Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.
1. This revision petition has been filed by Choeth Ram tenant, against the judgment of the Appellate Authority, Ludhiana, dated January 21, 1976, by which an order of ejectment has been passed against him.
2. Briefly the case of Deep Chand and Hans Raj (since deceased), who were petitioners before the Rent Controller, was that Choeth Ram was a tenant under them on payment of Rs. 60 per mensem as rent, and that he had not paid the rent since October 1, 1968. Consequently they filed an application for ejectment of Choeth Ram, tenant, under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinfater referred to as the Act), inter alia on the ground of non-payment of rent. The other grounds for ejectment are not relevant for the decision of the present revision petition. The tenant contested the application for ejectment and pleaded that in the beginning the property was on rent with him at the rate of Rs. 10 per mensem and the rent was enhanced to Rs. 30 per mensem in the middle of March 1960. He further pleaded that he had already paid the rent at the rate of Rs. 30 per mensem upto March 31, 1970 and was ready to pay the balance rent at the said rate. He also averred that six months' notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was required to be served by the landlord on him as he was a contractual tenant of the premises from year to year, He asserted that no notice had been given by the landlord to him.
3. The tenant tendered an amount of Rs. 120 on account of rent from April 1, 1970 to July 31, 1970 at the rate of Rs. 30 per mensem together with Rs. 2 as interest and Rs. 25 as costs on August 3, 1970, the first date of hearing. The landlord accepted the rent under protest and without prejudice to his right to eject the tenant on the ground of non-payment.
4. The learned Rent Controller framed nine issues out of which issues Nos. 3 and 4 are relevant for the decision of the revision petition and these are as follows:--
'3. Whether the tender made is valid?
4. Whether notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary as alleged in paragraph No. 5 of the petition?'
The learned Rent Controller held that tender of rent was not valid and that no notice was required to be served under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the tenant. In the aforesaid circumstances he ordered ejectment of the tenant. The tenant went up in appeal before the appellate authority, Ludhiana, before whom findings on the aforesaid issues only were challenged. He dismissed the same. The tenant has come up in revision against the order of the appellate authority to this Court.
5. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner had paid the rent of the premises in dispute at the rate of Rs. 30 per mensem, from March 23, 1968 to March 31, 1969. amounting to Rs. 369. vide receipt dated November 16, 1968 (Exhibit R-3) and from April 1, 1969 to March 31, 1970, vide receipt dated August 20, 1969 (Exhibit R-4). He submits that the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority had held that the receipt, Exhibit R-3, was genuine, but receipt Exhibit R-4. was not so. According to the learned counsel, the findings of the Courts below to the effect that Exhibit R-4 was a forged receipt, was not correct. In support of his contention, he referred to the statements of the witnesses.
6. I have considered the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, but find it to be devoid of force. The question as to whether the receipt executed by Hans Raj in favour of Choeth Ram, tenant, is forged or not, has been decided by the Courts below after appraising the evidence. It has not been pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that the finding of the Courts below is vitiated. Normally in the revision petitions, the evidence is not reappraised by the High Court. In the aforesaid view. I am fortified by the observations of the Supreme Court in Pandit Kishan Lal v. Ganpat Ram Khosla, AIR 1961 SC 1554 and Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, 1962-64 Pun LR 694: (AIR 1963 SC 499). In the former case, the Controller and the District Judge found that the tenant of the shop in dispute was not Khosla, but the Company and the two Tribunals also found that possession of the shop was handed over by the Company to Khosla without the consent of the appellant The High Court had upset that finding. Shah, J. speaking for the Court, observed that the findings of the authorities below were binding upon the High Court, In Neta Rain's case, Hidayatullah, J. observed that the powers of the High Court under Section 15(5) of the Act do not include the power to reverse concurrent findings without showing how those findings are erroneous. The learned Judge further observed that if the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had examined the facts after instructing themselves correctly about the law, a Court of revision should be slow to interfere with the decision thus reached, unless it demonstrates by its own decision, the impropriety of the order, which it seeks to revise. I have also gone through the evidence, hut do not find sufficient reasons for interfering with the conclusions of the Courts below in the revision. After taking into consideration all the aforesaid circumstances, I reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
7. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the lease deed dated April 16, 1956, Exhibit P-l, executed by Choeth Ram. tenant, in favour of Hans Raj, landlord, was not got registered according to the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently it was inadmissible into evidence. He argues that the document was executed by the lessor and the lessee. According to him, the document, being inadmissible into evidence, should not have been relied upon by the learned appellate Court
8. I have given a deep consideration to the argument and find force in it. It is not disputed that Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. is applicable to Ludhiana. In that section, it is provided that a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered document. It is further stated therein that all other leases of immovable property may be made by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. In the present case, it is no doubt true that the lease deed was from February 24, 1956 to December 24, 1956, that is, for ten months. It being a document signed by both the lessor and the lessee, required registration under the aforesaid section, If it was not got registered, the period for which the lease deed was executed, could not be taken into consideration by the Courts below The Courts, however, after taking notice of the period of lease, held that the lease expired on December 24, 1956 and thereafter the tenant became a statutory tenant.
