D.K. Mahajan, J.
1. There is no merit in this second appeal and it must fail. The respondent was working as a head constable in the year 1950, and was reduced in rank and was made a constable. On the 19th of May 1956 he was dismissed from service by the Inspector-General of Police, Pepsu. That led to the present suit for a declaration that his dismissal and reduction in rank were illegal and void, and that he was still in police service. During the trial he gave up the relief claimed so far as his reduction in rank is concerned and confined himself in the suit to the ultra vires nature of the order of dismissal. The suit was contested by the State of Punjab because, in the meantime, Pepsu and Punjab had been merged. The trial Court decreed the suit. It was held that there was no compliance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and so also with Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1984. The State of Punjab was dissatisfied with that decision and preferred as appeal to the District Court at Patiala. The appeal was disposed at by the Additional District Judge, Patiala, and was dismissed. Hence the present second appeal.
2. The first contention advanced by the State counsel is that the show-cause notice was accompanied by the findings of the enquiry officer and, therefore, there was no violation of the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The Courts below have held that inasmuch as the findings of the enquiry officer were not conveyed to the plaintiff, he was handicapped in his defence and, therefore, could not properly show cause as contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The show-cause notice has not been produced OB the record and there is no other evidence to show that either a copy of the enquiry officer's report or his findings were conveyed to the plaintiff. As a matter of fact, even mere conveyance of findings would be of no consequence because the plaintiff is entitled to know the reasons which have prevailed with the enquiry officer in order to show cause against the findings recorded by that officer. Therefore, the first contention has no merit and must fail.
3. The second contention of the learned counsel for the State is that the offence that was committed by the plaintiff had no relation to the public as such. Learned counsel admits that if as a police constable he had extorted money, Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules had to be complied with, but, as the plaintiff impersonated as a C. I. D. Inspector -- which rank he did not hold -- Rule 16.38 need not be complied with, I have noticed this argument merely to reject the same. The matter really stands concluded by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Nand Nandan Sarup v. District Magistrate, Patiala, 1966 Cur LJ 608: (AIR 1967 Punj 342). In the instant case, and (sic) is not disputed that the provisions of the said rule have not been complied with.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to the fact that the enquiry officer imported his personal knowledge to contradict the stand taken by the plaintiff, whose stand was that his mother-in-law was ill and, therefore, he was absent from duty. The enquiry officer, without himself coming into the witness-box, recorded in the enquiry report that the stand taken by the plaintiff was wrong because he (enquiry officer) had seen the plaintiff sitting behind him with his wife in the cinema hall on that date. Such a course has been condemned by the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86, and it has been held that such a procedure offends the rules of natural justice. On either view of the matter, there is no force in this appeal. The same fails and is dismissed with costs.