Skip to content


income-tax Officer Vs. Reno Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtIncome Tax Appellate Tribunal ITAT Mumbai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1984)10ITD849(Mum.)
Appellantincome-tax Officer
RespondentReno Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals
Excerpt:
where the tax is determined on a paper and not on the assessment order under section 143(3) the assessment was still a valid assessment as no form of assessment order has been prescribed.assessment--determination of tax--form itns 150 showing determination of tax, not sent to the assessee with assessment order and demand notice.where form no. itns 150 showing determination of tax, was not sent to assessee with assessment order and demand notice, the same would not make assessment a invalid, but there would be a defect within the meaning of provisions of section 292b.assessment--non-compliance with s. 144b--fresh assessment whether can be directed.where there is non-compliance with section 144b such assessment shall not be a nullity and appellate authority can direct fresh.....
Judgment:
Where the tax is determined on a paper and not on the assessment order under section 143(3) the assessment was still a valid assessment as no form of assessment order has been prescribed.

Assessment--DETERMINATION OF TAX--Form ITNS 150 showing determination of tax, not sent to the assessee with assessment order and demand notice.

Where Form No. ITNS 150 showing determination of tax, was not sent to assessee with assessment order and demand notice, the same would not make assessment a invalid, but there would be a defect within the meaning of provisions of section 292B.Assessment--NON-COMPLIANCE WITH S. 144B--Fresh assessment whether can be directed.

Where there is non-compliance with section 144B such assessment shall not be a nullity and appellate authority can direct fresh assessment.

Where there is nothing wrong with the assumption of the initial jurisdiction but some irregularity, including non-compliance with some mandatory provisions had crept in, the assessment, no doubt, would have to be set aside but it would be the duty of the appellate authority to direct a fresh assessment after complying with the legal requirements.

The CIT (Appeals) was not justified in annulling the assessment. The ITO was accordingly directed to make a fresh assessment after complying with the provisions of s. 144B.Reference--QUESTION OF LAW--Assessment completed without complying with section 144B.Whether assessment completed without complying with section 144B would nullify such assessment, gave rise to a question of law for reference.

1. The appeals are by the ITO and relate to the assessee's assessments for the assessment years 1977-78 and 1978-79. The cross-objections are by the assessee and relate to the assessment for the assessment year 1978-79. For the sake of convenience, the appeals and the cross-objections are disposed of by a consolidated order.

2. The department has taken the following three grounds in its appeal memo for the assessment year 1977-78 : 1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in holding that the addition made to' the assessee's total income exceeded Rs. 1,00,000 and, therefore, assessment made under Section 143(3) is illegal, thereby failing to appreciate the fact that the actual addition to the assessee's total income was only Rs. 52,006.

2. The appellant prays that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on the above ground be set aside and that of the ITO be restored.

3. The appellant craves leave to amend or alter any ground or add a new ground, which may be necessary.

An application has been made at the time of hearing, seeking permission to take up an additional ground of appeal reading as under : Without prejudice to Ground No. 1, the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in annulling the assessment order passed by the ITO under Section 143(3) without appreciating that Section 144B is only a procedural section and that failure to follow the requirements of this section would only be a remedial procedural irregularity. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) ought to have set aside the assessment to be redone in accordance with the provisions of Section 144B.The admission of the additional ground has been objected to by Shri Ajoy Thakore, the learned counsel for the assessee. He has submitted that the appeal was filed by the ITO on 26-3-1981 and that before the additional ground may be admitted, the department must show that it was prevented by sufficient cause in not taking up the additional ground, originally and in taking it up as late as the date of hearing, i.e., 12-7-1984. The departmental representative has, on the other hand, fairly admitted that it is a mistake on the part of the department in having not taken up the ground originally. It is, however, urged that the ground is purely legal and does not require any investigation into facts and, therefore, should kindly be entertained.

