1. It is contended that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal could not have exercised the power contained in Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the provision had not been made available to the said Tribunal either by any provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act or by any rule framed there under.
2. Mr. Dhanda has cited : AIR1958Pat427 . In none of the cases the High Court became concerned with Section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act. Sub-section (1) in that provision is:-
'In holding any inquiry under Section 110-B, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.'
The comprehensive power given by the afore quoted provision is unfettered by the other provisions in the Act and the Rules framed there under.
3. Rules framed under a statute cannot override the provisions contained in it. The rule-making power itself is delegated by a provision in the statute. It is no doubt true that certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been specifically made applicable by sub-section (2) of Section 110-C as well as by the Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, but the scope of the power given by sub-section (1) of Section 110-C is to be appreciated in the light of Section 110-B which is specifically mentioned therein. When an application for compensation is preferred under Section 110-A the Tribunal deals with it in terms of Section 110-B. That provision prescribes that on receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 110-A the Tribunal shall after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just and the Tribunal has to specify the person or persons to whom the compensation shall be paid. The Tribunal has to specify the amount in the award and has to clearly state as to whether it shall be paid by the insurer or the owner or transferee of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them. In making the determination within Section 110-B the Tribunal is to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. Where after an application has been preferred in time the applicant finds that the, injuries sustained by him are found to have caused such physical infirmity which may call for claiming higher compensation, will he be without the right to claim an amendment of the application originally made by him under Section II-A? Will not the Tribunal be able within the scope of Section 110-C (1) to follow the procedure which permits the allowing or refusing of the amendment sought?
4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has cited New India Assurance Co. v. Punjab Roadways, Air 1964 P & H 235, in which the learned judges noticed the observations made by Bhandari C. J. in Mathra Das v. Om Parkash, (1957) 59 PLR 45 to the effect that in the absence of a restraining provision a Tribunal is at liberty to follow any procedure that it may choose to evolve for itself so long as the procedure is orderly and consistent with the rules of natural justice and does not contravene the provisions of the statute under which the Tribunal is functioning.
5. Where no procedure is specially devised by a special enactment and the Tribunal created by it is given the power as is visible from Section 110-C to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit, the Tribunal can exercise its discretion in devising the procedure, provided the procedure so devised does not infringe any of the provisions contained in the statute or the Rule-s framed there under. Mr. Dhanda submits at this stage- that if it is reserved to the petitioner to raise the ground at the time of the appeal against the order which may be passed determining the compensation payable to the respondent that the application initially made under Section 110-A could not have been amended then be would not be pressing the petition. I am of the view that the petition should be allowed to be withdrawn without prejudice to the right of the present petitioner to urge at the time of an appeal against the, ultimate determination of compensation as to whether the compensation could have been or not determined on the basis of the application which has been allowed to be amended. With this reservation this petition is dismissed as withdrawn.
6. With reservation petition dismissed.