The learned counsel for the landlord has raised an objection that the question regarding admissibility cannot be raised in revision petition. I am, however, not convinced with the argument of the learned counsel. The objection of admissibility of a document, if it does not re-late to mode of proof, can be taken even in the revision petition, under Section 15(5) of the Act. In this view I get support from the observations of Privy Council in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji, AIR 1943 PC 83, Wherein it was held that where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself admissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. The effect of the above observation is that the objection regarding admissibility of document itself is available, to a party even at the stage of appeal. After taking into consideration all the aforesaid circumstances, I am of the opinion that the learned Courts below have erroneously read into evidence the lease deed. Exhibit P-1, which is inadmissible in evidence.
9. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was in occupation of the property in dispute prior to February 24, 1956, as a tenant from month to month, He further submits that the observations of the Courts below that he was a statutory tenant, were erroneous. I also find substance in this contention of the learned counsel. Deep Chand admitted in his statement that the respondent was a tenant in the property in dispute prior to the execution of the rent note, Exhibit P-1 (back of page 125). Choeth Ram, tenant, deposed that he took the building in dispute on an initial rent of Rs. 7 per month. The rent was raised to Rs. 10 per mensem and he paid at that rate up to the year 1968 when it was raised to Rs. 30 per mensem. That part of the statement has not been seriously challenged. From the aforesaid facts, the irresistible conclusion is that the petitioner was a tenant in the property in dispute from month to month before execution of the lease deed. I have already held, that the lease deed, Exhibit P-1, is inadmissible into evidence and cannot be taken into consideration for finding out the period of lease. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, I am of the opinion that at the time of filing the application for ejectment, the petitioner was a tenant from month to month under the respondent.
10. The fourth contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if the petitioner was a tenant of the premises in dispute from month to month, then a notice terminating his tenancy was required to be served upo him by the landlord under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and if he failed to do so, the application for ejectment was liable to be dismissed on this ground.
11. There is abundance of case law of the Supreme Court and the High Courts Including this Court on this subject. Before dealing with the case law, I shall refer to some provisions of the Act. Section 2(c) defines the word 'landlord' and it says that 'landlord' means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and. every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Section 2(i) defines the word 'tenant'. It says that 'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, unless with the consent in writing of the landlord, or a person whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has, been farmed out or leased by a municipal, town or notified area committee.
Section 4 deals with determination of fair rent and Section 13. with eviction of tenants. Section 4(1) says that the Controller shall on application by the tenant or landlord of a building or rented land fix the fair rent for such building or rented land after holding such inquiry as the Controller thinks fit. The relevant clauses of Section 13 are as follows:--
'13 (1) A tenant in possession of a building or rented, land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy except in accordance with the provisions of this section, or in pursuance of an order made under Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, as subsequently amended.
(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied;--
(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable;
Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid.. ... ... ...... ... ... ...On reading the definitions of the words 'landlord' and 'tenant' it is apparent that the Act does not create any distinction between different types of tenants, such as, statutory tenants, tenants for a fixed term, tenants from month to month, etc. A perusal of Section 4 of the Act shows that all types of tenants can make an application for fixation of fair rent. From the language of Section 13 (1) it is clear that a tenant can be evicted before as well as after the termination of the tenancy, in the aforesaid section, the words 'before or after the termination of the tenancy' are significant. The only inference that can be drawn from the aforesaid section is that the tenants, even before the termination of the tenancy, can be evicted if the case of the landlord falls under Section 13 (2) of the Act. Besides the provisions for fixing the fair rent and effecting ejectment, there are various other provisions which deal with different matters between landlords and tenants Section 6 provides that landlord cannot claim anything-in excess of fair rent; Section 9 provides for increase of rent on account of payment of rates, etc., of local authority; Section 10 forbids landlord to interfere with amenities enjoyed by the tenant, and Section 11 forbids conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building. From the above analysis, it is clear that all contingencies which are likely to arise between the landlords and the tenants have been incorporated in the Act.