3. We have considered the objection raised by Shri Ajoy Thakore carefully. We are inclined to admit the additional ground. It is pertinent to mention that the question whether or not an assessment completed by an ITO, without following the mandatory provisions of Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act'), is a nullity came up for consideration before a Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Third ITO v. Shivaji Park Gymkhana [1983] 4 ITD 462 (Bom.). The order in this case was passed by the Tribunal on 30-4-1983. It is true that more than one year has since passed. Since, however, the ground raised is a pure question of law, we have considered it fair and in the interests of justice to admit it.

4. The assessee, a company, filed its return for the assessment year 1977-78, declaring total income of Rs. 1,73,670. The assessment had been completed under Section 143(3) of the Act computing the assessee's total income at Rs. 3,42,204 rounded at Rs. 3,42,200 on 29-2-1980. The assessment was, admittedly, completed without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 144B even though, according to the ITO himself, the variation between the returned income and the assessed income exceeded the sum of Rs. 1,00,000.

5. Appeal was filed by the assessee, originally, objecting to non-grant of the assessee's claim for deduction of Rs. 41,119 under Section 80J of the Act and against charging of interest amounting to Rs. 40,670 under Section 215 of the Act. The appeal was filed on 30-3-1980. Before the hearing started on 22-10-1980, the assessee, it appears, raised an additional ground challenging the legality of the assessment having been completed, without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 144B. A copy of the additional ground was sent to the ITO, who, by his letter dated 30-10-1980, stated that the variation between the returned income and the assessed income did not exceed Rs. 1,00,000 and that, therefore, the provisions of Section 144B were not applicable in this case. The Commissioner (Appeals) considered the ITO's objection but found that his contention was not correct. Accordingly, he held that the provisions of Section 144B were applicable in this case and that the assessment having been made without complying with the mandatory provisions, as stated above, was void and required to be annulled.

6. We have examined the return filed by the assessee. The departmental representative has also furnished us with a copy of the return, which indicates that the assessee might have declared its income at Rs. 2,90,198. However, this is not correct as unabsorbed depreciation has been claimed separately in the return itself amounting to Rs. 1,16,529 and, thus, the returned income is Rs. 1,73,670 only. This is what the ITO himself has stated in the order of assessment. In the circumstances, we have no difficulty in holding that the variation between the income returned and that proposed by the ITO exceeded Rs. 1,00,000 and the provisions of Section 144B were clearly applicable.

7. The second ground is consequential and the third ground is only a general ground. This takes us to the additional ground which has been admitted, as stated by us earlier. We would like to mention that while admitting the additional ground, we have also taken into account the fact that the assesses had also challenged the legality of the assessment by means of an additional ground which was taken up about seven months after the filing of appeal and was yet admitted by the Commissioner (Appeals).

8. The departmental representative has strongly relied on the Special Bench order of the Tribunal in the case of Shivaji Park Gymkhana (supra), for the purpose of arguing that the Commissioner (Appeals) was not justified in annulling the assessment and that he should have set aside the assessment with a direction to the ITO to make a fresh assessment according to law. Fairly admitting that the order of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shivaji Park Gymkhana (supra) supports the contention raised on behalf of the department, Shri Ajay Thakore, the learned counsel for the assessee, invites our attention to an order passed by another Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of East Coast Marine Products (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [1983] 4 ITD 73 (Hyd.), where, according to him, a contrary view has been taken. In this context, Shri Ajay Thakore points out that the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shivaji Park Gymkhana (supra) has proceeded on the assumption that the jurisdiction to make the assessment in that case always remained with the ITO, who eventually completed the assessment. It is stated that the issue in the case of East Coast Marine Products (P.) Ltd. (supra) was whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction to revise the order of assessment which was passed by the ITO in accordance with the directions of the IAC under Section 144B(4).

