1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against a judgment and decree of this Court passed on the 8th September, 1952 (See AIR 1953 Punj 177) reversing the decree of the District Judge.
2. This application arises out of Regular Second Appeal No. 327 of 1948 (See AIR 1953 Punj 177) which was brought by Mst. Jeo against Ujagar Singh against a decree passed by District Judge, Sri Ram Puri, dated the 21st November, 1947. The parties' names in the Regular Second Appeal were:
'Mst. Jeo daughter of Jowala Singh, wife of Gulab Singh, caste Jat of Mauza Walla, Tehsil and District Amritsar, Versus Ujagar Singh, son of Sant Singh, caste Jat, of Mz. Sultan-wind Tehsil and District Amritsar, -- Respondent.'
In the application for leave to appeal to theSupreme Court which was filed in this Courtthe parties' names were as follows and itbegan 'In R. S. A. 327 of 1948.'
'Mst. Jeo daughter of Jewala Singh W/OGulab Singh. Caste Jat, of village Wallah,Tehsil and District Amritsar .....................Plaintiff-Appellant, Versus Ujjar Singh son of Sant Singh, Caste Jat of Mauza Sultan Wind, Tehsil and District Amritsar, Defendant-Respondent.'
Written on the margin is the following: Correction made vide order dated 26-3-53 of Kapur, J.
The stamp which under the rules has to be in the name of the person who is filing the application was in name of Mst. Jeo, daughter of Jawala Singh, of Walla, District Amritsar. The petition began as under:
'Petition of Ujjar Singh, under Article 133 of the Constitution of India, for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India against the decree dated 8-9-52 in the above appeal humbly showeth that'.
In the petition it was stated that Mst. Jeo's appeal had succeeded in this Court and the decree of the District Judge had been reversed & in paragraph 6 it was stated that the petitioner wanted to prefer an appeal against the decree of this Court and a certificate was prayed for. In the grounds of appeal it was made quite clear that it was Ujagar Singh who was attacking the decree of this Court.
3. On the 13th of March 1953 Mr. Chiran-jiva Lal Aggarwal made an application to this Court stating that the petitioner had come to know that the summons had been served on him rather than on Mst. Jeo because of a clerical error and that this was due to a 'bona fide' mistake of his clerk in buying the court fee stamp in a wrong name and he asked for the correction of names which I allowed on the 26th March in the following words:
'Granted subject to just exceptions'
4. On the 13th June 1953 a stamp of Rs. 2/-in the name of Ujagar Singh was filed in this Court seems to have been accepted by the office.
5. Along with the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court a power of attorney was filed. This is headed as follows:
'In the High Court of Judicature
In re:-Mst. Jeo Plantiff or Defendant
Ujagar Singh Applellant or Petitoner
Ujjagar Singh Defendant Respondent.'
Mst. Jeo Plaintiff
Application under Art. 133, Constitution of India.
(This is written on the margin).
In the body of this power of attorney the word 'respondent' has been changed to the word 'petitioner' and the date of this document which originally was the 10th of July 1948 was changed to September 1952. The stamp on this document is also in the name of Mst. Jeo, daughter of Jawala Singh and is dated the 29th of September, 1952, the date when the application under Art. 133 of the Constitution was filed-in this Court. No objection seems to have been taken, to this document by the office.
6. At the hearing of this application by way of preliminary objection Mr. Yashpal Gandhi submitted that there was no proper application made within the time allowed by the Limitation Act for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and he relied on the rules made by this Court in Chapter 8-A, Volume V of the Rules and Orders of this Court, which deal with Privy Council cases and begin 'Rules framed by the High Court regarding appeals to His Majesty in Council'. He also drew our attention to Chapter 9 of this volume which deals with Federal Court Appeals. The point raised by him was that according to these rules, which have been framed by the High Court, certain requisites are prescribed in paragraph 1 of both these chapters.
Chapter 8-A contains rules framed by the High Court regarding appeals to His Majesty in Council and they came into force on the 1st January 1921. Rules in Chapter 9 were framed by the High Court regarding appeals to the Federal Court but it has not been shown that either of these set of rules has been made applicable to applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. I have made enquiries from the office of this Court but have not been able to discover any authority or any rule showing that any one of these chapters had been made applicable to appeals to the Supreme Court. In view of this, the rule which was laid down by us (Khosla, J., and myself) in -- 'Tej Krishen v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd', AIR 1950 EP 195 at p. 198 (A) becomes Inapplicable and, therefore, I am of the opinion that this objection would have no force.
7. Not only this, the petition seems to show quite clearly that it was made by Ujagar Singh in regard to the Regular Second Appeal where a decision had been given against him and in favour of Mst. Jeo and the document was accepted by this office and it appears to me that it was by inadvertence that it was stamped in the manner that it was stamped and after the mistake was discovered by counsel he has filed a proper stamp which was accepted by the office of this Court. Under section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code, the fee having been received the effect is the same as if it has been paid in the first instance. The stamp which was originally bought and which is on the application is of the requisite amount but counsel explains that it was due to inadvertence that a wrong name was put on the stamp. In my opinion, these circumstances are sufficient to invite the applicability of section 28 of the Stamp Act and as the document has been allowed to be stamped with another stamp of Rs. 2/-, I am of the opinion that the application bears a proper stamp and the objection of Mr. Gandhi on this ground should be overruled.
8. The next objection raised by Mr. Gandhi is as to the power of attorney accompanying the application. This power of attorney, it is submitted, was given to Mr. Chiranjiva Lal Aggarwal for him to appear in the Second Appeal. There is no doubt that if this power of attorney had been filed with a proper stamp bearing the name of Ujagar Singh, it would have authorised Mr. Chiranjiva Aggarwal to file the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court but it was not filed in the Second Appeal or at any time while the Second Appeal was pending in this Court. It bears the stamp with name of Mst. Jeo and there are corrections as regards the date. There is nothing to show that this document was given to Mr. Chiranjiva Lal Aggarwal for the purpose of filing the application for leave to appeal. On the other hand, there are so many corrections made that it is not a document which this Court should accept to be a proper power of attorney. I would, therefore, give effect to this objection and hold that this application, had been filed without proper authority. As there is no authority to file the application for leave to appeal, I would dismiss it but in the circumstances would leave the parties to bear their own costs.
9. I agree.