Harnam Singh, J.
1. In thess proceedings the question that arises for decision is the true meaning of the expression 'purely residential premises' occurring in Section 9(1) (e) of the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Bent Control Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
2. Mr. Bishan Narain, learned counsel for the Plaintiff-landlord, contends that the true test in deciding whether the demised premises are 'purely residential premises' within Section 9(1) (e) of the Act is the 'nature of the premises' and not the conditions of the tenancy or the actual use made of them. In this connection Mr. Bishan Narain cites Clause (d) and (g) of Section 9(1) of the Act. In order to bring a case within Clause (d) and (g) of Section 9(1) of the Act, it is pointed out, that the landlord has to prove that the premises were 'let to the tenant for use as a residence'. This, it is contended, is not the requirement of law in Section 9(1) (e) of the Act. Indeed it is maintained that 'premises built for use as a residence are' 'purely residential premises' within Section 9(1) (e) of the Act notwithstanding that the tenant does change the user of the premises and creates a shop out of what was built as 'purely residential premises.'
3. in 'Civil Revn. No. 354 of 1949' D/- 12-9-1950 it was said that when it is found that the premises in possession of a tenant are being used for non-residential purposes it is for the plaintiff-landlord to prove that that is not in accord with the original terms of the tenancy. In other words, it was held that the purpose of letting is the essential factor and the user of the premises by the tenant is admissible to 'show, subject to rebuttal, that the premises are or are not 'purely residential premises' within Section 9(1) (e) of the Act. In that case the contention set out in the preceding paragraph was neither raised nor considered.
4. in 'Civil Revn. No. 135 of 1950', D/- 9-10-1950 it was contended on behalf of the land-lord that in deciding the application of Section 9(l)(e) of the Act, what the Court has to see is not the purpose for which a particular portion of the demised premises is being used but the construction of it and the purpose for which it was built. In other words, it was contended, that Section 9(l)(e) of the Act applies to a building which was built as a residential house but was being used by the tenant as an office at the time the possession of the building is claimed by the landlord. In that case the contention raised was dismissed with the observation that if a build-Ing was let for residential purposes and was being used for purposes other than that for which it was let it was open to the landlord to bring a suit for the eviction of the tenant from that building under Section 9(l)(b)(i) of the Act. Clearly, the user of the premises by the tenant and not the purpose of letting was considered to be the essential factor in deciding the application of Section 9(1) (e) of the Act.
5. Considering then that the point has arisen in a petition for revision and from the Judgment of a Single Judge in such cases there is no right of appeal under the Letters Patent, I refer Civil Revision No. 685 of 1949 to a Division Bench of two Judges, subject to the sanction of my Lord, the Chief Justice.