It was held that to the extent the ITO had passed the assessment order in accordance with the directions of the IAC under Section 144B(4), the order could not be said to be the order of the ITO to give the Commissioner jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act to revise the same. The counsel submitted that in this view of the matter, it cannot now be assumed that the jurisdiction to make the assessment always remained with the ITO and that in that view of the matter, the Bench has either to hold that the assessment completed by the ITO in violation of the provisions of Section 144B is a nullity or a reference will have to be made to a larger Bench for considering the point at issue. Shri Anjani Kumar, the departmental representative, on the other hand, pointed out that the order in the case of East Coast Marine Products (P.) Ltd. (supra) was passed on 16-3-1983, while in the case of Shivaji Park Gymkhana (supra) it was passed on 30-4-1983 and, therefore, the latter order required to be followed. On merits, he pointed out that the Special Bench has not at all held, in the case of East Coast Marine Products (P.) Ltd. (supra), that the jurisdiction to make the assessment as such even vested in the IAC under Section 144B.What it has held is that the order passed by the ITO, to the extent it is in compliance with the directions of the IAC under Section 144B(4), cannot be treated as an order of the ITO to give the Commissioner jurisdiction to revise the same under Section 263.

9. We have considered the rival contentions carefully. It may be mentioned that the counsel filed written submissions after the hearing was over. The department, thus, did not get an opportunity to make its submissions on the points raised in the written submissions. We have glanced through the written submissions also. Since, in our view, the written submissions have, by and large, been considered and rejected by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shivaji Park Gymkhana (supra), we have not considered it necessary to call upon the departmental representative to reply. For instance, the cases relied upon in the written submissions, namely, the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of P.V. Doshi v. CIT [1978] 113 ITR 22, the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ram Swamp v. Shikar Chand AIRUnion of India v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros. AIR 1971 SC 1558 and Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh AIR 1964 SC 1300 have all been considered at length in that case. The other Supreme Court case, namely, CIT v. Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur AIR 1961 SC 1927, which, according to the counsel, is nearest to the facts of his client's case, is obviously distinguishable inasmuch as it was held in that case that the notices reopening the assessments were ab initio void and, therefore, the assessments made on that basis had to be held null and void. The other submission, including reliance on some other decisions, does not really improve the position.

10. We find that the Special Bench of the Tribunal has held in the case of Shivaji Park Gymkhana (supra) that when the initiation of the proceedings is itself invalid, the assessment has got to be annulled.

On the other hand, where there is nothing wrong with the assumption of the initial jurisdiction but some irregularity, including non-compliance with some mandatory provisions has crept in, the assessment, no doubt, will have to be set aside but it will be the duty of the appellate authority to direct making of a fresh assessment after complying with the legal requirements. A question arises whether and to what extent the other Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of East Coast Marine Products (P.) Ltd. (supra) has taken a contrary view. For this purpose, we have carefully gone. through the said order. We do not agree with the counsel for the assessee that the Special Bench in that case has held that the jurisdiction of the ITO to make the assessment is ousted even temporarily because of the applicability of the provisions of Section 144B. What it has held is that Section 263 empowers the Commissioner to revise the orders passed by the ITO, provided such orders were erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. To the extent the ITO has passed the order in accordance with the directions of the IAC under Section 144B(4), it cannot be held that it is the order of the ITO and in any event the order of the ITO to that extent cannot be said to be erroneous, as the ITO is bound to follow the directions of the IAC given under Section 144B(4) of the Act and such compliance can, by no stretch of imagination, be held to be erroneous In fact, the question of jurisdiction in that case was not involved at all. In this context, it may be desirable to refer to the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 ('the 1957 Act') in this regard.

In appropriate cases, the WTO refers the question of valuation of any asset to Valuation Officer. Sub-section (6) of Section 16A of the 1957 Act provides that so far as the valuation of the asset in question is concerned, the WTO shall proceed to complete the assessment in conformity with the estimate of the Valuation Officer. Can one say, by any stretch of imagination, that just because the WTO is bound to complete the assessment in conformity with the estimate of the Valuation Officer, his jurisdiction to make the assessment is ousted, though for the purpose of Section 263 of the 1961 Act, corresponding to Section 25 of the 1957 Act, it may be held that to the extent the order has been passed by the WTO in terms of Sub-section (6) of Section 16A of the 1957 Act, it is not an order over which the Commissioner will have jurisdiction Accordingly, we are of the view that there is no real contradiction between the two Special Bench orders pointed out by the assessee's counsel. In the circumstances, following the Special Bench order of the Tribunal in the case of Shivaji Park Gymkhana (supra), we further hold that the Commissioner (Appeals) was not justified in annulling the assessment. His order is modified and the ITO is directed to make a fresh assessment after complying with the provisions of Section 144B and after giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing, etc.

