1. The parties were married on July 30, 1982, and as claimed, the appellant-wife went to her husband' house at Delhi. She remained there for 4 or 5 days and was brought back to Ambala Cantt. in observance of a custom of having a newly wedded bride back in her father's house after a few days of marriage. She never went back. Or rather, as she claims, she was never taken back. For the period of stay in Delhi her version was that her husband was furious on her having brought less dowry and had even beaten her mercilessly making her life most miserable and ultimately turning her out on Sept. 11, 1982, warning that if she ever returned to his house he would kill her. As per her allegations in the divorce petition, her parents tried to effect reconciliation but to no avail. And thus on the ground of cruelty, she presented the divorce petition in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Ambala, on June 15, 1984.
2. The husband denied the allegations altogether. Since he did not pay maintenance pendente lite and litigation expenses, as ordered on the application under S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, preferred by the wife, his defence was struck off. Thus, the appellant wife-was left to prove her case. Since she failed to do so before the trial Judge and was denied relief, she has approached this Court in appeal.
3. The only evidence led by her and that of her father is that in the total period of 4/5 days which she spent at Delhi the husband was guilty of inflicting mental as also physical cruelty on her. Both the wife and her father are discrepant on the incidences of cruelty. Whereas the wife said that she had been turned out after 4 or 5 days of marriage, her father stated that she had customarily been brought back to Ambala after spending some time in the husband's house. It is difficult to reconcile the aforesaid two stances Additionally, period of four-five days stay immediately after marriage cannot give wife sufficient grounds to claim divorce on the basis of cruelty, especially when, the incidences quoted by her were in the nature of initial wear and tear of marriage. That itself was a period of adjustment and a little rubbing here and there could not be ruled out altogether. Such short durated cruelty could hardly give a ground to the wife to seek divorce. Thus, I m of the view that she was rightly denied the relief claimed.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that if divorce cannot be, granted to her, let her have the lesser relief either of judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights, for, she should not be allowed to stagnate in her father's house. For either of the two reliefs, separate pleadings are required and these have to go through another bout of litigation between the parties. The apprehension of the learned counsel that this petition might stand in her way is totally misplaced. Any petition, now preferred by her, would have to be decided on its own merits and the decision of the present case cannot cast a shadow thereon.
5. With these observations, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.
6. Appeal dismissed.