Shamsher Bahadur, J.
1. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India directed against an ward of the Industrial tribunal, dated 6 April I960, holding that the services of the respondent 1, K.K. Sharma, cad been wrongfully terminated and he was entitled to the lights of reinstatement and live months' emoluments.
2. At the outset it may be stated that the clause of the respondent 1 had been espoused Commercial Employees' Union to whom notice of this petition has been served. The respondents 3 and 4 are the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, and the Delhi Administration, Delhi, who are not represented in this Court. The respondent 1 was served in the first instance though the notice of an actual date his not been served on him. I do not, however, consider it is necessary to adjourn the hearing of this petition because the respondent 2 (Commercial Employees' Union, which had espoused the cause of K.K. Sharma, has been served with a notice of the actual date of the hearing.
3. K.K. Sharma was employed as an advertisement manager on 11 November 1958, by the petitioner Radio Television. There were only three other employees in this organization, these being K.S. Virdee, who is styled as editor and manager, P.K. Anand and V.P. Ajmani. The services of all the employees except K.S. Virdee were terminated on 24 August 1959. Their case was sent to the conciliation officer before whom the employees other than K.K. Sharma compromised and the dispute relating to K.K. Sharma was eventually referred for adjudication to the industrial tribunal on 2 February 1960, it being stated in the order of reference that the respondent 1 was represented by the Commercial Employees' Union.
4. The industrial tribunal found that there was a valid reference to arbitration as K.K. Sharma was a workman and the matter for adjudication fell within the ambit of an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act.
5. It has been contended by Mr. Sarhadi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the award of the tribunal is vitiated because K.K. Sharma was neither a workman under the Act, nor did the dispute constitute An 'industrial dispute' under the Act.
6. On the point whether the respondent 1 was a workman under Clause (s) of Section 2 of the Industrial Deputes Act, the matter admits of no difficulty. A workman means any person, whether skilled or unskilled, who is doing 'manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work' and even if he is employed in a supervisory capacity his duties should be such that they are not of a managerial nature if his emoluments fall below Rs. 500. It is not in dispute that K.K. Sharma was employed
(i) to secure advertisements from local parties and outside parties through correspondence,
(ii) to devise ways of increasing the circulation of the journal.
(iii) to see it through the printing press, and
(iv) to look to the other aspects of the magazine.
From an enumeration of these duties, it seems clear to me that the duties annexed to the appointment held by K.K. Sharma were mainly administrative and managerial in devising ways of increasing the circulation of the Journal Radio Television.' It would be a travesty to suggest that this entailed duties of a clerical or manual nature. It may be that in the course of his duties he was also called upon to perform work which falls to the lot of a clerk but that could not reduce the essential administrative status assigned to him. It has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in May and Baker (India), Ltd. v. their workmen 1961 II L.L.J. 94 that the designation of the employee is not of great importance and what is to be looked at is the nature of his duties. Nowhere has it been stated by the respondent 1 that his duties were of a clerical nature. It was a small organization consisting of only four employees where he was working, and when he had to secure advertisements and devise ways of increasing the circulation of the journal, he was called upon to exercise judgment and initiative and not merely follow the advice, direction and guidance of others. The work which the respondent 1 was performing In the petitioner's organization was dearly of a managerial and administrative nature and the dispute could not have been referred for adjudication under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
7. This would be sufficient to dispose of this petition but I have also been invited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to hold that the dispute was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act. After the dispute bad been compromised with two out of three employees, whose services had been terminated by the petitioner, it ceased to partake the characteristic of a collective dispute. It may be that the respondent 2 took up the cause of K.K. Sharma but it has not been established that this organization had in its roll of membership the employees of the petitioner. There were only four employees one of whom is an editor and the two had already withdrawn from the dispute. It is manifest that the respondent 2, though it took up the cause of K.K. Sharma, could not be regarded as a union which could legitimately or validly take up cudgels on behalf of the respondent 1. As held by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court of Chief Justice P.V. Rajamannar and Veeraswami, JJ., in Working Journalists of the Hindu v. The Hindu 1961 I L.L.J. 288, it is necessary that a dispute in order to become an industrial dispute should have the support of a substantial section of the workmen concerned in the establishment. That essential element is lacking in this case and it cannot be said that it was an 'industrial dispute' which had been referred to the tribunal. Both the points urged by the learned Counsel must, therefore, prevail. I would accordingly allow this petition and quash the award of the industrial tribunal being outside the bounds of its authority. As the petition is not contested, I would make no order as to costs.