11. The grounds in the appeal for the assessment year 1978-79 are as under: 1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned Commissioner (Appeals) erred in annulling the assessment order passed by the ITO under Section 143(3), read with Section 144B. 2. Without prejudice to the Ground No. 1 above, the learned Commissioner (Appeals) erred in directing the ITO, to refund all the taxes paid by assessee, namely, advance tax, self assessment payment and TDS, etc.

3. The appellant prays that the order of the AAC/Commissioner (Appeals), on the above grounds, be set aside and that of the ITO be restored.

4. The appellant craves leave to amend or alter any ground or add a new ground, which may be necessary.

It is common ground that the return was filed by the assessee for the assessment year 1978-79 on 9-8-1978, declaring total income of Rs. 1,96,446. A revised return was filed on 8-10-1980, revising the declared income from Rs. 1,96,446 to Rs. 1,45,143. In the assessment proposed to be made, the ITO computed the variation between the returned income and the assessed income at more than Rs. 1,00,000.

Accordingly, the ITO prepared the draft assessment order and forwarded it to the assessee on 11-2-1981. The assessee objected to the various additions and disallowances. The draft assessment order was forwarded to the IAC along with the objections raised by the assessee. The assessment has, eventually, been completed on 24-9-1981, taking into consideration the directions of the IAC of the same date. It is pertinent to mention that the assessee claimed to have received the demand notice and the order of assessment and not the calculation sheet in ITNS-150.

12. Besides objecting to the various additions and disallowances, the assessee had strongly contended before the Commissioner (Appeals) that the assessment order was bad and illegal inasmuch as : (iii) the assessee was not given an opportunity after receipt of the directions by the ITO and, in fact, the assessment was back-dated.

The Commissioner (Appeals) has considered these three grounds in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of his order. Following the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case of S. Mubarik Shah Naqshbandi v. CIT [1977] 110 ITR 217, he has held that not computing the tax in the assessment order itself, makes the assessment invalid. Referring to the fact that the IAC had directed the ITO to verify certain claims but the ITO completed the assessment on the same date without giving an opportunity to the assessee, he held that the assessment so passed was illegal. He has also held that the IAC having taken more than one hundred and eighty days, the assessment is barred by limitation.

13. It is submitted before us by the departmental representative that the Commissioner (Appeals) has failed to appreciate the facts correctly. It is pointed out that the IAC and the ITO function in the same building, that as soon as the directions were received, the ITO verified the claims in accordance with the directions from the facts and material on record and that the mere fact that the assessment has been made on the date the directions were received itself, does not justify any adverse inference. As regards the applicability of the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, the departmental representative submitted that the Hon'ble High Court having not considered the provisions of Section 292B of the Act, the said decision cannot be applied to the facts of the case. Moreover, according to him, the demand notice has duly been received by the assessee along with the order of assessment. The law nowhere provides that the tax should be calculated in the assessment order itself. The assessment order determines the total income and the calculation of the tax is always an act subsequent to the computation of the total income. Therefore, where the tax is calculated and the figure of tax is given in a separate sheet or demand notice, it makes no difference whatsoever. Even this aspect has not been considered by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court.

Lastly, the departmental representative invites our attention to a Special Bench order of the Tribunal in the case of Highway Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [1983] 4 ITD 545 (Cal.), where it has been held that the failure to forward the calculation sheet on which the tax was determined, was a curable defect and, hence, the assessment made by the ITO was a valid assessment. As regards the question whether the assessment is barred by limitation or not, the departmental representative submits that the law has not laid down any time limit on the time to be taken by the IAC. Explanation 1(iv) to Section 153(3) of the Act provides the limit of exclusion of time on such grounds to one hundred and eighty days. In other words, his submission is that if the IAC has taken more than one hundred and eighty days, the time limit cannot be extended by more than one hundred and eighty days. So considered, the assessment, according to the departmental representative, would be in time.

