R.S. Narula, C.J.
1. This is a petition under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (3 of 1949) (hereinafter called the Act) for revision of the order of the Appellate Authority, Ferozepore, dated January 3, 1974, upholding the decision of the Rent Controller for the eviction of the tenant-petitioner under Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Act, that is on the ground of bona fide personal necessity. The only around pressed by Mr. Harbans Lal Sarin, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, for petting aside the decision of the Courts below is that out of the three statutory conditions precedent entitling a landlord to apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession specified in Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Act, namely :--
(a) he requires it for his own occupation;
(b) he is not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area;
the landlord neither pleaded nor proved conditions (b) and (c) specified above. The ground of ejectment is specified in paragraph 4 (b) of the application for ejectment. It is clear that the pleas requisite under Section 13 (3) (a) (i) (b) and (c), have not been taken therein or at anyother place in the application for ejectment. Nor has any clear evidence on those two points been led by the landlord-respondent.
2. The learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has referred to the judgment of the Delhi High Court (Himachal Bench) in H.N. Bhasin v. Chamba Mall, 1970 Ren C. R. 840 and the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Mahajan, J. as he then was) in Darshan Singh v. Jagdish Kumar, 1974 Ren C. R 99 (Punj) in support of his contention that the landlord cannot succeed in obtaining an order or direction against the tenant for his eviction under Section 13 (3) (a) (i) unless he pleads and proves all the three ingredient of the aforesaid provision inferred to above. Mr. Gokal Chand Mitlal, learned counsel for the respondent, has on the other hand relied on the earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court in Shri Krishan Lal Seth v Smt. Pritam Kumari, 1961-63 Pun LR 865 (to which Mahajan, J., himself was a party). In that case it was held that in an application under Section 13 of the Act for the eviction of tenant on the ground of the requirement of the residential building for personal occupation, it is not necessary for the landlord to re-state in the application the statutory conditions set out in paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 13 (3) of the Act. It appears that subsequent to the decision of the Division Bench in Krishan Lal Seth's case (supra), this matter came up for consideration somewhat obliquely before a Full Bench of this Court in Sant Ram Das Raj Kalka v. Karam Chand Mangal Ram, AIR 1963 Punj. 1 (FB). While concurring with the mainjudgment of Mehar Singh, J., (as he then was) in that case, Shamsher Bahadur, J., (as he then was) observed that a landlord may apply under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act for ejectment of the tenant from a residential building on fulfilment of all the three conditions laid down in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of that subsection. In a later judgment of the Supreme Court in Attar Singh v. Inder Kumar, 1967-69 Pun LR 83 = (AIR 1967 SC 773), it was held that in order to succeed under a similar provision, the landlord has not only to prove that he requires the premises in question for his own use, but he has also to prove that he is not in possession of any other such premises in the urban area in question, and also to prove that he had not vacated any such premises without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act. It is clear that in view of the observations made by Shamsher Bahadur, J., in the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Messrs. Sant Ram Das Rai Kalka (supra), and the authoritative pronouncement oftheir Lordships of the Supreme Court in Attar Singh's case (supra), the Delhi High Court and the learned Single Judge of this Court took the correct view (referred to above), and the view taken by the Division Bench in Krishan Lal Seth's case (supra) is no longer good law. In the face of the state of law referred to above. Mr. Gokal Chand Mittal could not support the order of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, but has prayed that instead of dismissing his application for ejectment I should adopt the course the was adopted by the Delhi High Court in H. N. Bhasin's case (supra), and by D. K. Mahaian, J., in Darshan Singh's case (supra). I agree and accordingly re mand the respondent's application for ejectment to the Rent Controller for fresh trial after allowing the landlord-respondent an opportunity to amend the application for ejectment. Mr. Sarin has no objection to this course being adopted.
3. For the foregoing reasons I allow this petition, set aside the judgment and order of the Appellate Authority and of the Rent Controller, and remand this case to the Rent Controller, Ferozepore, for rehearing and re-deciding the case on merits in the light of the observations herein made after allowing the landlord-respondent an opportunity to amend his petition for ejectment. The amended petition may be filed by the landlord before the Rent Controller on May 12, 1975, when the parties will appear before him for further proceedings. The landlord may serve an advance copy of the amended petition on the counsel for the tenant in the trial Court. The tenant would be entitled to file his fresh written statement in reply to the amended petition. A it is an old case, the Rent Controller shall make an effort to dispose it of as expecitiously as possible. There is no order as to costs incurred by the parties in this Court.