Mehar Singh, C.J.
1. The only question which is for consideration in this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent by the Assessing Authority (Sales Tax) of Jullundur City, from the order, dated 9th April, 1963, of a learned Single Judge, is whether under Section 7(4) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (Punjab Act 46 of 1948), the Commissioner had power to cancel the registration certificate of the respondent-firm, Modern General Store, Jullundur City, on a ground other than one within Sub-section (6) of Section 7, or on information otherwise than that mentioned in Section 16 of the Act ?
2. The appellant on 1st October, 1962, cancelled the registration certificate of the respondent. On that date Sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the Act read :-'The Commissioner may from time to time amend or cancel any certificate of registration in accordance with information furnished under Section 16 or otherwise received.' By a subsequent Amending Act of 1965 this sub-section has been given a new shape, but that does not concern this particular case. It has to be considered under the unamended sub-section as reproduced above. The words 'otherwise received' in Sub-section (4) of Section 7 have reference to the word 'information' in the earlier part of this sub-section. So the information referred to therein may be furnished under Section 16 or it may be received by the Assessing Authority otherwise. The information referred to in this sub-section has obvious reference to information detailed in Section 16 of the Act. This section gives four instances of sale or disposal of the business or place of business, discontinuance or transfer of the same, change in the name, constitution or nature of business, or desire to change the class or classes of goods specified in the registration certificate. It was the duty of the dealer to give this information to the Assessing Authority. When he did so, it is such information that is referred to in the first part of Sub-section (4) of Section 7. When he failed to give such information and the Assessing Authority received it from any other source, it was then that it otherwise received it within the meaning and scope of that subsection. The argument on the side of the appellant that the words 'otherwise received' in this sub-section mean information outside that. required to be furnished by the dealer according to Section 16, cannot be accepted. The learned Single Judge was of the same opinion. No substantial reason has been advanced in support of such a contention and the language of Sub-section (4) of Section 7 immediately militates against such a construction of this sub-section. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the appellant that the ground on which registration certificate of the respondent was cancelled has nothing to do either with the type of information as referred to under Section 16 or with the ground of cancellation of registration certificate as given in Sub-section (6) of Section 7. So, the order of cancellation of the certificate was rightly quashed by the learned Judge. However, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that what was alleged against the respondent was that the firm was showing sales to registered dealers under the umbrella of its own registration certificate, but it was found as a fact that those sales were wrongly shown in the names of registered dealers as, when contacted, such registered dealers denied having purchased any goods from the respondent-firm. The learned counsel has urged that the Court will so interpret the provisions of the statute as to advance its object and to correct a fraudulent design as practised in this case by the respondent-firm. This broad and general contention cannot be made an excuse for ignoring the clear and unambiguous language of Sub-section (4) of Section 7. Meanings not available in the language of the sub-section cannot be given to the words employed in its drafting, for, as pointed out by the learned Single Judge, that would amount not to interpreting the sub-section but rewriting it. So this argument on the side of the appellant fails.
3. It is not denied that it was conceded before the learned Single Judge that both for the proceedings under the Act and for the proceedings under the Central Sales Tax Act the respondent-firm had not been given adequate opportunity before adverse orders were made against it. So the learned Judge had no option but to quash the orders against the respondent-firm. This part of the approach of the learned Single Judge obviously has not been open to argument in this appeal because of the concession made at the time of hearing of the petition of the respondent-firm by the learned Judge. So the argument has been confined only to one aspect and on that the conclusion is against the appellant as has been stated.
4. This appeal fails and is dismissed, but there is no order in regard to costs.
B.R. Tuli, J.
5. I agree.