Shamsher Bahadur, J.
1. The question in issue for determination in this petition relates to the competence of an industrial tribunal to implead a party.
2. By notification of the State Government dated 3 and 4 March 1958 an industrial dispute between the management of Delhi Cloth Mills, Swatantra Bharat Mills, Blrla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills, Ltd., and Ajudhia Textile Mills and their workmen (exoludlng clerks and mistries) as represented by the Kapra Ekta Union, was referred to the adjudication of the industrial tribunal, Delhi. Later, a petition was filed by the Textile Mazdoor Sangh to be added as a party to the industrial dispute. Mr. E. Krishnamurthi allowed this petition and impleaded this organization as a party by his order of 12 of August 1958. This order has been challenged at the instance of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the tribunal did not act within the bounds of its Jurisdiction. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, do not warrant the action which has been taken by the tribunal. Under Section 10 of the Act the appropriate Government, when it is of the opinion that 'any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.' may refer it for adjudication to a tribunal. An industrial dispute under Clause (i) of Section 2 of the Act is defined as
any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.
It is argued that an industrial dispute, which can be referred under Section 10, must be restricted to the parties who are specified in the reference itself. It is only the appropriate Government which can make any change in the parties to an industrial dispute. Reliance has been placed for this contention on Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act which authorizes the appropriate Government 'at the time of making the reference or at any time thereafter' to include in it any establishment, group or class of establishments of a similar nature between whom a dispute exists or is apprehended. The counsel contends that the power to add parties in the reference lies only with the Government and not the tribunal.
3. In the chapter dealing with the procedure, powers and duties of authorities it is mentioned under Clause (3) of Section 11 that a tribunal to which reference is made under Section 10 is vested with the powers of the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters:
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath:
(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects:
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;
(d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed.
Concededly, the power to implead a party does not fall under any of these four heads and it is manifest that the tribunal, acting as a civil court, has not been given any powers to implead a party. Mr. Krishnamurthi, however, relied on Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act which mentions that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act shall be binding on-
(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;
(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute..
4. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 does not vest the tribunal with a power to implead parties which are not mentioned in the industrial dispute. There is, however, abundant authority for the proposition that the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act vest an implied authority in the tribunal to implead parties. In a Division Bench judgment of Subba Rao, J. (now Mr. Justice Subba Rao of the Supreme Court), and Balakrishna Ayyar. J., of the Madras High Court in P.G. Brooks v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras 1953 II L.L.J. 1, it was held that
Section 18(3)(b) by necessary implication gives power to the tribunal to add parties. It can add necessary or proper party. He need not be the employer or the employee.
In the present instance the industrial tribunal has considered that the representation of the Textile Mazdoor Sangh is necessary for the representation of the employees. To a similar effect is the Single Bench judgment ; of the same Court in Radhakrishna Mills, Ltd. v. Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras 1954 I L.L.J. 295, in which Govinda Menon, J., relying on the Division Bench authority of P.G. Brookes v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras 1953 II L.L.J. 1 (vide supra), held that the tribunal is vested with the power to add any person or establishment whose presence is necessary or proper for the doe and just adjudication of the dispute. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi 1959 II L.L.J. 553, Mr. Justice Wanchoo observed at p. 554 that the workmen were not precluded, if they wanted to be represented by any other union, to apply to the tribunal for such representation or even to apply for being made parties individually. It seems to have been taken for granted by their lordships that the tribunal was vested with the power to implead parties on the representation of the workmen. In this view of the matter the tribunal cannot be said to have acted outside the scope of its jurisdiction and there is no reason for interference. This petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.