A.D. Koshal, J.
1. The suit out of which this petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure arises was instituted on these allegations. On the 30th of June, 1964, the plaintiff deposited with the Committee of Management of Gurdwara Shahidan Ladewal Mahalpur (hereinafter referred to as the defendant-Committee) a sum of Rs. 500/- against receipt Exhibit P-l. The same was repayable to the plaintiff on demand and a demand in that behalf was made in the last week of April, 1967, whereupon the defendant-Committee passed a resolution in the month of May, 1967, to the effect that the amount be repaid to the plaintiff. However, the demand was not met till the institution of the suit.
The suit was resisted by the defendant-Committee on the pleas that it never received the amount in dispute, that receipt Exhibit P-1 was a false document prepared by the plaintiff in conspiracy with the then President of the defendant-Committee, that in any case the advance did not amount to a deposit and that the suit was time-barred.
Both the Courts below held that although the amount was advanced by the plaintiff to Shri Pritam Singh, the then President of the defendant-Committee, Shri Pritam Singh was not authorised to accept the advance on behalf of the defendant-Committee and that the plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to recover the amount from the defendant-Committee. The trial Court also held that the transaction was in any case a loan and not a deposit and that the suit was time-barred having been brought three years after the 30th of June, 1964. Both the Courts, therefore, dismissed the suit with costs and it is the decree passed by the lower appellate Court that is challenged by the plaintiff in revision before me.
2. I am inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant-Committee must be held liable to repay the amount of Rs. 500/- found to have been advanced by the two Courts below to Shri Pritam Singh, the then President of the defendant-Committee, because the amount was duly credited in the account-books of the defendant-Committee to the plaintiff and was actually utilised by the defendant-Committee. The matter, however, does not end there because the plaintiff has another insurmountable hurdle in the way of a decree being passed in his favour. As observed by the trial Court, the Gurdwara is not a banker and receipt Exhibit P-1 does not show that the transaction was a deposit and not a loan. It is well settled that where a question arises as to whether a transaction is a deposit or a loan, there is no presumption in law that it is a deposit except in regard to the monies of a customer in the hands of a banker. If a person hands over money to another who is not a banker on the understanding that it is not a gift, it would be regarded in law as a loan and if the former wants to make out that it is a deposit, the onus is on him to show that the parties intended to treat it as such, i.e.. that their intention was that the person to whom the money was handed over should keep the money till it is asked for by the other party to the transaction. The Gurdwara not being a banker, no presumption arises that the transaction with which we are concerned here was a deposit and there is no evidence in support of the proposition that the intention of the parties was that the defendant-Committee should keep the money till it was asked for by the plaintiff. The trial Court thus correctly characterised the transaction as a loan so that it was covered by Article 19 of the Limitation Act according to which a suit for the recovery of the amount would be barred three years after the date on which the loan was made, i.e.. 30th of June, 1964. That period of three years admittedly expired before the institution of the suit which consequently must be held to be time-barred.
3. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed but with no order as to costs because the defendant-Committee has not put in appearance at the hearing.