12. Now I shall advert to the case law on the point. A question whether a notice was required to terminate the tenancy before filing an application for ejectment, was taken before a Division Bench consisting of Falshaw and Kapur JJ., in Bawa Singh v. Kundan Lal, 1952-54 Pun LR 358 : (AIR 1952 Punj 422). An argument was raised by the counsel for landlord in that case that the Act was a complete code by itself and it was not necessary to import into this an additional condition for coming to the Controller for an order of eviction that the landlord should give notice terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In support of the contention, the learned counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw, 1951 SCR 145: (AIR 1951 SC 115) Kapur, J. as my Lord then was, speaking for the Bench, observed, after taking notice of Rai Brij Raj Krishna's case, that in order to determine whether a tenant had become liable to eviction or not, the Controller must- confine himself to the provisions of the Act and to no other provision. The learned Judge further held that the Act was a complete code by itself and its provisions superseded the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence liability to ejectment is governed by the provisions of the Act and not by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Consequently the learned Judge held that no notice determining the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary. While making the above observations, the learned Judge placed reliance on the following quotation from Rai Brij Raj Krishna's case:--
'Section 11 is a self-contained section, and it is wholly unnecessary to go outside the Act for determining whether a tenant is liable to be evicted or not, and under what conditions he can be evicted. It clearly provides, that a tenant is not liable to be evicted except on certain conditions, and one of the conditions laid down for the eviction of a month to month tenant is non-payment of rent.'
13. Again the same question was raised before another Division Bench of this Court consisting of Khosla and Kapur JJ. in Hem Chand v. Sham Devi, ILR (1955) Punj 36. The main judgment in the case was written by Khosla, J., wherein the learned Judge, after making a reference to Bawa Singh's and Rai Brij Raj Krishna's case (AIR 1952 Punj 422 and AIR 1951 SC 115) (supra), observed that the Rent Control Act lays down not only the rights inter se of landlord and tenant but also provides the procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment, and that being so, the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, requiring the serving of a notice upon the tenant have no relevance when considering an application for ejectment made under the Act, The learned Judge further observed that consequently no notice was necessary. Kapur, J., concurred with the judgment delivered by Khosla, J., but appended a short note wherein he did not agree with the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Gurupada Haldar Jihan v. Arjoondas Goenka, AIR 1949 Cal. 61. In that case a learned Single Judge had held that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were applicable in spite of the fact that an Act of the West Bengal provided that the Calcutta Rent Ordinance would be applicable notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act The learned Judge held:--
'I am unable to agree that if the provisions of the Calcutta Ordinance were applicable in spite of the Transfer of Property Act the provisions with regard to notice would also be applicable.'
It may be mentioned here that Hem Chand's case came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwanddin v. Dave Bhag-watprasad Prabhuprasad, AIR 1963 SC 120. Their Lordships, however, did not express any opinion regarding the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, observing that the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, provided the procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment, and that being so, the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. had no relevance in considering an application for ejectment made under that Act. They further observed that there was nothing in the Act corresponding to the provisions of Section 13 (1) in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947.
14. This matter came up again before the Supreme Court in Mangilal v. Sugan Chand Rathi, AIR 19.65 SC 101, a case under Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. Mudholkar, J., speaking for the Court observed that the requirement of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is that a lease from month to month can be terminated only after giving fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy either by the landlord to the tenant or by the tenant to the landlord. Such a notice is essential for bringing to an end the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was further observed that unless the relationship is validly terminated, the landlord does not get the right to obtain possession of the premises by evicting the tenant.