14. Shri Ajay Thakore, on the other hand, has invited our attention to the fact that Section 292B was inserted in the Act by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from 1-10-1975 and that the Jammu and Kashmir High Court has decided the case of S. Mubarik Shah Naqshbandi (supra) on '20-10-1976. Fairly admitting that the provisions of Section 292B have not been referred to in the said decision, the counsel submitted that that only indicated that the provisions contained in Section 292B have no application to this aspect of the matter. It is reiterated that the assessment order, which is not accompanied by the calculation sheet and the tax is not computed in the order itself, is invalid in view of the above decision. The Special Bench order of the Tribunal in the case of Highway Construction Co.

(P.) Ltd. (supra) also supports the assessee's contention that the assessment will be invalid if the calculation sheet is not enclosed therewith and the tax is not computed in the order itself. It is a different thing that the Special Bench held that this defect was curable but the existence of the defect has not been and cannot certainly be denied. As regards the non-compliance by the ITO with the directions of the IAC, Shri Ajay Thakore has strongly placed reliance on the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). On the question of limitation, however, Shri Ajay Thakore has strongly contended that Section 153(3) provides for exclusion of time and that exclusion of time in this context refers to the time taken commencing from the. date on which the ITO forwards the draft order under Section 144B(1) to the assessee and ending with the date, on which the ITO receives the directions from the IAC under Section 144B(4). This time, according to Shri Ajay Thakore, cannot exceed one hundred and eighty days. In other words, if the time taken for this purpose is more than one hundred and eighty days, the assessment passed would be barred by limitation.

15. Having heard the parties and after going through the facts on record, we find that the directions given by the IAC under Section 144B are dated 24-9-1981 and the order of assessment is also dated 24-9-1981. On the face of it, it may give rise to some suspicion that the ITO had, perhaps, completed the assessment without complying with the directions given by the IAC or might have even back-dated the order. However, this is not correct and, in any event, not borne out by the records. The ITO and the IAC sit in the same building. Such matters are quite often discussed across the table. The directions given by the IAC have been, to the extent possible, taken into account by the ITO while finalising the assessment on receipt of the directions. There does not appear to be anything suspicious just because the order of assessment has been made on the same date. This is particularly so, as we find that the order of assessment and the demand notice have been received by the assessee on 27-9-1981, i.e., within three days of the date of the order. In our view, the Commissioner (Appeals) was not justified in holding the assessment to be invalid on the ground that the ITO has not complied with the directions of the IAC in completing the assessment.

16. We have gone through the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in S. Mubarik Shah Naqshbandi's case (supra). It is no doubt true that their Lordships have held that Section 144 of the Act provides that the ITO shall make an assessment of the total income or loss to the best of his judgment and determine the sum payable by the assessee or refundable to the assessee on the basis of such assessment. It is, however, evident that the provisions of Section 292B, which were brought into the statute book with effect from 1-10-1975, were not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble High Court and that the Hon'ble High Court was considering the provisions of Section 144 and not those of Section 143(3). This issue, as stated earlier, has been considered at great length by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Highway Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. (supra), where it was held that the assessment made under Section 143(3) should not only contain the computation of income or loss but also should contain the determination of the tax payable or the amount refundable by or to the assessee, without which the assessment order would be invalid. However, as no form of assessment order is prescribed, if the tax is determined on any paper within the period of limitation, it would fulfil the requirements of Section 143(3)(a). As in that case, in the case of the assessee also, the tax has been determined by the ITO on Form ITNS-150. The demand notice and the assessment order are dated 24-9-1981 and have duly been served on the assessee on 27-9-1981. The only omission on the part of the ITO, if any, has been that the Form ITNS-150, on which the tax was determined by the ITO, was not sent to the assessee but in view of the specific provisions of Section 292B, the failure to forward the form/calculation sheet is a curable defect or omission, which would not make the assessment invalid.

