is the date on which the possession of 98,408 sq.

ft. of the property was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and it is from this date that the assessee became entitled to compensation, damages, solatium, etc. By a reference to the Civil Judge and thereafter on appeal to the High Court, the assessee has only tried to get more compensation but the debt created against the State of UP related back to the date of notification, i.e., 5-7-1962, which is prior to all the relevant valuation dates of the years under consideration. Alternatively, he submitted that till the Hon'ble Supreme Court reverses/modifies the decision of the Hon'ble High Court, the assessee has acquired valuable right to receive damages/solatium which has to be valued and included in its net wealth. In other words, he wanted to impress upon us that the AAC was not justified in deleting the entire amount of damages/solatium from the net wealth of the assessee. Apart from relying on the decision in Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha's case (supra), the learned representative for the department referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Kesoram Industries & Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CWT [1966] 59 ITR 767 and Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai v. ACED [1980] 122 ITR 21.

9. The learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, supported the action of the AAC. In this connection, he made the following submissions: (i) there is a difference between the compensation payable on the acquisition of the property and damages payable for the injuries affected to the property that was not acquired under the Land Acquisition Act; (ii) the relevant date of compensation is the date of notification/declaration issued under Section 4 or 6, while the relevant date of damages solatium is the date on which the Land Acquisition Officer, the Civil Judge, the Hon'ble High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court in their discretion award such damages/solatium; (iii) the decision of the Civil Court and the Hon'ble High Court allowing damages/solatium was nothing but an actionable claim which is not a property under the Transfer of Property Act. There is a difference between the actionable claim and the debt. The former is not an asset, while the latter is, under the Act; (iv) once an appeal is admitted by the higher Court against the decision of the lower Court, the whole issue becomes sub judice and, therefore, damages/solatium allowed by the Civil Judge and the Hon'ble High Court cannot be taken into consideration till the Hon'ble Supreme Court pronounces its decision in the appeal preferred by the State of UP; (v) the decision in Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jhds case (supra) and Chena's case (supra) would not be applicable in the present case as the statutes and the point at issue in those cases were different: (vi) the damages/solatium allowed by the Civil Judge and the Hon'ble High Court are nothing but flat of the Court which could not be treated as an asset for the wealth-tax purposes; (vii) the fact that the assessee had withdrawn money deposited in the bank against the bond/bank guarantee, would not convert what was not an asset into an asset for the wealth-tax purposes; (viii) in any event since the damages and the solatium were allowed on 15-7-1969 and 16-4-1976 respectively, they could not form part of the net wealth in respect of the valuation date(s) which fall prior to these dates, i.e., 15-7-1969 and 16-4-1976; (ix) on reading Section 23 with Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act, since damages and solatium were payments quite unconnected with the compensation payable for the property acquired, the assessee "had no right, title or interest in them on the date of acquisition of the property and, therefore, there was no question of relating them back to the notification/declaration issued under Section 4 or 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the assessee referred to the following cases : CWT v. Pierce Leslie & Co. Ltd. [1963] 48 ITR 1005, Topandas Kundanmal v. CIT [1978] 114 ITR 237, (Guj), J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. O.S. Bajpai, ITO [1976] 105 ITR 864 (All.), Satyanarayan Prosad v. Diana Engg. Co. AIR 1952 Cal. 124, 126, Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. LAO AIR 1961 SC 1500, 1503, Addl. CTT v. New Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd. [1979] 117 ITR 849 (Guj.), CTT v. Hindusthan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd. [1977] 108 ITR 380, Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jhd's case (supra) and Chena's case (supra).

10. We have carefully considered the rival submissions of the parties, material placed before us and the cases cited at the time of hearing and we must confess that the point involved in the appeals is quite a ticklish one. Both the parties have forcefully argued their respective case, which makes the issue quite interesting and at the same time difficult to resolve. The wealth-tax is payable on the net wealth as computed on the valuation date. The net wealth is defined as the difference between the sum total of the value of all the assets and the sum total of the value of all the liabilities as on the valuation date.