15. Thereafter this question again was raised before a Division Bench of this court consisting of Shamsher Bahadur and R.S. Narula, JJ. in Swaraj Pal v. Janak Raj. (1968) 70 Pun LR 720: (AIR 1969 Punj 26) R. S. Narula. J., while speaking for the Bench, after noticing Mangilal's case (AIR 1965 SC 101) and some other cases, held that there was no provision in the East Punjab Urban Restriction Act, abrogating the necessity of notice required by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be stated that the learned Bench in this judgment did not notice the two Division Bench judgments of this Court, namely Bawa Singh's and Hem Chand's cases (AIR 1952 Punj 422 and ILR (1955) Punj 36) (supra). The matter was then canvassed before P. C. Pandit. J., in Bhaiya Ram v. Mahavir Prasad, 1968-70 Pun LR 897. The learned Judge, fn view of the conflict between the two Division Benches of this Court, namely. Sawaraj Pal's and Bawa Singh's cases (supra), referred the matter to a Full Bench which is reported in the same volume as Bhaiya Ram v. Mahavir Parshad, 1968-70 Pun LR 1011: (AIR 1969 Punj 110) (FB). In that case, the Full Bench, after considering a large number of authorities, held that nothing contained in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act can be said to have impliedly repealed the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as that provision can stand side by side with Section 13 of Punjab Act No. 3 of 1949. The Full Bench further held that an application for ejectment of a monthly tenant under Section 13 of the Act cannot succeed without the contractual tenancy being first determined by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the judgment the learned Full Bench expressly overruled Bawa Singh's wise and held that it was no longer good law in view of the chain of subsequent Supreme Court judgments. It further held that the judgment in Sawaraj Pal's case (supra) laid down the correct law.
While dealing with Hem Chand's case (supra), the Bench observed thus:--
'It would thus be observed that whereas the personal inclination of Khosla, J. in Hem Chand's case was in favour of the tenant, he appeared to be compelled to hold in favour of the landlord as he did, on the assumption that the observations of Fazal Ali, J., in Rai Brij Raj Krishna's case (already referred to) (AIR 1951 SC 115) had impliedly laid down that the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been abrogated by the relevant provisions in the Rent Control Act. J. L. Kapur, J. had already expressed his opinion on the point in question while writing the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Bawa Singh. While re-affirming the same view, the learned Judge categorically disapproved of the principles laid down in the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Gurupada Haldar Jiban Krishana Das's case (AIR 1949 Cal 61). It is noteworthy that the correctness of the view expressed by a Division. Bench of this Court in Hem Chand's case came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwanddin v. Dave Bhagwatparsad Prabhuparsad (AIR 1963 SC 120) (to which judgment detailed reference will hereinafter be made), and their Lordships expressly abstained from deciding whether the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court had laid down the correct law in this respect or not.. ... ... ...... ... ... ...I have already referred to the Supreme Court having left the question of the correctness of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Hem Chand's case (supra) open. They did mention that there is nothing in the Bombay Rent Act corresponding to the provisions of Section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, but left the Punjab case with the following observations:--
It is unnecessary for us to consider whether Hem Chand's case, was rightly decided or not.'
Whereas one side has contended before us that this amounts to the Supreme Court not having approved of the judgment of this Court in Hem Chand's case when an opportunity arose for doing so, the other side has contended that the Supreme Court did not hold the Punjab case to have been wrongly decided. All that the abovesaid observations appear to us to mean is that their Lordships expressly abstained from expressing their opinion on the point decided by this Court in Hem Chand's case one way or the other.'
The Bench relied upon the following observations from Mangilal's case:--
'The requirement of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is that a lease from month to month can be terminated only after giving fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy either by the landlord to the tenant or by the tenant to the landlord. Such a notice is essential for bringing to an end the relationship of landlord and tenant. Unless the relationship is validly terminated, the landlord does not get the right to obtain possession of the premises by evicting the tenant. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not provide for the satisfaction of any additional requirements. But then, Section 4 of the Accommodation Act steps in and provides that unless one of the several grounds set out therein is established or exists, the landlord cannot evict the tenant.'
16. The learned Full Bench further placed reliance on the observations of another Supreme Court judgment reported as Manujendra Dutt v. Purnendu Prasad Roy Chowdhury, AIR 1967 SC 1419, and while dealing with the case, said:--
'Their Lordships observed that the rent Acts are not ordinarily intended to interfere with contractual leases and are Acts for the protection of tenants and are consequently restrictive and not enabling, conferring no new rights of action, but restricting the existing rights either under the contract or under the general law. Their Lordships then referred to a statutory tenancy arising when a tenant under a lease holds over, that is, when a tenant remains in possession after the expiry or determination of the contractual tenancy, in that context it was observed that the right to hold over, which has been called the right of irremovability, thus is a right which comes into existence after the expiration of the lease and until the lease is terminated or expires by the efflux of time, a tenant need not seek protection under that right unless his tenancy has otherwise deter' mined under the general law, as the tenant is till then protected by the lease in breach of which he cannot be evicted.'
