(1) This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by Parvati Devi, petitioners to which the respondent are Tibbia College Board Delhi and the Competent Authority Slum Areas, New Delhi, 1964, under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (Act 96 of 1956) against the petitioners that is challenged in this petitioners on the sole ground which is to prevail under that section for making an order, as that has been rendered clear by the judgment of their Lordships in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602, in which, at page 1611, their Lordships observed--
'Obviously, if the protection that is afforded is read in the context of the rest of the Act, it is clear that it is to enable the poor who have no other place to go, to and who if they were compelled to go out, would necessarily create other slum in the proves and live perhaps in less commodious and more unhealthy surrounding than those from which they were evicted, to remain in their dwellings until provision is made for a better life for them elsewhere. Though, therefore, the Act fixes no time limit during which alone the restraint on eviction is to operate, it is clear form the policy and purpose of the enactment and the object which it seeks to achieve that this restriction would only be for a period which would be determined by the speed with which the authorities are able to make other provisions for affording the slum dweller-tenants better living condition s. The Act, no doubt, looks at the problem not form the point of view of the landlord, his needs, the money he has suck in the house were either let to other tenants or was reconstructed and let out have not alternative accommodation and who would be stranded in the open if an order for eviction were passed. The Act itself contemplates eviction in for human habitation it has to be demolished either singly under section 7 or as one of a block of building under Chapter IV. So long therefore as a building can, without great determent to health or safety, permit accommodation the policy of the enactment would seem to suggest that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation could be obtained for him.'
In the present case respondent 2 has found that her petitioners is a poor lady and though he does not say in his order that by her eviction she is likely to create further slum, but that of course is immediately clear from his finding that she is a poor lady. The ground on which respondent 2 proceeds to order residential accommodation provided by respondent 1 to the petitioners was not a residential house, not form nay commercial or profit making motive but with the sole object of providing an amenity to the petitioners like other servicemen of respondent 1. Respondent 2 considers that the amenity is provided and maintained by respondent 1 to attract to their service better qualified and better experienced person or persons possession a better claibre.
(2) The husband of the petitioners was compounder with respondent 1 in its hospital. He died on June 6,1959. He was in occupation of quarter No. B. 12 of the quarters provided by respondent 1 solely for its employees. Those quarters are not meant to be let out to the public in general and have been provided by respondent 1 with the specific object of an amenity to its staff working in its hospital. Two days after the death of her husband, that is to say on June 8, 1959, the petitioner made an application copy Annexure R-4 to the Principal of respondent 1's college that she be allowed to work as a paid apprentice Aya for one or two months. On June 20, 1959, her request was accepted to give her a trial as an Aya for three months. She was called upon the evacuate quarter No. B. 12 and instead she was allotted on trial on the specific condition that she was to copy of the letter is Annexure R-5 and it shows that the petitioners accepted those conditions.
Subsequently another letter of November 20, 1959, copy Annexure R 6 appointed her on temporary basis for one year obviously leaving her in occupation of quarter No. D-151. But by December 28 and 29, 1959, the hospital authorities of respondent I abolished the department in which the petitioners was employed temporarily and as a consequence cancelled her appointment. She was then asked to vacate the quarter in her occupation. As she did not do so an application was made to the Rent Controller for her eviction on a number of grounds including the ground of subletting. It appears that there was a compromise between the parties before the Rent Controller and in her statement of which the copy in English translation is R-2/A, she admitted all the grounds in the eviction petition of respondent 1. However the Rent Controller proceeded to pass an order of eviction against the petitioners on the ground that the quarter was needed by respondent 1 for housing its employees.
In this petitioners the petitioners has filed an affidavit denying that she admitted at that time the subletting of the quarter and the position that she now takes is that as she was alone and a widow, so her brother lived with her. She says that she never sublet the quarter. She was, however, allowed by the Rend Controller one year on a settlement between the parties to vacate the quarter. She not having vacated the quarter after expiry of one year respondent 1 moved an application under S. 19 of the Act for permission to execute the decree against her an dress 2 has allowed that application. It is that order of respondent 2 of which the legality and validity is question in this question.
(3) There is only one argument which has been urged at this stage in this petitioners on behalf of the petitioners and that is the respondent 2 has not proceeded to a decision under S. 19 of the Act on the basis of the criterion laid done by their Lordships in Jyoti Pershad's case, AIR 1961 S C 1602 as has respondent 2 finds that the petitioners is a poor lady; she is in occupation of one room quarter. Although eviction form that quarter likely to create another slum but I should say that that is apparent form the tenor of the order. It is the substance of the matter that has to be taken and not necessarily the use of the particular would n expressing what the authority is saying. So that if what their Lordships have observed in Jyoti Pershad's case AIR 1961 S C 1602 is to be strictly applied to the present case it is said on the side of the petitioners that the order of respondent 2 cannot possibly stand. But Jyoti Pershad's case AIR 1961 S C 1602 on facts has no relation to a situation as in the present case.
It does not deal with the position of a residential accommodation provided by an institution as respondent 1, when such accommodation is maintained not for the purpose of letting out for profit and gain but only as an ancillary to the institution so as to provided an amenity to its servants. In fact such an occupation becomes almost a part of the contract of service of the employees of such an institution. Now if the argument for the petitioners were to succeed and it should so happen that a considerable number of employees of such an institution were either to resign or were to be dismissed an impossible situation will arise in this that the institution would lose such accommodation for all practical purposes for which the accommodation was being maintained. In other words the institution would not be able to provide any such amenity to its employees. I do not consider that their Lordships had a case of this type in contemplation when observations were made a shave been reproduced above.
Here is a petitioner who has accepted the accommodation as an amenity accompanying temporary service provided for her and in no Circumstances has she any right or consideration in her favour to remain in possession of such an accommodation after she has ceased to be in the service of the institution. Such accommodation is meant for another person who takes up service of the institution in lieu of the petitioners. In fact in this case the petitioners has thrown over board all her previous agreements with respondent 1 and although she has held occupation of the quarter for more than a year, she still is crating every conceivable obstruction to make the quarter available to the institution. In the Circumstances. I think respondent 2 has no option but to accept the application respondent 1 under S. 19 of the Act and give permission for execution of the decree against the petitioners.
(4) The petitioners fails and is dismissed. Normally costs ought to follow the event and particularly in facts of a case like this, but the petitioners is a poor lady and she was holdings a minor job of which she has been deprived so there is no order in regard to costs in this petition.
(5) Petition dismissed.