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The State Vs. Jamna Das and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation;Civil
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 17 of 1953
Judge
Reported inAIR1955P& H117
ActsLimitation Act, 1908 - Sections 14 and 15(2); Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Sections 80, 100 and 101
AppellantThe State
RespondentJamna Das and anr.
Appellant Advocate S.M. Sikri, Adv. General
Respondent Advocate D.N. Aggarwal and; R.N. Aggarwal, Advs.
Excerpt:
.....of rent has to be regarded as basic rent within the meaning of section 4(2)(b) of the act in the process of fixing fair rent irrespective of the fact whether the lease period stipulated in a lease deed has expired......'of rice, the court of first appeal in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the suit excluded the period of notice given to the union of india and has remanded the case for trial on merits.9. prom the order remanding the case for trial on merits the state of punjab appeals under order 43, rule 1(u) of the code of civil procedure.10. plainly, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the suit the period of notice can be excluded if notice was given in accordance with the requirements of any law.11. section 80, civil p. c., provides 'inter alia' that in the notice cause of action shall be stated. in the present case the plaintiff had no cause of action against the union of india. that being the position of matter, i find that in computing the period of.....
Judgment:

Harnam Singh, J.

1. In Civil Suit No. 2 of 1952 Jamna Das claimed decree for compensation for wrongful detention of ten maunds of rice. That suit was Instituted on 22-5-1952.

2. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for civil Suit No. 2 of 1952 the period of notice given to the State of Punjab and the Union of India was excluded under Section 15(2), Limitation Act, 1908, hereinafter referred to as the Act.

3. In resisting Civil Suit No. 2 of 1952 the State of Punjab pleaded 'inter alia' that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for that suit the period of notice given to the Union of India could not be excluded.

4. On the pleadings of the parties the Court of first instance fixed preliminary issue readme 'Is the suit barred by time?'

5. Section 15(2) of the Act reads : 'In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded.'

6. Finding that the detainer's possession became unlawful on 28-2-1949, the Court of first instance dismissed the suit as being barred by time.

7. Prom the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 2 of 1952 Jamna Das appealed under Section 96, Civil P. C.

8. Finding that the plaintiff gave notice to the Union of India under 'bona fide' belief that the Union of India was liable for wrongful detention 'of rice, the Court of first appeal in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the suit excluded the period of notice given to the Union of India and has remanded the case for trial on merits.

9. Prom the order remanding the case for trial on merits the State of Punjab appeals under Order 43, Rule 1(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

10. Plainly, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the suit the period of notice can be excluded if notice was given in accordance with the requirements of any law.

11. Section 80, Civil P. C., provides 'Inter alia' that in the notice cause of action shall be stated. In the present case the plaintiff had no cause of action against the Union of India. That being the position of matter, I find that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the suit the period of notice given to the Union of India cannot be excluded.

12. But it is said that the detainer's possession became unlawful on 27-4-1951.

13. Prom the Judgment under appeal it la plain that in the Court of first appeal it was common ground between the parties that the possession of the State of Punjab became unlawful on 28-2-1949, when the plaintiff was discharged by the Magistrate. In the suit out of which this appeal has arisen copy of the order of discharge was not produced. Plainly, in second appeal the plaintiff-respondent cannot be permitted to challenge the correctness of facts which he admitted in the Court of first appeal.

14. For the foregoing reasons, I set aside the passed by the District Judge on 15-5-1953, and restore the Judgment and the decree passed by the Court of first instance on 24-10-1952.

15.) Parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.


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