I shall also like to mention that a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Raval and Co. v. K. G. Ramachandran, AIR 1967 Mad 57 (FB) was cited before the Full Bench by the counsel for the landlord, in support of the proposition that no notice waa necessary by the landlord for terminating the tenancy of a tenant under the Act The learned Full Bench did not place reliance on this decision inter alia on the ground that the law laid down in the judgment was contrary to that in Manujendra Dutt's case (supra).
17. After the decision of the Full Bench in Bhaiya Ram's case, the appeal against the decision of Full Bench of Madras High Court in Raval and Company's case (AIR 1967 Mad 57) (FB) came up before the Supreme Court in Raval and Co. v. K. G. Ramachandran, AIR 1974 SC 818. The Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by the Full Bench and distinguished Manujendra Dutt's and Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwand-din's cases (AIR 1967 SC 1419 and AIR 1963 SC 120) (supra). The Supreme Court also made a reference to Hem Chand's case (ILR (1955) Punj 36) (supra) end approved its observations. Alagiri-swami, J, speaking for the majority, said thus:--
'We may also point out that in Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw and Bros., 1951 SCR 145: (AIR 1951 SC 115) dealing with the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 and interpreting Section 11 of that Act this Court observed as follows:--
Section 11 begins with the words 'Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the contrary' and hence any attempt to import the provisions relating to the law of transfer of property for the interpretation of the section would seem to to be out of place. Section 11 is a self-contained section, and it is wholly unnecessary to go outside the Act for determining whether a tenant is liable to be evicted or not, and under what conditions he can be evicted. It clearly provides that a tenant is not liable to be evicted except on certain conditions, and one of the conditions laid down for the eviction of a month to month tenant is non-payment of rent.
Similarly in Shri Hem Chand v. Smt. Sham Devi, ILR (1955) Punj 36 which dealt with the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, Section 13 (i) of which provided that no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, it was held that the Act provided the procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment and that being so the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had no relevance. Both these cases were referred to in the- decision in (1963) 3 SCR 312 : (AIR 1963 SC 120). Therefore, the following observations in 1967-1 SCR 475 : (AIR 1967 SC 1419) that--
'Rent Acts are not ordinarily intended to interfere with contractual leases and are Acts for the protection of tenants and are consequently restrictive and not enabling, conferring no new right of action but restricting the existing rights either under the contract or under the general law.' should' not be held to apply to all Rent Acts irrespective of the Scheme of those Acts and their provisions. The decision of the Madras High Court in R. Krishnamurthy v. Partha-sarathy, AIR 1949 Mad 780 : 1949-1 Mad LJ 412 where it was held that Section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1946 had its own scheme of procedure and therefore there was no question of an attempt to reconcile that Act with the Transfer of Property Act and that an application for eviction could be made to the Rent Controller even before the contractual tenancy was terminated by a notice to quit, should not have been summarily dismissed on the grounds that it was contrary to the decisions of this Court in Abbasbhai's case (1964) 5 SCR 157: (AIR 1964 SC 1341) and Mangilal's case (1964) 5 SCR 239 : (AIR 1965 SC 101) and therefore was not a correct law without examining the provisions of that Act.'
It is relevant to mention that the provisions of Section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease & Bent Control) Act are similar to those of Section 13 of the Act. The scheme of the Act has already been given above. Thus the above observations fully support the case of the landlord.
18. In the chain of decisions, I may refer to another judgment of the Supreme Court, decided by it on March 3, 1976. wherein the same question was debated. In that case the section for interpretation was Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1980. The landlord had filed a petition for ejectment against his tenant, who was a tenant from month to month, on the ground that he had not paid the rent. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, after noticing an earlier Division Bench judgment of that Court, held that no notice was necessary. The tenant went up in the Supreme Court against the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The case was decided by a Bench of three learned Judges presided over by A. N, Ray, C. J., and is reported as Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana, AIR 1976 SC 869. Beg, J., while speaking for the Bench, followed M/s. Raval and Co.'s case (AIR 1974 SC 818) (supra) approved the observations in Hem Chand's case (ILR (1955) Punj 36) and held that the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, was a complete code providing procedure for eviction and a prior notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. terminating the lease, is not necessary before filing a petition for eviction under Section 10 of the Andhra Act. The observations of the learned Judge regarding M/s. Raval and Co.'s and Hem Chand's cases are as follows:--
'We may also refer here to the observations of this Court in Raval and Co. v. K. G. Ramachandran, (1974) 2 SCR 629 at p. 634 : (AIR 1974 SC 818 at p. 821). There, this Court noticed Shri Hem Chand v. Smt. Sham Devi, ILR (1955) Punj 36 and pointed out that it was held there that the Act under consideration in that case provided the whole procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment, and, that being so, provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had no relevance.' No doubt the decision mentioned with approval by this Court related to another enactment. But, the principle indicated by this Court was the same as that applied by the AndhraPradesh High Court.'
