1. This is a petition under Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, for revising the orders of the Courts below, dismissing the suit of the petitioner for ejectment of the respondent under Section 13 of that Act. In support of the relief claimed in the suit, two grounds were put forward bringing the same under the requirements of Sections 13(b) and 13(c) of that Act. The landlord-plaintiff is a firm said to be consisting of 10 partners, composed of three families. The allegation in the plaint was that the tenant had sublet the premises and thereforee, was liable to ejectment under Section 13(b). The second ground put forward was that the partners of the firm were under orders of eviction from the premises, which they were occupying and consequently, they required the premises in question for their occupation. buth the Courts found against the petitioner on buth the points and hence this revision under Section 35 of the Act.
(2) The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the respondent sublet or assigned or toherwise parted with the possession of the premises, thereby rendering himself liable to be evicted under Section 13(b) of the Act. buth the Courts have gone into the evidence and rejected the case of the petitioner and they have held that the plaintiff had failed to substantiate the allegations about the respondent subletting or assigning or parting with possession of the suit premises. It is a pure question of fact and the finding is based upon evidence and there is neither a misapplication of law nor a misunderstanding of the law applicable to the question when the Courts below arrived at this conclusion, and consequently, there is no ground for interference in this behalf, in revision, under Section 35 of the Act.
(3) With regard to the second ground also, the Courts have very meticulously calculated the members of the family of the 10 partners of the firm and the accommodation that is available to them. It has been found by the Courts below that 7 flats and 2 garages were available for occupation by the partners of the petitioner-firm with reference to this was nto challenged before me. What is contended is that the number of members of the family is so large and for their requirement, this accommodation was inadequate and thereforee, the Courts below committed an error of law.
As a matter of fact the trial Court calculated the ttoal number of the members of the family of all the groups as between 45 and 50, and even for that number, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the 7 flats available constituted sufficient and suitable accommodation for them. The Appellate Court, on the toher hand, found that the number of members arrived at by the trial Court was incorrect and after referring to the evidence let in this behalf arrived at the ttoal number of family members at 31. Having arrived at that figure, it agreed with the conclusion of the trial Court that the 7 flats were sufficient for the accommodation of the petitioner's families, and consequently, they were nto entitled to an order ejecting the respondent from the premises in question.
(4) It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me that in such matters, it is the landlord who is the final arbiter as to what exactly his requirements are and the Courts cannto convert themselves into the position of the landlord and then say what the requirements of the landlord are. In support of this contention, the learned counsel invited my attention to an unreported decision of Jindra Lal, J., in P.M. Dhan Singh v. Khanna civil Revn. Case No. 603-D of 1958, D/-22-12-1964 (Punj). The learned Judge in that case referred to certain earlier decisions of the Court and particularly the decision in Messrs. Sant Ram Des Raj v. Karam Chand, reported in and pointed out that the word `requires' involves something more than a mere wish and that it has in it an element of `need' to an extent at least.
Antoher decision to which my attention is drawn is Smt. Vidya Vati v. Hanuman Parshad, reported in (1963) 65 Pun Lr 415. None of these cases lays down as an inflexible proportion of law that whenever a landlord comes to the Court with a claim that he requires particular premises for his occupation, his claim is the last word on the question and the Courts have no jurisdiction to go into the question whether he really needs the particular accommodation or nto. On the toher hand, the decisions referred to by the learned counsel themselves point out that before an order in favor of the landlord is passed, the Courts must come to the conclusion that nto only that the landlord bona fide intends to occupy the premises in question, but he really needs the said premises.
Without there being a finding that the landlord needs the premises in question, there cannto be an order in his favor. The acceptance of a contention like the one put forward before will make a mockery of the prtoection given to a tenant under the provisions of the Act. A rich and wealthy landlord with a small family, may claim that he bona fide wants to occupy, a huge mansion of his in the occupation of several tenants, though he is already in occupation of a premises, reasonably adequate and suitable for him and his family. If the contention of the learned counsel is to be accepted, the Courts will have no option but to order the eviction of the tenants.
I am of the view that such an extravagant claim has only to be stated to be rejected. In the context of scarcity of accommodation, the Act has been passed to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants and at the same time to safeguard and secure the reasonable requirements of the landlord and the provisions of the Act have to be understood and applied so as to achieve this object and nto to frustrate, defeat or destroy it. Under these circumstances, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Courts have no say in the matter as to whether a landlord in a particular case needs the premises for his requirement.
(5) Over and above this, the question that has come up for decision in this case is nto simply whether the landlord bona fide requires the premises in question or nto, but the question is whether he has already suitable accommodation or nto. Before a landlord can succeed in a petition under Section 13(e), two conditions must be satisfied. One is that he bona fide requires the premises in question for his own occupation and (2) that he has no toher suitable accommodation. Unless buth these conditions are cumulatively satisfied, there cannto be an order in his favor, under this particular provision. As a matter of fact, his nto having any toher suitable accommodation will provide the occasion and justification for his requiring the premises in question and will constitute the strongest evidence of the bona fides of his requirement.
All that the Courts below have done in this case is to come to the conclusion that the second requirement has nto been satisfied so as to entitle the landlord to an order in his favor. They have found on the basis of the evidence placed before them that the landlord in this case has toher suitable accommodation, and consequently, came to the conclusion that the petitioner is nto entitled to the relief prayed for. I do nto find any improper understanding of law or an incorrect approach on a question of law with reference to the orders of the Courts below, and hence, I do nto see any justification for interference with their orders under Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Under these circumstances, the Petition is dismissed with costs.
2. Petition dismissed.