Skip to content


Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan Vs. Hira Lal Kapur Chand - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectDirect Taxation
CourtSupreme Court of India
Decided On
Judge
Reported in[1972]83ITR441(SC); (1972)4SCC419; 1972(4)LC475(SC)
ActsIndian Income Tax Act, 1922 - Sections 66(2)
AppellantCommissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan
RespondentHira Lal Kapur Chand
Excerpt:
.....in the value for the purpose of assessment of excise duty. if a packaging is not necessary for the sale of the product in the wholesale market at the factory gate, the same cannot be included in the value for the purpose of assessment of excise duty. [860 fg] in the instant case, the secondary packaging for tread rubber consists of cardboard cartons and wooden cases. this secondary packing is not employed merely for the pur- pose of facilitating transport or smooth transit but is necessary for selling the tread rubber in the wholesale trade. the cost of these cardboard cartons and wooden cases or any other special secondary charges incurred by the company on tread rubber could not, therefore, be excluded from its assessable value. [861a, d, e-f] union of india & ors. v. godfrey..........firm known as m/s. babu mal & co., or whether it was by an association of persons consisting of kapur chand and his brother hira lal. it appears that kapur chand and hira lal were partners of the firm m/s. babu mal & co., the right to collect the price of the jewellery sold to the prince of berar appears to have been allotted to the share of kapur chand and hira lal by the arbitrator who divided the assets of m/s. babu mal & co., amongst the various partners of that firm. the income-tax officer assessed kapur chand and hira lal as association of persons in respect of the profits said to have arisen as a result of the sale of jewellery to the prince of berar. kapur chand and hira lal denied their liability to be taxed on the profit in question. according to them they cannot be held.....
Judgment:

K.S. Hegde, J.

1. This appeal by special leave arises from the decision of the High Court of Delhi wherein the High Court refused to call for a statement of case under Section 66(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.

2. The material facts of the case are as follows :

There was a sale of jewellery in 1937 to the Prince of Berar. The main question that fell for decision was whether the sale was by the firm known as M/s. Babu Mal & Co., or whether it was by an association of persons consisting of Kapur Chand and his brother Hira Lal. It appears that Kapur Chand and Hira Lal were partners of the firm M/s. Babu Mal & Co., The right to collect the price of the jewellery sold to the prince of Berar appears to have been allotted to the share of Kapur Chand and Hira Lal by the arbitrator who divided the assets of M/s. Babu Mal & Co., amongst the various partners of that firm. The Income-tax Officer assessed Kapur Chand and Hira Lal as association of persons in respect of the profits said to have arisen as a result of the sale of jewellery to the prince of Berar. Kapur Chand and Hira Lal denied their liability to be taxed on the profit in question. According to them they cannot be held liable for the sale of the jewellery in question merely because that the right to collect the price of those jewellery had been assigned to their share. The Income-tax Officer rejected the plea of Kapur Chand and Hira Lal and assessed them in respect of the profits said to have arisen as a result of the sale of those jewellery as an association of persons. That order was affirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal, however, set-aside the order of the assessesment. It came to the conclusion that there was no evidence to show that the transaction in question was effected by Kapur Chand and Hira Lal but all the same the Tribunal directed the Income-Tax officer to proceed to find out as to who was responsible for the transaction and assess the profit arising there from in the hands, of that person. Thereafter the department wanted the Tribunal to refer certain question claimed by it to be questions of law arising from its order to the High Court for its opinion. The Tribunal rejected that prayer hold that no question of law arose from its order. Aggrieved by that decision, the department moved the High Court to direct the Tribunal to state a case and refer the questions mentioned by it in its application to the High Court for its opinion. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal that no question of law arose from the order of the Tribunal. We are in agreement with the High Court that no question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal. The finding of the Tribunal are essentially findings of fact.

3. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //