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S.K. Nair Vs. State of Punjab - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in1984CriLJ1090
AppellantS.K. Nair
RespondentState of Punjab
Excerpt:
.....the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. - 3. with regard to the nature of custody envisaged by section 167, its sub-section (1) is amply clear, which lays down that whenever any person is..........the case is essential, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order of a magistrate under section 167, exceed twenty-four hours exclusive of time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the magistrate's court.from the combined reading of the above-said provisions of the code, it is manifest that section 167 envisages arrest and detention of any person in police custody, preceding his production before a judicial magistrate. besides, proviso (a) to section 167 of the code speaks of the detention of an accused-person by the authority of a magistrate.4. for the foregoing reasons, learned counsel for havildar s.k. nair was unable to show how the period of the air force custody could be brought within the ambit of the proviso (a)(i) to section 167(2) of the.....
Judgment:
ORDER

S.C. Mital, J.

1. The salient facts of this case are that against Havildar S.K. Nair, F.I.R. No. 173 was registered under Sections 302 and 307, Indian Penal Code, at Police Station Nehianwala, District Bhatinda, on 13th August, 1982. The offences were allegedly committed in the barracks. The same day he was arrested by the Air Force authorities and kept under detention thereafter, He was made over to the police on 28th October, 1983. Under the authority of the Magistrate he has been in custody ever since, but the chalan has not been put in so far. Proviso (a)(i) to Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that no Magistrate shall authorize the detention of an accused person in custody for a total period of 90 days. Relying thereon, this petition for release on bail has been filed.

2. Now, the question for determination is, in computing the period under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code, whether the period of the Air Force custody is to be included?

3. With regard to the nature of custody envisaged by Section 167, its Sub-section (1) is amply clear, which lays down that whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57 and there are grounds for believing that the accusation is well-founded, the Police Officer making the investigation shall produce the said person before the nearest Judicial Magistrate. Here, the terms of Section 57 may be quoted with advantage.

No Police Officer shall detain in custody a person arrested without warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case is essential, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate under Section 167, exceed twenty-four hours exclusive of time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court.

From the combined reading of the above-said provisions of the Code, it is manifest that Section 167 envisages arrest and detention of any person in Police custody, preceding his production before a Judicial Magistrate. Besides, proviso (a) to Section 167 of the Code speaks of the detention of an accused-person by the authority of a Magistrate.

4. For the foregoing reasons, learned Counsel for Havildar S.K. Nair was unable to show how the period of the Air Force custody could be brought within the ambit of the proviso (a)(i) to Section 167(2) of the Code. That being so( this petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed.


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