1. Respondent Sushila Rani (hereinafter referred to as the landlady) sought the eviction of Girdhari Lal Jain, tenant-petitioner, (hereinafter referred to as the tenant) from the house in question un the ground, inter alia that the house was needed for her personal use and occupation as well as for her husband and children.
2. Mr. S. C. Goyal the learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has not challenged the finding of the appellate authority with regard to the relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. He has submitted that the Courts below erred in assuming that the ejectment had been sought by the landlady on the ground of insufficiency of accommodation in the old joint family house in which, at the time of the filing of the ejectment-application she with her husband and children was residing In view of the aforesaid concession of Mr. Goyal the only question that has to be examined is as to whether the Courts below are right in assuming that the ejectment was sought and justified on a plea of insufficiency of accommodation in the old joint family house. Her pleadings in this regard are contained in clause (b) of para 4 of he ejectment application, which is in the following terms:--
'That the petitioner bona fide requires the house in dispute for her personal use and occupation as well as for her husband and her three children aged nearly 5 years and two 2 years The petitioner and her husband want to live separately from the other family members as they cannot on amicably and live in peace in the old joint family house.'
A perusal of the aforesaid pleadings would indicate that the tenant was sought to be evicted from the said house on the ground that the said house was needed by the landlady for herself, for her children and husband as she was not able to pull on amicably and live in peace with other members of the family in the old joint family house.
3. Evidence was, however, led to establish the ground that the said old joint Family house contained accommodation which was insufficient for all the members of the family. This evidence evidently was irrelevant to the pleadings, for it was not the case of the applicant landlady in her pleadings that the accommodation in the old joint family house was insufficient and for that reason the house under occupation of the tenant was needed by her for her personal use and occupation.
4. It is well established that no evidence can be led or looked into in support of a plea that had not been pleaded in the pleadings. Such being the position, the inescapable conclusion follows that both the Courts below committed the error of taking into consideration evidence which they ought not to have done so. Once the evidence in justification of the plea of insufficiency of accommodation is ruled out of consideration along with the plea of insufficiency of accommodation which, as already observed had not been pleaded then the plea that survives or the ground that survives is that the landlady needed the house occupied by the tenant for her personal use and occupation as she was unable to pull on amicably in the old joint family house. Such a ground is not recognized by the East Punjab Urban 8ent Restriction Act, 1949, as warranting the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal. use and occupation.
5. Mr. Gurjit Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-landlady, has, however contended that the landlady by pleading in clause (c) of para 4 of her ejectment application that the applicant owned and possessed no other residential house in Ludhiana City and she had not vacated any such residential house without sufficient cause in the said urban area by necessary implication had pleaded that bona fide need of the landlady for the use and occupation of the house in occupation of the tenant was based on insufficiency of accommodation in the old joint family house in which she happened. to be residing. No plea of insufficiency, I am afraid, can be read by implication. The pleadings in an ejectment application have to be construed strictly.
6. Mr. Gurjit Sin. the learned counse1 for the respondent landlady,. states that after 31-12-1978; the petitioners has not paid any rent till to date. The learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner gives an undertaking on behalf of the tenant that all arrears of rent that are due till to date, including the rent, for the months of May and June 1980 shall be paid by a Bank draft to the respondent-landlady positively within two months from today.
7. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is allowed and the order of the appellate authority is set aside to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
8. Petition allowed.