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Achhra Singh Vs. Om Parkash Garg - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Revn. No. 337 of 1975 and Civil Misc. Nos. 2955-CII and 3068-CII of 1980
Judge
Reported inAIR1981P& H179
ActsEast Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 13(3)(A) and 151 - Order 6, Rule 17
AppellantAchhra Singh
RespondentOm Parkash Garg
Cases ReferredPasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders
Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply..........rent restriction act, which authority affirmed the decision of the rent controller dismissing the ejectment application filed by the petitioner.2. briefly stated the petitioner-land lord sought the eviction of om parkash respondent-tenant mainly on two grounds (1) default in the payment of rent and (2) requirement of the demised house for the use and occupation of the petitioner had his family. so far as the first ground is concerned, the same was set at naught by the tender of the arrears along with costs et cetera on the first date of hearing before the rent controller. on the second ground, there is a concurrent finding of both the rent control authorities that the need for the occupation of the premises by the landlord was not bona fide.3. it may be mentioned here that the civil.....
Judgment:
ORDER

1. This revision petition has been filed by Achhra Singh (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) against the decision of the Appellate Authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, which Authority affirmed the decision of the Rent Controller dismissing the ejectment application filed by the petitioner.

2. Briefly stated the petitioner-land lord sought the eviction of Om Parkash respondent-tenant mainly on two grounds (1) default in the payment of rent and (2) requirement of the demised house for the use and occupation of the petitioner had his family. So far as the first ground is concerned, the same was set at naught by the tender of the arrears along with costs et cetera on the first date of hearing before the Rent Controller. On the second ground, there is a concurrent finding of both the Rent Control Authorities that the need for the occupation of the Premises by the landlord was not bona fide.

3. It may be mentioned here that the civil revision petition was filed in this Court on 12th February, 1975 and was admitted for hearing on 23rd April, 1975. On 1st September, 1980, Civil Miscellaneous No 29 55/CII was filed on behalf of the petitioner under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the amendment of the original ejectment application. In this civil miscellaneous application is was averred that earlier it was not necessary to plead all the ingredients of the ground for eviction in the ejectment application and these ingredient not having been mentioned in the same the ejectment application was fatally defective and was liable to be dismissed on this short ground. It was further pleaded in he said application that in view of the changed legal position, it is essential to incorporate all the ingredients of Section 13(3)(A) of the Act in the ejectment application. The changed legal position has obviously a reference to the Full Bench decision of this court in Banke Ram v. Smt. Sarasti Devi, (1977) 79 Punj LR 112: (AIR 1977 Punj & Har 158). The petitioner, therefore, desired that after para 6 of the original ejectment application a new para 6-A as detailed in he application for amendment may be added. The proposed new para is reproduced below for ready reference:--

'Para 6A: That the applicant requires the premises in dispute for his own occupation and for residence on his married son Harcharan Singh. The applicant is not occupying any other suitable residential building in Patiala except for the insufficient accommodation in his father's house mentioned above. The applicant has not vacated any building at Patiala without sufficient cause after the Commencement of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The applicants son Harcharan Singh is under suspension and 'his family consists of his wife and 3 children out of which two are school going.They are also residing in the house of the applicant's father mentioned above and the accommodation with them is highly inadequate.'

4. The matter did not end there. The petitioner put in another application (C.M. 3068-CII) on 10th September,198, under order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the code of Civil Procedure for a further amendment of the ejectment application. By means of this application a prayer was made to add the following words in the proposed para 6A referred to above:--

'Harcharan Singh is not occupying in patiala any other building for residence and he has not vacated any such building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the said Act in Patiala.'

5. At the time of the argument in the revision petition, Mr. Vijay Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner, frankly stated that he would press only his two civil miscellaneous application mentioned above and if the prayer for amendment of the ejectment application as made in these two application. Is not grated he had nothing to say in regard to impugned order of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority. The learned counsel, therefore, concentrated only upon the relief claimed in he miscellaneous application. After giving the matter my careful consideration and hearing the counsel for both the parties, I find that it is not possible to grant the prayer made in the civil miscellaneous application. My reasons for this conclusion follow.

6. In these the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the observation made in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 Sc 1409, and some others authorities in support of his contention that even this court should take note of subsequent events in disposing of proceedings relating to Rent Control Statues but I find that the peculiar circumstances of the present case do not entitle the petitioner to this discretionary benefit. While on this subject it may be observed that even the Supreme Court did not lay down an inflexible rule that the Appellate Court must take notice and Cognizance of all events and development subsequent to the institution of the proceedings. On the other hand, a clear proviso has been mentioned that such a course should be adopted only 'If the rules of fairness to both the parties are scrupulously obeyed.' In the case in hand, neither in the original ejectment application which commenced more than a decade ago i.e. 16th July, 1970, nor at the appellate stage before the Appellate Authority, an attempt was made by the petitioner to rectify the mistake committed in the averments made in the ejectment application.The argument that the new position of law in regard to this fact had emerged, entitling the petitioner to amend the ejectment application is also not tenable as the changed interpretation of law, (if it can be said so) also occurred as far back as 1977 when the Full bench decision was pronounced.There is no reason shown as to why the petitioner did not take any steps in this behalf during the period of about three years since then. The laches on the part of the petitioner does not therefore entitle him to the discretionary relief of amendment.

7. There is another aspect of the matter and this is that the petitioner in C. M. 2955-CII has sought to add para 6A in which it is averred that the petitioner son Harcharan Singh is under suspension and the premises in dispute are also required for use of that son and his family. The allegation so made is quite incomplete as it is not stated as to how the presence of the petitioner's son is necessary at Patiala after his suspension from government service. On the other hand, when the counsel for the petitioner was faced with a query as to what was the station of posting of the petitioner's son during his suspension, the counsel has to concede, after taking instructions from his client, that the station of posting of the petitioners son during his suspension was some place other than Patiala.

8. In the wake of what has been stated above, it is apparent that by taking the shorter course of amendment of the ejectment application, the petitioner seeks to launch practically a new ejectment application with a cause of action quite different from the one on which he litigated earlier. It would not be, therefore, prudent to allow the amendment after the petitioner had lost in both the Tribulas of fact, i.e. the Rent Controller and the appellate Authority. While the Court is called upon to safeguard the genuine interest of the landlord, it is at the same time its duty not to prolong the agony of the tenant in a protracted and endless litigation.

9. In view of what has been discussed above, both Civil Miscellaneous application 2955-CII and 3068 CII of 1980, are disallowed.

10. As already observed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has nothing further to press in the civil revision petition and rightly so in view of the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two Rent Control Authorities, in regard to the personal necessity of the petitioner to occupy the demised premises. The revision petition is therefore, dismissed but with no order as to costs. It is, however, made clear that no observation made in this judgment shall be deemed to limit the right of the petitioner to file a fresh ejectment application on a new cause of action if, available to him under the law.

11. Petition dismissed.


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