1. This is a revision against an order of the lower appellate Court refusing to grant an application under O. 22, R. 10, Civil P. C. (hereafter referred to as the Code), of the successful pre-emptors to be substituted for the original vendee who had brought a suit for redemption against the mortgagees. The facts as are necessary may be stated as under:--
The property in dispute was mortgaged with Ram Chander, Khubi and Kishan. The owners sold the smae to Badri Parshad, plaintiff in the suit out of which the present revision has arisen. Badri Parshad filed a suit against the mortgagees for possession of the property by way of redemption. A preliminary decree for redemption was passed on payment of Rs.1,850/- on 12th August, 1966, and it was directed that the payment shall be made within six months.
2. Meanwhile Dharam Chand and Mst. Shanti brought two suits for possession of their respective shares by pre-emption, which were decreed on 6th August, 1968. As a result of this, in law, they got 'substituted' for Badri Parshad so far as the original sale by the owners was concerned. They then filed an application under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code to be substituted for Badri Parshad in the suit.
3. A number of objections were taken and three issues were settled. All these issues were found in favour of Dharam Chand etc. and the application was granted. On an appeal filed by the mortgagees, the lower appellate Court reversed the finding of the Court below on issue No. 1, which was as follows:--
'Whether the petitioners are assignees of Badri Parshad plaintiff?'
4. Relying upon Shamas Din v. Sarfaraz, 1911 Pun LR 960 and Sharif Hussain v. Nur Shah, AIR 1929 Lah 589, it was held that the right of pre-emption is one of substitution and it cannot therefore, be said that the successful pre-emptors are representatives of, or claim under the original vendee. In view of that it was held that the petitioners were not assignees within the meaning of O. 22, R. 10 of the Code. Dharam Chand etc. have filed this revision.
5. On behalf of the petitioners it is urged that the lower appellate Court failed to see that the authorities relied upon have no bearing on the question as to what is the meaning of 'assignee' within the purview of Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code. In Sharif Hussain's case, AIR 1929 Lah 589 (supra) all that was said was that if there is a decree obtained against a vendee for a declaration, the successful pre-emptor is not bound by that decree, because he does not claim under him in that sense. The head note (a) in Sharif Hussain's case runs as under:
'The doctrine of lis pendens is applied to things coming into existence during the pendency of the suit and not where there is an existing right prior to the suit. In a case where the right of pre-emption had accrued before the declaratory suit was instituted and pre-emptors had also obtained their decree for pre-emption long prior to the declaratory suit being instituted the doctrine of lis pendens had no application.'
In this connection, it was observed that the right of pre-emption is one of substitution and in that sense the pre-emptor does not claim under the vendee.
6. One thing is very clear that being substituted for the vendee, the equity of redemption now vests in Dharam Chand etc. and in that capacity they can certainly bring a suit seeking possession by way of redemption. Now what they are trying to do is that whatever proceedings have been taken by the vendee, for whom they have been substituted, they are prepared to be bound by the same. They do not challenge the amount that they were directed to pay to the mortgagees. So far as the mortgagees are concerned, they did not go in appeal against the order passed and so they are satisfied with the amount awarded. All that Dharam Chand etc. want to do is their substitution for the original vendee so that they can redeem the mortgage by making the payment and the decree is made final. There can be no sense in the multiplicity of the proceedings by forcing the successful pre-emptors to file a separate suit in which the same matter shall have to be gone into all over again. The words used in Order. 22, Rule 10 of the Code are-
'In other cases of 'an assignment creation or devolution of any interest................'
7. These words have been used in a very wide sense and cover a number of different matters. There are a number of decided cases in which during the pendency of the suit, if the mortgagee or the mortgagor becomes insolvent, the receiver has a right to be substituted under this Order. See in this connection Karim Bux v. Khesa, AIR 1935 Lah 316; P. Ammanna v. P. Ramakrishna Rao, AIR 1949 Mad 886 and Kala Chand Banerjee v. Jagannath Marvari, AIR 1927 PC 108. The very object of Order 22, Rule 10 would be frustrated if the words used are interpreted in a narrow sense. No decided case was brought to my notice dealing with the case of a pre-emptor but the very fact that he gets substituted for the original vendee, would go to show that all rights that were conferred on the original vendee under the sale-deed had come to be developed on the successful pre-emptor. In that view of the matter, I have no hesitation in holding that the successful pre-emptors in this case have a right to be substituted for the plaintiff and continue the suit from the stage it had reached when the application under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code was filed.
8. For the aforesaid reasons I accept this revision, set aside the order of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court. Parties will appear in the trial Court on 30th August, 1971. Records will be sent back immediately. No order as to costs.
9. Revision allowed.