Shamsher Bahadur, J.
1. The order passed by the Director of Public Instruction, Punjab, respondent 2, on 2 May 1961, terminating the services of Tara Chand Garg, petitioner, officiating junior scale stenographer, on payment of one month's pay in lieu of notice, has been challenged in this writ petition on the ground that no show-cause notice was issued to the official concerned.
2. That the petitioner was only a temporary hand serving as officiating junior scale stenographer in the office of the Director of Public Instruction, Punjab, is not denied. What has been vehemently asserted by Sri Tirath Singh, counsel for the petitioner, is that some inquiry was launched by respondent 2 against the petitioner and it is apparent from the office-noting that the Director wanted the dismissal of the petitioner on the ground that he had been writing recommendatory letters to other officials. It may be that the motive which impelled the authorities to take action against the petitioner involved some allegation of inefficiency or undesirability in the petitioner but the form of the order passed on 2 May 1961 conforms to the requirement that the services of a temporary employee can be dispensed with on payment of one month's pay. The impugned order is in these words:
The services of Tara Chand Garg, officiating junior scale stenographer, office of the Direotor of Public Instruction, Punjab, Chandigarh, are terminated with immediate effect. He will be given one month's pay in lieu of notice according to terms of his appointment orders.
The petitioner joined the service in the office of the Direotor of Public Instruction, Punjab, on 1 September 1959, in pursuance of an order passed by the Director on 14 August 1959. He held no substantive rank and was appointed as an officiating junior scale stenographer from which post his services have been dispensed with.
3. It may even be assumed for argument that the motive which may have actuated the Director to terminate the services of the petitioner involved some measure of mis-conduct. As observed by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar in the Supreme Court decision of Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India 1964-I L.L.J. 418:
it must be held that the termination of services of the temporary servant which in form and in substance is no more than his discharge effected under the terms of contract or the relevant rule, cannot, in law, be regarded as his dismissal, because the appointing authority was actuated by the motive that the said servant did not deserve to be continued for some alleged misconduct.
To the same effect is the observation of Justice Sri Wanchoo in another Supreme Court decision in Champaklal v. Union of India 1964-I L.L.J. 752. The learned Judge Bald:
further even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service, the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant.
4. There is no suggestion that the termination of services of the petitioner took place in a manner which was contrary to or in breach of the appointment order. It is only the office-noting on which reliance has been placed that the dismissing authority had a motive operating in its mind. That is settled to be an irrelevant consideration in construing such orders.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has sought support from my decision in Ved Parkash Vohra v. State of Punjab 1964 P.L.R. 1224 in which I said that if the order of termination of service even though it purports to be one of discharge is in fact an order which results in penal consequences, notice would be required under the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. In that case the Punjab Government had terminated the services of an Assistant Engineer and it was fairly clear that the order was passed because a criminal charge had been framed against him. The officer was subsequently exonerated completely and obtained an order of acquittal from the Sessions Judge. Even the Minister in that case had expressed an opinion that the services of the officer could not be dispensed with till the decision of the criminal case. The very foundation on which the order of termination was passed disappeared when the officer came to be acquitted. In my opinion, the facts of Ved Parkash Vohra case 1964 P.L.R. 1224 (vide supra) were totally different from those in the instant case. There is no force in this petition which fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs of this petition.