17. In order to appreciate whether or not the assessment made by the ITO on 24-9-1981 is barred by limitation, it is desirable to refer to the provisions of Explanation 1(iv) to Section 153(3), which reads as under : (1) No order of assessment shall be made under Section 143 or Section 144 at any time after- (iii) two years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable, where such assessment year is an assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1969 ; or 1969; or (c) the expiry of one year from the date of the filing of a return or a revised return under Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (5) of Section 139, whichever is latest.

(3) The provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not apply to the following classes of assessments, reassessments and recomputations which may, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2A), be completed at any time- Explanation 1 : In computing the period of limitation for the purposes of this section- (iv) the period (not exceeding one hundred and eighty days) commencing from the date on which the Income-tax Officer forwards the draft order under Sub-section (1) of Section 144B to the assessee and ending with the date on which the Income-tax Officer receives the directions from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under Sub-section (4) of that section, or, is a case where no objections to the draft order are received from the assessee, a period of thirty days, or It is evident from the above that the order of assessment could have been passed in this case on or before 31-3-1981, if the revised return filed on 8-10-1980 is not to be taken into account. If the revised return is taken into account, as it should be, then as laid down in Section 153(1)(c), the assessment can be made on or before 7-10-1981 as the revised return was filed by the assessee on 8-10-1980. The assessment having been completed on 24-9-1981, it is within time even if the time taken on account of Section 144B proceedings is not considered and taken into account. Since, however, arguments have been advanced by the parties at great length, we have considered it desirable also to examine the purport and scope of the Explanation 1(iv) to Section 153. As stated by us earlier, the Explanation provides that in computing the period of limitation for the purpose of Section 153, the period as mentioned in Sub-section (4) of Section 144B shall be excluded. The ordinary time limit for completing the assessment in this case is two years from the end of the assessment year, in which the income is first assessable, i.e., two years from 31-3-1979. Let us examine which period is to be excluded. If we omit the expression 'not exceeding one hundred and eighty days, which is within the brackets, the period to be excluded is the period that commences from the date on which the ITO forwards the draft order to the assessee and ends with the date on which the ITO receives the directions from the IAC. In this case, the draft assessment order has been forwarded to the assessee on 11-2-1981 and the directions have been received from the IAC on 24-9-1981. Ordinarily, therefore, the period to be excluded is the period from 11-2-1981 to 24-9-1981, i.e., two hundred and twenty-five days. However, the expression within the brackets, referred to above, provides that the period of exclusion in terms of Explanation 1(iv) cannot exceed one hundred and eighty days. In other words, where the period taken from the date on which the ITO forwards the draft order to the party to the date he receives the directions from the IAC is less than one hundred and eighty days, the period to be excluded would be that period, otherwise it will be one hundred and eighty days. In any event, the period to be excluded has to be added to the period of two years so that this will extend the period of limitation beyond the last date on which the assessment could have been completed under Section 143 or 153. If that is done, the assessment could have been completed in this case on or before 27-9-1981 and, therefore, the assessment made as on 24-9-1981 is very much in time.

18. It may not be out of place to mention that Shri Ajay Thakore, the learned counsel for the assessee, has invited our attention to instructions contained in Instruction No. 1167 where, according to him, the Board has stated that the period to be extended beyond one hundred and eighty days will commence from the date on which the ITO forwards the draft order and not from the date on which the assessment could have been normally completed. On carefully going through the Board's circular, we find that the circular does not support the assessee's contention. Accordingly, we hold that the assessment for the assessment year 1978-79 is valid and is not barred by limitation.

19. The other ground in the departmental appeal, namely, that the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in directing the ITO to refund all the taxes paid by the assessee, namely, advance tax, self-assessment tax, TDS, etc., does not survive for consideration in the view we have taken about the validity of the assessment.

20. By means of the cross-objections, the assessee has objected to the additions/disallowances confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in his impugned order. The Commissioner (Appeals), it may be stated, has not really considered these grounds while annulling the assessment altogether. In view of the fact that we have upheld the validity of the assessment, we set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and restore the appeal for the assessment year 1978-79 to his file with a direction that he should consider the assessee's grounds of appeal on merits afresh according to law.

21. In the result, the departmental appeals for the two assessment years are allowed, while the cross-objections filed by the assessee are also allowed.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //