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Sanni and ors. Vs. Sada Nand and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtDelhi High Court
Decided On
Case NumberS.A.O. No. 2 of 1973, against order of G.C. Jain, Rant Control Tribunal, Delhi. D/- 15-12-1972
Judge
Reported inAIR1974Delhi99
ActsDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Sections 14 and 25; Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 - Rule 23; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Sections 50
AppellantSanni and ors.
RespondentSada Nand and ors.
Appellant Advocate M.L. Sharma, Adv
Respondent Advocate D.K. Makhija, Adv.
Cases ReferredMohd.Idris v. Mehar Illahi
Excerpt:
.....a judgment-debtors dies before the decree had been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the court, which passed it, to execute the same against the legal representatives of the deceased......dies subsequent to the passing of the said order against him, cannot have it executed against his legal representatives.2. on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased, who are the appellants before me, it is contended that they are not the tenants and, thereforee, the additional controller had no jurisdiction to execute the eviction order against them, as the act, according to them, is confined to disputes between landlords and tenants alone.3. the contention of the appellants is unfounded. under section 25 of the delhi rent control act, herein called 'the act' the controller has been given specific jurisdiction, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, to execute such an order against all persons, who may be in occupation of the premises and to evict them there.....
Judgment:

1. In this case, the only question that has arisen for consideration is whether the landlord after obtaining an order of eviction against his tenant, who dies subsequent to the passing of the said order against him, cannot have it executed against his legal representatives.

2. On behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased, who are the appellants before me, it is contended that they are not the tenants and, thereforee, the Additional Controller had no jurisdiction to execute the eviction order against them, as the Act, according to them, is confined to disputes between landlords and tenants alone.

3. The contention of the appellants is unfounded. Under Section 25 of the Delhi Rent control Act, herein called 'the Act' the Controller has been given specific jurisdiction, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, to execute such an order against all persons, who may be in occupation of the premises and to evict them there from. The executing arm of the Controller has not been restricted up to the tenant or the ex-tenant. Apart from this, under Section 37 of the Act, the Controller is required to follow as far as may be, the practice and procedure of the Court of Small Causes, which, of course, subject to certain exceptions, is laid down in the code of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rule 1959, the Controller is to be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the code a specific provision has been made in Section 50 to the effect that where a judgment-debtors dies before the decree had been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court, which passed it, to execute the same against the legal representatives of the deceased. The controller, thereforee, takes his guidance also from this section and is enabled to execute the eviction order against the legal representatives of the deceased.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to judgment of V.S.Deshpande, J, in Nathu Khan v. Mhod. Ismail, : AIR1973Delhi213 , (SAO 178 of 1972 decided on 1-9-1972, where it is observed.

'on the other hand, it must have appeared to the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal that a proceeding before them must be against some human being and cannot be in vacuum; it was quite plausible, thereforee, that they should have brought the legal representatives of the deceased Rahim Khan on record; on the other hand, an argument can also be made that the jurisdiction of the Controller is limited to the relationship ;of landlord and tenants and the heirs of a statutory tenant cannot become parties to a proceeding before the Controller, Both these arguments are plausible.'

The learned Judge while making the aforesaid observations it is significant to notice, did not rule out the correctness of the one or the other contention. Even on facts, that case was entirely different. Eviction order had been passed against the legal representatives themselves. Eviction was not being sought of the legal representatives of a tenant, against whom an eviction order had been passed as in this case. This judgment thereforee is of no assistance to the appellants. On the other hand, in Shaha Mangal Chand v. Gurbux Singh : AIR1972Delhi56 , V.S.Deshpande J. was of the view that the right to execute the order of eviction survives the death of the statutory tenant against his legal representatives on the principle embodied in Rule 4 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. There is a judgment of the Division Bench of our court in Mohd.Idris v. Mehar Illahi, : AIR1971Delhi262 where I sitting with S.N. Shankar J., similar circumstances; and had come to the conclusion that the question of dispossession of the legal representatives of a deceased tenant against whom an order of eviction has already been passed, was a question relating to the execution discharge and satisfaction of the earlier order for recovery of possession and thereforee was to be determined by the court (the Controller), executing the same and not be a separate suit on the principle of Section 47 of the Code of Civil procedure. In these circumstances, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed in liming.

6. Mr.Sharma, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that in these days of difficulty in getting accommodation in Delhi, the appellants would find it extremely hard to immediately comply with the eviction order. He prays for time and undertakes to vacate the premises immediately after the expiry of time that I may grant. I accordingly direct that the order of eviction shall not be executable for three months from the date of this order. Mr.Makhija the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, in view of the undertaking by Mr. Sharma has no objection to the grant of this time.

7. Appeal dismissed.


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