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Ram Sarn Dass Ganda Mal Vs. Union of India (Uoi) - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectConstitution;Service
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 455 of 1953
Judge
Reported inAIR1954P& H142
ActsConstitution of India - Sections 309
AppellantRam Sarn Dass Ganda Mal
RespondentUnion of India (Uoi)
Appellant Advocate H.R. Mahajan, Adv.
Respondent Advocate N.L. Salooja, Adv.
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Cases ReferredShenton v. Smith
Excerpt:
.....remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single judge. it has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an appeal to the high court. it has not made any provision for filing appeal to a division bench against the judgment or decree or order of a single judge. no letters patent appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a single judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a special act. sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002] & 104:[dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] writ appeal held, a writ appeal shall lie..........to amend the seniority list of its guards thus placing him as no. 1 in class 'a'. the plea of the union was that such a suit did not lie. it was accepted by both the courts below.3. mr. hem raj mahajan contends that accord-ing to the rules which have been made under the statute he is entitled as a matter of right to the seniority claimed by him. even if that is so the question still remains whether a suit would lie to enforce this right.this matter was considered by their lordships of the privy council in - 'venkata rao v. secy, of state', air 1937 pc 31 (a), where it was held that the terms of section 96b, government of india act contain a statutory and solemn assurance that the service, though at pleasure, will not be subject to capricious or arbitrary action and will be regulated by.....
Judgment:

Kapur, J.

1. This is a plaintiff's appeal against an appellate decree of Mr. Sheo Parshad, Senior Subordinate Judge, Gurdaspur, dated 8-6-1953 confirming the decree of the trial Court dismissing the plaintiff's suit for declaration and injunction.

2. The plaintiff alleges that he was appointed a Guard of Grade I on 15-9-1916 and was confirmed on 3-3-1918. He was appointed a Guard in Grade II on 16-3-1927 and was entitled to get seniority in service as from the date of his appointment in 1916 in accordance with the rules contained in Circular No. 1 of 1927 as revised in1937, and being the seniormost Guard on the Eastern Punjab Railway he was entitled to be styled as 'A' Class Guard with effect from the 1st January 1947. He sued for declaration and for permanent injunction ordering the defendant. Union of India, to amend the seniority list of its Guards thus placing him as No. 1 in Class 'A'. The plea of the Union was that such a suit did not lie. It was accepted by both the Courts below.

3. Mr. Hem Raj Mahajan contends that accord-Ing to the rules which have been made under the statute he is entitled as a matter of right to the seniority claimed by him. Even if that is so the question still remains whether a suit would lie to enforce this right.

This matter was considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in - 'Venkata Rao v. Secy, of State', AIR 1937 PC 31 (A), where it was held that the terms of Section 96B, Government of India Act contain a statutory and solemn assurance that the service, though at pleasure, will not be subject to capricious or arbitrary action and will be regulated by rules but that did not import a special kind of employment with an added contractual term that the rules are to be observed: At p. 34, Lord Roche observed:

'........... .....control by the Courts overGovernment in the most detailed work of managing its services would cause not merely inconvenience but confusion.'

At p. 34, Lord Roche said:

'But while thus holding on the clear facts of this case, as they now appear from the evidence, as they similarly held in - 'R. T. Rangachari v. Secy, of State', AIR 1937 PC 27 (B), their Lordships are unable as a matter of law to hold that redress is obtainable from the Courts by action.'

Reliance was there placed on the observations, of Lord Hobhouse in -- 'Shenton v. Smith', (1895) AC 229 CO, where Lord Hobhouse said-

'It appears to their Lordships that the proper grounds of decision in this case have been expressed by Stone J., in the Full Court.

They consider that, unless in special cases where it is otherwise provided, servants of the-Crown hold their offices during the pleasure of the Crown; not by virtue of any special prerogative of the Crown, but because such are the terms of their engagement, as is well understood throughout the public service. If any public servant considers that he has been dismissed: unjustly, his remedy is not by a law-suit, but by an appeal of an official or political kind......

As for the regulations, their Lordships again agree with Stone J. that they are merely directions given by the Crown to the Governments of Crown Colonies for general guidance, and that they do not constitute a contract between the Crown and its servants.'

4. Following these authorities I am of theopinion that even though there may be rules ofservice made under the statute they do notbecome a part Of the contract between the plaintiff and Union of India and in my opinion it isnot a matter which is subject to the control ofCourts. I would therefore dismiss this appeal withcosts.


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