S.P. Goyal, J.
1. This second appeal has been put up before us as the referring Bench thought that there was a conflict in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh, (1977), 79 Pun LR 523: (AIR 1977 Pun & Har 341) and the Supreme Court decision in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs., AIR 1977 SC 1944. The point involved is as to whether the limited estate of a widow created in her favour under a will would enlarge into full ownership by virtue of the provisions of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act when she was otherwise entitled to succeed under the law independent of the will. However, after going through the referring order we find that it was not necessary for the purpose of this case to decide the question posed as would be evident from the discussion next following.
2. The facts involved in this appeal are that Sewa Singh owner of the land in dispute executed a will bequeathing the same in favour of his wife, Smt. Purni, with the stipulation that on her death it would devolve on his successors. Smt. Purni executed a will in favour of her daughter on July 12, 1961 and she died on July 25, 1967. The collaterals of Sewa Singh filed this suit for possession of the land in dispute claiming that Smt. Purni was only limited owner under the will; that her estate was governed by the provisions of S. 14(2) and never enlarged into full ownership by virtue of S. 14(1) of the Act and that will executed by her was, therefore, void against their reversionary rights reserved under the will. The claim of the collaterals, it is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants, would be sustainable only if it could be spelled out from the will that the remainder of the property on the death of Smt. Purni was bequeathed in their favour. The Division Bench in the reference order has opined in unequivocal terms that Sewa Singh did not stipulate in the will that after the death of his widow, Smt. Purni, the property would rever to his collaterals. If that is so then on the death Smt. Purni, the estate would devolve on the heirs in accordance with law. It is also not disputed that the daughter of Sewa Singh and Smt. Purni would be entitled to inherit the property in accordance with law applicable on the death of Smt. Purni even if it is found that Smt. Purni never became the full owner of the property.
3. Faced with the said situation, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that on a true construction of the will it would be found that the collaterals have been nominated beneficiaries of the remainder estate on the death of Smt. Purni. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. What is stated in the will is that on the death of Smt. Purni the land bequeathed to her would devolve on Hakdarnas of the testator. The learned counsel canvassed that by the use of the word, Hakdarans the testator meant the collaterals under the custom or the reversioners under the Hindu Law. It is difficult to subscribe to this view. The equivalent of collaterals in vernacular is 'Yakjidian' and of the reversioners, 'Yakjidian Bazgasht'. The simple word, Hakdarans can never be understood anything other than the persons entitled to inherit under the law on the death of the testator. According to the provisions of S. 93 of the Succession Act when a bequest is in favour of the heirs or right heirs of relations or nearest relations or family or kindred or nearest-of-kin or next of kin of the testator, the property bequeathed is to be distributed as if it belongs to the testator and he had died intestate. On the death of Smt. Purni the will being not in the name of any specified person person and instead being in the name of the heirs, the property would devolve on the heirs as if the testator had died instate. As noticed above, the daughter of Smt. Purni being the lawful heir, the collaterals had no claim to the estate of Sewa Singh on the death of Smt. Purni even if it was held that her estate did not enlarge into full ownership by virtue of the provisions of S. 14(1) of the Act. The question posed by the Division Bench, therefore, need not be answered for the purpose of this case.
4. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
P.C. Jain, Ag.C.J.
5. I agree.
J.M. Tandon, J.
6. I also agree.
7. Appeals dismisses.