Prakash Narain, J.
(1) This appeal is directed against the order of Hardy, J. passed on the original side by which he directed the return of the plaint in the suit filed by the appellant for presentation to a proper court on the ground that the Delhi High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to try the. suit.
(2) Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 25,304.24 against the respondent which has its seat in Kurukshetra within the State of Haryana. This claim is for realisation of sales tax on the price of bricks which the appellant supplied to the respondent under a contract dated 30th April, 1960. The finding of the learned Single Judge is that the contract dated 30-4-1960 was executed by the parties, namely, the appellant and the respondent at Delhi where also the appellant had deposited the security for that due fulfillment of the contract. The further finding is that the claim for sales tax is not a claim for payment of money covered by any terms of the contract dated 30-4-1960 and even if this contract was executed at Delhi the Courts at Delhi would not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the claim for money fell outside the ambit of the contract between the parties.
(3) Mr. Vijay Kishan, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that he claims jurisdiction in Delhi Court on three grounds, namely, that the claims jurisdiction in Delhi, the security for the due fulfillment of that contract was deposited at Delhi and that the certificates of payment without which he could not receive any money due under the contract were issued to him by the architects of the respondent at Delhi. He urged that for the bills for sales tax the certificates had been issued by the architects at Delhi and so, the Courts of the Union Territory would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
(4) It will be pertinent here to refer to some of the paragraphs of the plaint. It was alleged in the plaint that the contract for the supply of the bricks was entered into between the parties at Delhi on 30-4-1960 and that this contract embodied the terms and conditions for the supply of bricks on the rates mentioned in the schedule to this contract. It is further alleged that bills for supply of bricks were submitted to the respondent after the same had been certified by the architects at Delhi. These bills, however, were only for the pries of bricks as, according to the appellant sales tax was not added in these bills at the request of the respondent in view of the respondent seeking exemption from payment of sales-tax. This exemption was not granted and according to the appellant he was asked to submit a consolidated bill of sales tax which was certified by the architects. Mr. Vijay Kishan urges that although payment of sales tax was not a term of the contract dated 30-4-1960 it was agreed to be paid and this is borne out by the certification by the architects. He contends that in order to prove the claim for sales tax he will have to prove the basic contract dated 30-4-1960 which would bring it within the bundle of facts which a plaintiff must prove in order to show that an action has arisen within the jurisdiction of a particular court. In other words, the argument is even if it be assumed that the original contract had no clause for payment of sales-tax and that sales tax was agreed to be paid by the respondent by a subsidiary or supplementary agreement the basic agreement would still have to be proved before the claim for sales-tax can be established. The basic agreement having been executed at Delhi the Courts here would have Jurisdiction to try the suit. In this connection he first invited our attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of India, : AIR1959Cal273 . in that case it was observed that the expression cause of action has one meaning in relation to the basis of a claim and another in relation to the jurisdiction of Court. The former is the restricted and the latter is the wider meaning of cause of action. In the restricted sense it includes facts constituting the infringement of the right and is thus the cause which is the foundation of the suit. In the wider sense it includes facts constituting the right itself. On the analogy of these observation Mr. Vijay Kishan urges that even. if ultimately the Court finds that the claim does not stand substantial and the suit is dismissed that should not detract from the Court entertaining the suit if the basic agreement was executed at Delhi. The learned counsel also referred to a decision of the Madras High Court in G. Venkataesha Bhat and others v. M/s Kamlapat Motilal and others, : AIR1957Mad201 . Ramaswami, J. had in that case observed as under :-
'THEexpression cause of action has been compendiously defined to mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence, which is necessary to be proved. It is, in other words, a bundle of essential facts which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the suit.
(5) It has no relation whatever to the defense which might be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the. grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action or in other words to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favor.'
(6) To our mind the contention raised by Mr. Vijay Kishan is not wellfounded. The principles of law in this respect are well settled and the Calcutta and the Madras precedents cited by the learned counsel have no application to the facts of the present case. The appellant has based his claim for payment of sales-tax on the contract dated 30-4-1960 but admittedly there is no term regarding payment of sales-tax in that contract. The subsidiary or supplementary agreement now urged by Mr. Vijay Kishan is not pleaded as such. Apart from that the price of bricks supplied has admittedly been awarded in favor of the appellant and if something more than that price is now claimed by him under some other contract then it has to be established that the other contract was executed or entered upon in Delhi. This has not been done. The proving of the supply of bricks under the contract of 30-4-1960 would only be incidental vis-a-vis the calculation of the quantum of sales-tax now claimed by the appellant. The claim is not based on that contract nor does it arise from it. In this view of the matter the entering upon of the contract of 30-4-1960 at Delhi would not be one of those bundles of facts which will constitute the cause of action for the purposes of finding out the territorial jurisdiction of a Court.
(7) Mr. Vijay Kishan laid great stress on Clause 33 of the contract dated 30-4-1960 and urged that the certificate under that clause had been granted by the architects at Delhi for payment of the sales-tak by him. There is a fallacy in the approch inasmuch clause 33 would be attracted only if the claim was turn money under the contract of 30-4-60. Any certification of a bill turn an amount not due under this contract would not give the appellant a cause of action to file a suit in Delhi. If that certification was required under the subsidiary or supplementary contract and the certificate was given at Delhi it may give the courts here jurisdiction to try the suit but that is neither the case of the appellant nor has any evidence to that effect been brought before the Court.
(8) In this view of the matter we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.