The learned Judge, however, distinguished Mangilal's case (AIR 1965 SC 101) and said that in that case a different kind of provision of another Act in another State was being considered by the Court and consequently the observations in that case were not applicable. From the perusal of the aforesaid case it is established that the ratio in Hem Chand's case, on which no opinion had been expressed by the Supreme Court in Bhaiya Punjalal's case (AIR 1963 SC 120) and the Full Bench of this Court in Bhaiya Ram's case (AIR 1969 Punj 110) has new been approved in M/s. Raval & Company's and Puwada Venkateswara Rao's cases (supra). The Full Bench had overruled Bawa Singh's case (AIR 1952 Punj 422). Bawa Singh's case was followed in Hem Chand's case (ILR (1955) Punj 36). It would be pertinent to state that provisions of Section 10 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, are pari materia with the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. Consequently, I am of the view that the Supreme Court impliedly also approved observations in Bawa Singh's case (supra).
19. R. S. Narula, C. J., who wrote the main judgment in Bhaiya Ram's case (AIR 1969 Punj 110) (FB), recently decided the same question in Mool Raj Jain v. Jayna Engineering Works, (Civil Revn. No. 355 of 1976) decided on 3-11-1976 : reported in 1976-78 Pun LR 980. The learned Judge observed that after the settlement of the law by the Supreme Court in the latest judgment in Puwada Venkateswara Rao's case (AIR 1976 SC 869), no doubt Was left in the legal position. The words in the relevant provision relating to application for eviction in almost all the Rent Control Acts providing for special summary proceedings for eviction of tenants are practically the same. The learned Chief Justice further observed that the Supreme Court had held that in all such cases where a special provision for summary proceedings for eviction of tenants under an Act containing all the requirements for those proceedings was given, there was no room for importing the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Act, the learned Chiei Justice observed, was a complete code on the subject of eviction.
20. Mr. Gurbachan Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance on some observations of the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander, (1976) 2 SCC 103 : (AIR 1976 SC 588). Krishna Iyer J., speaking for the Court, observed that valid determination of lease under the Transfer of Property Act, is a must. The learned Judge, however, thereafter also made observations that if the rent control legislation specifically provides grounds for eviction in supersession, not in supplementation, of what is contained in the Transfer of Property Act, the situation may conceivably be different. From the aforesaid observations, it is clear that in order to determine whether notice is required in a particular case, it is necessary to go into the provisions of the Act under which the proceedings had been started. In the present case, I have already taken into consideration the aforesaid circumstance. In my opinion, the learned counsel cannot derive any benefit from the aforesaid case.
21. Lastly the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the alternative, has argued that the petitioner was liable to pay rent at the rate of RS. 10 per mensem upto March 31, 1968. He argues that there was a new agreement between the parties according to which the rent was enhanced by the petitioner to Rs. 30 per mensem. He says that thus a new contract came into force with effect from March 23, 1968. The learned counsel argues that if it is so, the petitioner became a tenant from month to month. He further argues that in the aforesaid situation, it was incumbent upon the landlord to serve notice upon the tenant. This argument of the learned counsel has lost all force in view of the fact that I have held that no notice is necessary for terminating the tenancy if ejectment application is filed under Section 13 of the Act. In the aforesaid situation I do not find much substance in this contention of the learned counsel.
22. After taking into consideration the scheme of the Act and the case law on the point, no doubt is left in my mind that the Act is a complete code in itself, and acts in its own field without dependency on the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. When any proceedings are taken for ejectment under the Act, the provisions of Transfer of Property Act have no relevance and it is not necessary to terminate the tenancy by serving a notice as required by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
23. No other point was raised.
24. For the reasons recorded above, the revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case I, however, make no order as to costs. I further grant one month's time to the tenant to vacate the premises.