The debt owed to the assessee is to be treated as his asset, while the debt owed by the assessee is to be treated as his liability. In the instant case, we are concerned with the debt owed to the assessee by the State of UP by way of compensation damages and solatium, on the acquisition/non-acquisition of the property owned by it. As the assessee had already offered for taxation of the compensation received by it in respect of the portion of the property acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the same is no longer in dispute before us. Therefore, now we are left with the damages/solatium received by the assessee by virtue of the order/decision of the Civil Judge Hon'ble High Court. The assessee's case is that since the State of UP has preferred an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the damages/solatium, its right to enjoy the same is nothing but an inchoate right, which could not be treated as a debt owed to it. In any event, since the damages/solatium were granted to it on 15-7-1969 and 16-4-1976, the amount of damages cannot be included in its net wealth in respect of the assessment years, the valuation dates of which fell prior to 15-7-1969. Similarly, the amount of solatium cannot be included in its net wealth in respect of the assessment years, the valuation dates of which fell prior to 16-4-1976. The revenue, on the other hand, contends that both these amounts are includible in the net wealth of the assessee irrespective of the fact that an appeal is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.. In any event, the value of the right to receive damages/solatium cannot be taken at nil as such right is a valuable right which has a market value on each of the relevant date(s). Again, since the right to receive damages/solatium partake the character of compensation under Section 23, the value thereof was rightly included in the net wealth of the assessee in each of the years under appeal.

According to the revenue, such right to receive damages/solatium relates back to the date on which notification was issued under Section 11. On the aforesaid submissions, we have to decide two issues, viz., (j) the date on which such right accrued to the assessee and (ii) whether such right had any market value in view of an appeal pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. There is no direct authority on the point regarding the determination of the date on which such right accrued to the assessee. However, a decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of CWT v. Smt. Preetilata Devi [1980] 123 ITR 382, gives certain indication on this issue. In that case, the property was acquired by a notification issued on 7-12-1961 and the Government took possession of the property on 7-3-1962. The assessee claimed compensation and the LAO by his order dated 9-5-1963 determined the compensation payable to the assessee at Rs. 98,430. The assessee applied for a reference to the Civil Judge and the Civil Judge vide his order dated 29-9-1964, determined the compensation payable at Rs. 2,92,690 in addition to the amount already awarded by the LAO. On 28-2-1968, the assessee filed her wealth-tax returns for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1966-67. In all these returns she had shown value of the assets acquired which was represented by the compensation awarded to her at Rs. 98,430. The wealth-tax authorities also included the additional compensation awarded by the Civil Judge in determining the net wealth of the assessee. In appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal upheld the action of the wealth-tax authorities in respect of the assessment years 1965-66 to 1966-67. However, in respect of the assessment year 1964-65 for which the relevant valuation date was 27-10-1963, the Tribunal held that the additional compensation granted by the Civil Judge could not be included in the net wealth of the assessee on the valuation date in view of the fact that an appeal was pending before the Hon'ble High Court against the order of the Civil Judge. The Hon'ble High Court reversed the order of the Tribunal in respect of the assessment year 1964-65 in the following manner: In our case the question referred to us relates to assessment year 1964-65, for which the relevant valuation date was 27th October, 1963. On this date the value of the asset, viz., the amount of compensation, was the amount determined as payable to the assessee for the acquired property with reference to the value of that property on 7th December, 1961, the date of notification under the Land Acquisition Act and that amount alone represented the value of the asset liable to be returned under the Wealth-tax Act. On 27th October, 1963, the only value in operation was the amount determined by the Land Acquisition Officer, viz., Rs. 98,430, but on the date when the assessee filed the return, viz., 28th February, 1968, the Civil and Session Judge judgment has come into existence. The order of the Civil and Session Judge superseded and supplanted the determination made by the Land Acquisition Officer. In the eye of law the order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer merged in the order of the Civil and Session Judge with the result that the legally recognised amount of compensation was Rs. 98,430 plus Rs. 2,92,690. That being the operative and enforceable amount of compensation payable to the assessee, the same was liable to be entered in the return under the Wealth-tax Act when the assessee filed the same on 28th February, 1968. The fact that the learned Civil and Session Judge's order was passed on 3rd May, 1976, viz., much after the relevant valuation date, which was 27th October, 1963, is neither material nor relevant because the assessee, in fact, filed the return on 28th February, 1968, a date when the learned Civil and Session Judge's order had already come into existence. In our opinion, the assessee was bound to return the amount of compensation determined by the Civil and Session Judge's order, for the assessment year 1964-65.

