Teja Singh, J.
1. The facts of the case are given at length in the judgment of the lower appellate Court and it is not necessary to recapitulate them here.
2. The only question in this second appeal is whether Section 10, Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 10 [x] of 1941, was in force in Jullundur Cantonment.
3. The Act received the assent of His Excellency the Governor-General on 15-5-1941 and was published in the Punjab Gazette on 23-5-1941. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 provides that the Act extends to all urban areas in the Punjab but 'nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect the regulation of house accommodation in any contonment area.' The words of Sub-section (3) of Section 1 are:
It shall come into force in such urban areas and on such dates as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf, and shall remain in force in each such area for live years from the date of its enforcement in that area unless such period is extended by a resolution of the Punjab Legislative Assembly. On 3-7-1941, the Government Punjab issued Notification No. 2038-C-41/34914 saying that in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (3) of Section 1. of the Act the Governor of the Punjab was pleased to direct that the Act should come into force in the areas specified in the schedule annexed to the Notification and with effect from the date of the Notification. Jullundur Cantonment was one of the areas mentioned in the Schedule.
4. Section 10 of the Act, deals with the conditions of statutory tenancy. Sub-section (1) of it lays down that no order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay rent to the full extent allowable by this Act and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. The proviso to this Sub-section reads as follows:
Provided that the Court shall make an order for the recovery of possession if the landlord satisfies the Court that six months' notice to quit or notice of such period as may be required under the contract of tenancy, whichever be longer, has been served on the tenant.Sub-section (2) lays down that where any order of the kind mentioned in Sub-section (1), has been made on or after 1-1-1939, but not executed before the commencement of this Act, the Court by which the order was made may, if it is of opinion that the order would not have been made if this Act had been in operation at the late of making of the order, rescind or vary the order in such manner as the Court may think fit for the purpose of giving effect to this Act. Then follow two provisos to the section. The first proviso is to the effect that nothing in the section shall apply where the tenant has committed any act contrary to the provisions of Clauses (o) and (p) of Section 108, T.P. Act or has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance etc., or where the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for certain purposes specified in the proviso, or where the landlord can show any cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court. The second proviso is worded as below:
Provided further that this section shall not apply to any Cantonment areas.5. To start with the appellants' counsel made an effort to show that according to Sub-section (2) of Section 1, the Act does not apply to any cantonment area and that notwithstanding Sub-section (3) of Section 1 the Provincial Government had no power to extend its provisions to any cantonment. The contention appears to me to be wholly untenable. From what I have said above, ir will be seen that the words of Sub-section (2) are quite different from those used in the first part of Sub-section (3); All that Sub-section (2), lays down is that the Act extends to all urban areas in the Punjab, but it is provided in Sub-section (3) that in order that it shall come into force in any such urban area a notification to this effect in the Official Gazette by the Provincial Government is essential and that the date of the enforcement in the urban areas included in the notification will be the date of the notification. It need not be pointed out that there is considerable difference between an enactment extending to a particular area and its coming into force in that area and that the term 'extends' is not quite analogous to the phrase shall come into force. When it is laid down in an enactment that it extends to the whole of a country or a part of it, it does not necessarily mean that it is also in force therein, particularly when there is an express provision that before it can come into force something further, such as the issue of a notification, is to be done. It may also be mentioned that even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the term 'extends' when used in an enactment without any qualification can be considered as analogous to the phrase 'shall come into force', when they appear in two sub-sections of the same section dealing with the applicability of the enactment, of which the section forms part, obviously they cannot mean the same thing. This is one of the fundamental principles governing the construction of statutes, Reference in this connection may be made to p. 322 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes wherein it is stated that when analogous words are used, each may be presumed to be susceptible of a separate and distinct meaning, for the Legislature is not supposed to use words without a meaning. Reading therefore Sub-section (2) of Section 1 with Sub-section (3) of the section my opinion is that the intention of the Legislature was to provide the Government with a ready-made law and to empower it to bring that law into force in any urban area and from any date that it may like.
6. As regards the effect of the second part of Sub-section (2) wherein it is provided that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect the regulation of house accommodation in any Cantonment area. I do not agree with the appellant's counsel that it excludes altogether all urban areas from the operation of the Act. It is common knowledge that cantonment areas are primarily meant for the accommodation of the military and as I read the words of Sub-section (2), all that they appear to me to mean is that the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act shall have no effect upon the action that the cantonment authorities may take in that connection. It will be seen that the expression 'urban area' as defined in Clause (f) of Section 2 means any area administered by a municipal corporation, a municipal committee, a cantonment board, a small town committee, a notified area committee or other authority etc. and since according to Sub-section (3) of Section 1 the Provincial Government has been expressly empowered to bring the Act into force in any urban area, it is futile to urge that when the Government issues a notification bringing the Act into force in a cantonment, even those provisions of it which cannot possibly have any effect upon the regulation of house accommodation therein do not apply to that cantonment.
7. Having failed to convince me about incorrectness of his first position the appellant counsel, then adopted a different line. He argued that by virtue of the notification the whole Act, including Section 10, became applicable to Jullundur Cantonment. When his attention was drawn to proviso 2 to Section 10 which clearly lays down that that section shall not apply to any cantonment areas, his reply was that the proviso became ineffective in view of the Government notification. I do not see any force in this contention either. It is correct that Sub-section (3) of Section 1 vests the power to bring the Act into force into an urban area in the Provincial Government but when the Government once exercises power under this sub-section and issues a notification, the result is that every part of the Act comes into force in the urban area in question. Now, Section 10 is as much part of the Act as any other section thereof and when the Government issues a notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 that the Act shall be enforced in any cantonment area like other sections of the Act this section would also apply to that cantonment area, but the last proviso to the section itself lays down that it shall not apply to any cantonment areas and in order to give effect to the proviso the applicability of the section to a cantonment area included in the notification must be ruled out To hold otherwise would be to apply only a part of Section 10 and to ignore the last proviso, which we cannot do. We must presume that while issuing the notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 bringing the Act into force inter alia into Juliundur Cantonment, the Provincial Government were aware of all the provisions of the Act and they knew that fey virtue of the last proviso to Section 10 that section does not apply to any cantonment areas. Consequently by notifying Jullundur Cantonment as one of the urban areas in which the Act was to be enforced, it cannot be said that they intended to apply that section to the said cantonment. Section 3 of the Act gives the Provincial Government power to exempt any particular premises or class of such premises from the applicability of all or any of the provisions of the Act, and if the Government intended that in spite of the last proviso to Section 10 that section should apply to houses or shops in that cantonment they eould have very easily directed that the said proviso shall not apply to them. The section which reads as below, is very widely worded and gives unlimited power of exemption to the Government:
Section 3 The Provincial Government may direct that all or any of the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any particular premises or class of such premises.For all these reasons, I hold that by virtue of the last proviso to Section 10, that section did not apply to Jullundur Cantonment. This was the view taken by the learned Senior Subordinate Judge. So the appeal is dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.