J.S. Bedi, J.
1. Respondent Gurdial Singh was made an approver in a case under Section 409, 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code, and was granted pardon on 26th June 1963, by the District Magistrate, Patiala, as required under Section 337 of Gr. P. C., Gurdial Singh, in his statement recorded by a Magistrate, 1st Class, Patiala, under Section 164, Cr. P. C., on 27th June 1963, confessed his guilt and disclosed how the other accused in that case committed the offences. He was examined in the committing Court where he resiled from his previous statement. The State has moved this application under Section 339 (3), Cr. P. C., that Gurdial Singh had not fulfilled the conditions of the pardon granted to him and had made contradictory statement before the committing Court from the one which he had made before a Magistrate under Section 164, Cr. P. C., and that Gurdial Singh had committed perjury. It was, therefore, prayed that this Court should allow permission to launch prosecution under Section 193, I. P. C., against Gurdial Singh.
2. Notice of this petition was issued to Gurdial Singh. He put in his affidavit stating that he was already being prosecuted in the original case under Section 409, 406 and 420, I. P. C. and, therefore, no prosecution as now prayed should and could be launched against him. In that connection his learned counsel has invited my attention to the wording of Section 339 of the Code the relevant provisions of which run as under--
'339 (1). Where a pardon has been tendered under Section 337 or Section 338, and the public prosecutor certifies that in his opinion any per son who has accepted such tender has, either by wilfully concealing anything essential or by giving false evidence, not complied with the condition on which the tender was made, 'such person may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was so tendered, or for any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty' in connection with the same matter:
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The words underlined (here into ' ') above are important for purposes of decision of the point raised. They indicate that the intention of the Legislature was either to launch prosecution under the original case or under Section 193 of the Penal Code, otherwise instead of the word 'or', the word 'and' between the words 'tendered' and 'for any other offence' should have been found. This view is supported by a Single Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Emperor v. Jairam Singh, AIR 1932 Lah 307, where almost under similar circumstances, the learned Judge held that it was unfair to the accused to prosecute him for perjury when he was being tried for the original offence. The learned counsel for the State has not been able to place before me any authority contradicting the above view. I, therefore, feel that there is force in the contention of Gurdial Singh and hence refuse to accord sanction for launching prosecution against Gurdial Singh under Section 193, I. P. C. as prayed for. The petition accordingly stands dismissed.