J.S. Bedi, J.
1. On the 19th April, 1962, the respondent, namely, Jagjit Singh filed an application against his wife Hamir Kaur petitioner under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The trial Court granted a decree in his favour and against the petitioner who filed an appeal in this Court which is F.A.0. No. 50-M of 1963. The petitioner then moved an application to this Court under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act for grant of maintenance pendant late to her in the said appeal. It came up before Sharma J., who on the 17th February, 1966, ordered the respondent to pay rupees twenty five by way of maintenance pendante lite and one hundred fifty rupees as litigation expenses of the proceedings in this Court from the 1st January, 1966. The petitioner has now come up to this Court under the provisions of Section 8 of the Contempt of Courts Act alleging that the order dated the 17th February, 1966, has not been complied with by the respondent who has refused to pay any part of the said maintenance allowance end litigation expenses to the petitioner and deliberately persists in nonpayment of the same in spite of demands by the petitioner. It was also alleged that the respondent's father owned considerable land and other property and had an income of fifteen hundred rupees per month. It was then pleaded that the respondent, by his refusal and mala fide conduct of persistent refusal, flouted the orders of this Court and still persisted in refusing to carry them out and, therefore, it was prayed that action against him under Section 8 of the Contempt of Courts Act be taken. This application is dated the 8th September, 1966. It came up before this Court and a notice was issued to the respondent on the 18th October, 1966. In response to that notice the respondent has put in the written statement and, in paragraph 6 thereof, has stated that paragraph 6 of the petition is not wholly correct. He then goes on to say that he has deposited two hundred and twenty five rupees in obedience to the order of this Court on the 17th March, 1966, and this fact has been deliberately suppressed by the petitioner in his petition although she is aware of this deposit. It has atop been denied that the respondent bas ever refused to pay the amount of litigation expenses as ordered by this Court as no demand bas been made by the petitioner from him. It has also been denied that the respondent owns any land. He has further averred that he could not procure the balance of the amount to be deposited. Moreover, he was under the impression that the money could be deposited in lump-sum and it was not necessary to deposit the money every month.
2. Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10, according to the respondent, are incorrect and have been denied.
3. The arguments of the parties were heard at considerable length. The petitioner's counsel submitted that the respondent had deliberately flouted the orders of this Court, had not paid a single pie so far and thus committed gross contempt of this Court and he should, therefore, be suitably dealt with. The counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that Sharma, J. hid pushed the relevant orders on the 17th February, 1966. In those orders, the learned Judge had not specified the manner and time in and at which the amount was to be paid. Anyhow, he deposited two hundred and twenty-five rupees on the 17th March 1966. Another sum of two hundred rupees was deposited on the 8th November, 1966, and yen another sum of twenty-five rupees was deposited on the 9th January, 1967. The F.A.0. in question came up before Sharma, J., on the 19th January, 1967, when he remanded the case for retrial on account of some technical flaw. In all, therefore, according to him, the amount of four hundred and fifty rupees had already been deposited in the Court and the same amount was due from him up to the 19th January, 1967. He further submitted that it was true that he did not or could not deposit this amount every month, but it was not clear from the order in question that the deposit was to be made every month. Ha further submitted that if the petitioner had any grouse against him, he could have realised this amount through execution as laid down in N. Balasubramaniam v. Smt. B. Saroja (1966) 68 Pun LR 121, head note 3, wherein the learned Narula, J., laid down that the spouse in whose favour an order under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act had been made could execute that order through Court to the extent of the amount which had become payable to the applicant within three years of his application for execution. Moreover, the wordings of Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, are quite clear. It lays down that all decrees and orders made by the Court in any proceeding under this Act shall be enforced in like manner m the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction are enforced. It is, therefore, quite obvious to me that to approach this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act is not the only remedy to be adopted in such a case and that the recourse to Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Acts could also be taken.
4. The grouse of the petitioner now seems to be that although the respondent has deposited he said amount, as stated by him, in this Court, but the petitioner was not aware of that and this silence on the part of the respondent was intentional, just to harass the petitioner.
5. The respondent's counsel, on the other hand, says that, after he deposited the amount it was not his duty to inform the petitioner of it. In any case, the respondent's counsel submits that he did not willfully or intentionally ignore the orders of this Court, at all. I feel that it would have been parhaps better if at the time of making the deposit of the above same the respondent's counsel had informed the petitioner or his counsel to avoid harassment, but it cannot be said that the respondent did so intentionally. The amount deposited should now be paid to the petitioner. I do not think that the petitioner has been able to make out a case against the respondent under the Contempt of Courts Act. The petition is, therefore, dismissed, but no order as to costs.