1. This revision is directed against the order of the executing Court dt. Jan., 19, 1984, whereby the objection petition filed on behalf of the judgment-debtor petitioner was dismissed.
2. The decree-holder Inderjit Aggarwal got an eviction order passed against his tenant Gian Chand Goel, judgment-debtor objector. The said order of the Rent Controller was maintained up to the Supreme Court. When the matter was pending before the Appellate Authority in appeal, the following order was passed:--
'59. Before parting with this case, it must be remarked that the manner in which this case has proceeded before the Rent Controller, provides a classic illustration of how proceedings can be prolonged and delayed and justice thereby denied. The petition for ejectment of the respondent was filed on 1-5-1975 and final order of the Rent Controller could not be announced till Oct. 30, 1981. It appears that respondent utilised his knowledge and experience as an Advocate to seek out and use every opportunity and execuse to prolong the proceedings. The record of the proceedings provides numerous examples of how proceedings were unnecessarily sought to be delayed by the respondent. It must also be remarked as has been shown above that there are suspicious circumstances attending almost on every material piece of evidence that the respondent sought to rely upon. The most glaring aspect of the case, of course, being that Shri Gian Chand Goel had continued in possession of the said house for so many years without paying any amount in respect thereof. It cannot but be remarked that the conduct of Shri Gian Chand Goel as revealed in this case was unbecoming of an Advocate.
60. There can thus be no manner of doubt that the respondent is liable to ejectment on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent, sub-letting and also that the petitioner required the premises bona fide for his own use and occupation. The findings of the Rent Controller are upheld and affirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs. In the circumstances the respondent is clearly liable to pay compensatory costs for the false defence set up by him to deny the claim of the petitioner. In this behalf, it is also pertinent to bear in mind the amounts which the respondent has obviously been receiving as rent from sub-tenants without paying a penny to the petitioner landlord for over six years. In this view of the matter, the respondent is ordered to pay a sum of Rs. 3,000/- as compensatory costs besides counsel's fee of Rs. 500/- '.
As regards the ejectment of the judgment-debtor the order was duly executed in view of the undertaking given be him in the Supreme Court. However, now the decree-holder sought execution to recover the money on the basis of the costs which were awarded against the judgment-debtor by the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh. This application for execution was resisted on behalf of the judgment-debtor by filing an objection petition. It was alleged that the order of the Appellate Authority awarding the costs amounting to Rs. 3,000/- was absolutely without jurisdiction, as the law does not permit the awarding of the costs by the Appellate Authority and that too in an appeal case under the Rent Act. The learned executing Court came to the conclusion that the executing Court is bound to execute the order and if the judgment-debtor was aggrieved against this order, the proper course for him was to file an appeal or revision, as the case may be. Since this order has been maintained even by the Hon'ble High Court, therefore, the executing Court cannot go beyond the decree, and, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction to find fault with the order passed by the Appellate Authority. Consequently the objection petition was dismissed. Dissatisfied with the same the judgment-debtor has filed this petition in this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that no compensatory costs could be awarded by the Appellate Authority, as S. 35A of the Civil P. C. was not applicable, to the proceedings under the Rent Act. According to the learned counsel the imposition of compensatory costs was an order without jurisdiction and, therefore, the executing Court could go into the matter.
4. It will be pertinent to note that the judgment-debtor filed a suit for permanent injunction and sought a declaration that the order of the Rent Controller dt. Oct. 30, 1981 and that of the Appellate Authority dt. Dec. 15, 1981 were without jurisdiction and thus not binding on him i.e. the present-petitioner. The said suit was filed on Jan. 18, 1982, which was dismissed by the trial Court on Feb.28, 1983. The decree of the trial Court was maintained, in appeal, by the lower Appellate Court on May 13, 1983. High Court also dismissed his appeal (R. S. A. No. 1195 of 1983) at the motion hearing vide its order dt. May 19, 1983. In spite of all this litigation the judgment-debtor again took up the objections before the executing Court that the order of the Appellate Authority awarding compensatory costs was without jurisdiction.
5. From perusal of the order of the Appellate Authority, reproduced above, it is quite apparent that the learned Authority never invoked the provisions of S. 35A of the Civil P. C. as such. As a matter of fact the compensatory costs were awarded by the learned Judge because of the conduct of the judgment-debtor. This conduct of the judgment-debtor is quite apparent even now when he filed a separate suit for declaration challenging the said orders of the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority. As a matter of fact it was inherent in the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority to award compensatory costs if it found that the conduct of a party was not above board. In this case admittedly the objector is an Advocate and it has rightly been observed by the Appellate Authority that his conduct was not becoming that of an Advocate. In these circumstances the executing Court rightly came to the conclusion that it could not go behind the order and was bound to execute the same as such.
6. When the petitioner was faced with the judgments delivered in the civil suit filed by him for declaration, it was contended that in that suit the order was not challenged on this ground. Even if this ground was not specifically taken, the petitioner is bound by the same on the principles of res judicata. If a ground was available and not taken, then he cannot be allowed to take the ground subsequently in the executing Court.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent produced a copy of the paper-book which was filed on behalf of the petitioner in the Supreme Court. At page 199 thereof in para No. 12 of the Grounds of Revision in this Court the petitioner specifically stated that:-
'That the Appellate Authority has outstepped the limit of judicial propriety in deciding the complicated question involved in controversy, compensatory costs of Rs. 3,000/- without there being any claim in that regard by way of an appeal from the respondent and the same is the case regarding counsel's fee of Rs. 500/-, which again is very excessive'.
Despite all these pleadings, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
8. Thus taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, I am constrained to observe that the conduct of the petitioner speaks for itself. Not only the Appellate Authority, even in this Court I am of the considered view that it is a fit case where the petitioner must pay compensatory costs to the decree-holder who is being dragged unnecessarily into litigation by filing frivolous suits and applications and thus wasting Public time. Consequently this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Costs assessed at Rs. 1,000/-.
9. Petition dismissed.