R.S. Narula, J.
1. These two applications under sub-clauses (a) and (c) of Clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution are directed against the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court dated April 10, 1970, whereby two Letters Patent Appeals filed by the applicant against the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court allowing two writ petitions of Man Kauri respondent and quashing the orders of the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, wee dismissed. In these applications it has been claimed that the market value of the land in dispute measuring 28 Bighas 10 Biswas at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per Bigha at the time of the filing of the purchase application by the tenant in the Court of the Assistant Collector First Grade, Sirsa and still on appeal to the Supreme Court was and is more than Rs. 20,000. The Judgment of the Full Bench being of affirmance, the applicant is not entitled to a certificate as of right under Art. 133(1) (a) or (b) of the Constitution.
It is then stressed by the learned counsel for the appellants that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court as important questions of law relating to the interpretation and scope of various provisions of Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. and the 1956 Rules framed thereunder, have been decided and no authoritative pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court is available on any of these points. The Full Bench held inter alia:-
(i) Before the Collector determines the permissible area of land owner or a tenant, he is to hear the land owner and the tenant and further that the tenant has to be heard both in his capacity to determine his own permissible area of tenancy as also in regard to any matter that may affect his tenancy by the declaration of surplus area of land owner as his landlord and the determination of his permissible area.
(ii) The violation of principles of natural justice by an authority by his passing an order in violation of the doctrine of audi alteram partem does not oust the jurisdiction of such authority and does not render the order in question void in the sense that it is non est. Such an order is merely voidable. Where the order is void and non est that may be ignored altogether. But when it is voidable the aggrieved party has to proceed to get rid of it in accordance with law and where it fails to do so, it remains within jurisdiction, and the party is then not in a position to say that it is non est. If the Collector under the Act, while deciding the question of surplus area commits breach of the statutory rules in not hearing the tenant of that area this does not render the order of the Collector a nullity in the sense of its being void but only renders it voidable so as to be liable to be quashed at the instance of the aggrieved party.
(iii) The scope of power and jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner to revise the order under Section 24 of the Act is the same as that of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The interference in exercise of the revisional power has to be when the authority or the Court below in making the order under revision has either acted in excess of jurisdiction or has assumed jurisdiction which it does not possess, or in the exercise of its jurisdiction it acts with material irregularity or commits any breach of procedure laid down for reaching its conclusion. It is only when a conclusion of this type is reached that there may be interference by the Financial Commissioner in revision under Section 24 of the Act.
2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties we are of the considered view that in any case, the second question decided by us is of great public and private importance and arises in a large number of cases in this Court. Since, as already stated, there is no direct pronouncement of the Federal Court or the Supreme Court on that point we consider each of these two cases to be fit for appeal to their Lordships of the Supreme Court with in the meaning of sub-clause (c) of Clause (1) of Art. 133 of the Constitution. We certify accordingly.
3. In C. M. 1465-C of 1970, in S.C.A. 252 of 1970 and in C. M. 1464-C of 1970 in S.C.A. 253 of 1970, the Motion Bench had passed an order staying dispossession of the applicant ad interim. After hearing the counsel for the parties we are of the view that the said stay order should remain in force for another period of six weeks within which time the applicant may approach their Lordships of the Supreme Court for such further or other interim relief as he may be advised to seek. Costs of these applications shall abide the result of the intended appeals to the Supreme Court.
Mehar Singh, C.J.
4. I agree.
C.G. Suri, J.
5. I also agree.
6. Certificate granted.