Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.
1. This is a petition under Section 256(2) of the I.T. Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') praying that the Tribunal be directed to refer the following questions of law to this court:
'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the find-ding of the Tribunal that Shri Gyan Chand had no sufficient funds to make the advance of the loan of Rs. 20,000 to Shri Tarsem Lal is vitiated by taking into consideration the inadmissible evidence of Shri Gujjar Mal and by not taking into consideration the material on the record to prove that he had sufficient finances which were earlier loaned to third party assessees and which were later on loaned to Shri Tarsem Lal ?
(ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the finding of the Tribunal that the loan of Rs. 20,000 taken by the assessee is not satisfactorily proved is vitiated by not taking into consideration the plea of the assessee that he took loan from Shri Tarsem Lal and by not taking into consideration the material placed on the record and the circumstantial evidence in support thereof ?
(iii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal could legally infer that in spite of the failure of Shri Tarsem Lal to satisfactorily prove the loan of Rs. 20,000 from Shri Gyan Chand, the loan by the assessee from Shri Tarsem Lal is not proved '
2. Briefly, the facts are that the assessee is a registered firm and carries on business of manufacturing staple cloth, purchase and sale of yarn and cloth. During the accounting year ending March 31, 1968, relevant to the assessment year 1968-69, the assessee filed two returns--one on August 9, 1968, declaring an income of Rs. 30,856 and the second on October 29, 1968, declaring an income of Rs. 31,211. This was the second year of its business. During the course of examination of the books of accounts, the ITO noticed a cash credit of Rs. 20,000 in the name of Tarsem Lal on which no interest had been paid. The assessee gave an explanation that this amount was brought by Tarsem Lal from Gyan Chand. This explanation was not accepted by the ITO and the same was added to the assessee's income from undisclosed sources, vide his order of June 27, 1969.
3. The assessee went up in appeal against the order of the ITO to the AAC, which was dismissed by him on September 24, 1970. The assessee filed a second appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which was also dismissed on March 27, 1973. It then filed an application under Section 256(1) of the Act to refer the questions stated above for the opinion of this court which also met the same fate on August 5, 1974. Now the petitioner has come up in petition under Section 256(2) of the Act to this court.
4. The only question that arises for determination is as to whether the questions required by the assessee to be referred to this court are questions of law or not. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that no question of law arises because the decision of the Tribunal is based on appraisal of the entire evidence on record comprising a number of facts and the question decided by it is a pure question of fact. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Tribunal while deciding the appeal took into consideration the statement of Gujjar Mal which was inadmissible in evidence. He further contends that the Tribunal also did not take into consideration certain material on the record to prove that Tarsem Lal had sufficient finances and he was in a position to advance loan to the assessee. We are not impressed by this contention of the learned counsel. No contention was raised before the Tribunal that the statement of Gujjar Mal wasinadmissible in evidence. Unless this matter was raised before the Tribunal, it cannot be raised in this court. The Tribunal is the final court to decide the matters relating to facts. It was also not contended before the Tribunal that any material on the record had not been taken into consideration by it while deciding the appeal. For the said reasons, we reject the contention of the learned counsel.
5. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was not the duty of the petitioner to prove the source from where Gyan Chand got the amount of Rs. 20,000. He contends that the story of loan was plausible and the Tribunal misdirected itself in upholding that the cash credit in the name of Tarsem Lal was bogus and treating the amount as the Income of the assessee from undisclosed sources. We do not find force in this contention of the learned counsel as well. The Tribunal after taking into consideration various circumstances rejected the statement of Tarsem Lal. One of the reasons given by the Tribunal for doing so was that the statement of Gyan Chand was not worthy of credence. In case both these statements are rejected, no question of law arises in this regard. It is evident that the assessee wants reference regarding those questions which are purely of facts and which have been decided by the Tribunal. In the circumstances, there is no merit in the petition.
6. For the reasons recorded above, the petition fails and the same is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
J.V. Gupta, J.
7. I agree.