There are numerous other decisions rendered under the Income-tax Act, 1961, wherein the Hon'ble High Courts have taken a consistent view that the interest payable on the compensation and additional compensation should be reckoned from the date on which the notification is issued under Section 4. Further, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha's case (supra), clearly shows that the amount awarded to a person on the acquisition of his land would accrue to him 'the moment he was divested of his estate'. In this view of the matter, we have no doubt in our mind that the damages/solatium must relate back to the date of notification issued under the Land Acquisition Act, in present case. The assessee had argued that the damages/solatium awarded by the Civil Judge/the Hon'ble High Court are nothing but a fiat of the Court and, therefore, the same should not be considered in determining the net wealth of the assessee. In this connection, it would be necessary to refer to Section 23. The section starts with the following sentence: In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration- And thereafter, six items are mentioned which the Court has to consider before awarding compensation to the person whose property is being acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The items 'thirdly' and 'fourthly' read as under: thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land; fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings; The aforesaid extract of Section 23 clearly shows that the authority awarding compensation shall have to take into consideration the loss suffered by a person in respect of the property not acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. If the authority concerned failed to consider this aspect of the matter and if the higher authority in the judicial hierarchy considers this aspect of the matter, surely that cannot be said to be a flat of the Court as was urged on behalf of the assessee.

Sub-section (2) of Section 23 is a mandatory provision for awarding solatium to a party whose land is compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, if the lower authority does not consider the claim made by the person who is deprived of his property and the higher authority in the judicial hierarchy considers the same, we fail to appreciate how this also could be called a flat of the Court. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that the right to receive damages/solatium accrued to the assessee on the date on which the notification under Section 4 was issued.

12. During the course of his arguments, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted that since an appeal is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court the issue regarding damages/solatium has become sub judice and, therefore, nothing should be included in the net wealth of the assessee in this regard. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha's case (supra), we have no hesitation in rejecting the submissions made on behalf of the assessee.

It is no doubt true that in that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned with the compensation proper and not with the damages/solatium with which we are concerned in the present appeals.

However, the following observation of the report is very illuminating: Assuming for the sake of argument that the amount of compensation payable to the assessee had not been determined by the Compensation Officer by the valuation date, that fact would not justify the exclusion of the compensation payable from the assets of the assessee. The right to receive compensation became vested in the assessee the moment he was divested of his estate and the same got vested in the estate in pursuance of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. As the estate of the assessee which vested in the State was known and as the formula fixing the amount of compensation was prescribed by the statute, the amount of compensation was to all intents and purposes a matter of calculation. The fact that the necessaryc alculation had not been made and the amount of compensation had consequently not been qualified by the valuation date would not take compensation payable to the assessee out of the definition of assets or make it cease to be property. The right to receive compensation from the State is a valuable right, more so when it is based upon statute and the liability to pay is not denied by the State. It is no doubt true that the compensation is not payable immediately and its payment might be spread over a period of 40 years, but that fact would be relevant only for the purpose of evaluating the right to compensation. It would not detract from the proposition that the right to receive compensation, even though the date of payment is deferred, is property and constitutes asset for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act. (p. 108) In view of the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that the right to receive compensation/solatium has a value on each of the relevant valuation dates. Again, in the case of Chenai (supra), the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that where the lands are compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, there are no two rights but only one right to receive compensation. The only thing left is regarding the quantification of such right. Since as already stated above, the matter is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the view that it would be just and proper to restore the case to the file of the WTO with a direction to include the amount of damages/solatium as are finally determined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and modify the assessments accordingly.

13. Before we part with the order, we like to quote the following comments from the latest commentary on the Law of Land Acquisition and Compensation by V.G. Ramachandran (6th edition, 1983), which is also illuminating: 49. Limits of interference by Supreme Court or High Court.-The Supreme Court has laid down the salutary principle that in an appeal from an award granting compensation the Supreme Court will not interfere unless there is something to show, not merely that on the balance of evidence, it is possible to reach a different conclusion but that the judgment cannot be supported by reason of a wrong application of principle or because some important point affecting valuation has been overlooked or misapplied....(p. 576) The aforesaid commentary is based on a number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in [1977] 1 SCC 330, [1975] 1 SCC 284, [1959] 1 SCR (Supp). 404, [1971] 3 SCC 43 and [1975] 2 SCC 730.

14. In the result, all the appeals are allowed for statistical purposes.


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