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Poineer Chemical Co. Vs. Suraj Bhan Prem Raj and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectConstitution
CourtDelhi High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Miscellaneous (Main) Appeal No. 25-D of 1966
Judge
Reported in3(1967)DLT642
ActsConstitution of India - Article 227
AppellantPoineer Chemical Co.
RespondentSuraj Bhan Prem Raj and anr.
Advocates: R.L. Aggarwal,; Y. Dayal and; L.K. Gupta, Advs
Excerpt:
the case dealt with a petition under article 227 of the constitution of india, against the order of the competent authority under the slums areas act, 1956 - it was observed that the proceedings initiated were nto a substitute for the second appeal - in view of the facts and circumstances, it was ruled that the high court would nto interfere in the matter unless the justice demanded it to do so - .....to take oral evidence. (3) the only toher point which has been pressed before me is that the learned competent authority has committed some factual mistakes, one of them being the observation that shri h. k. gupta, has nto stated in his affidavit any relationship with the firm. shri r. l. aggarwal very eloquently contends that this assumption by the learned competent authority is wrong in fact and if once this consideration disappears, then there is practically no (vidence left on the basis of which the final conclusion of the competent authority can be supported. (4) i have considered the petitioner's submission, but i am afraid this petition must be held to be wholly misconceived and devoid of merit. the order of the competent authority read as a whole seems to be very.....
Judgment:

I.D. Dua, J.

(1) This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution directed against the order of Competent Authority, dated 23rd May, 1966, granting to Messrs Suraj Bhan Prem Raj permission to execute the order passed by the Rent Controller on 30th November, 1964, for eviction of Messrs Pioneer Chemical Company, the petitioner in this Court.

(2) The first ground on which the application was admitted has nto been pressed by the learned counsel, conceding that this is covered by a decision of this Court in which it has been held that the Competent Authority is nto obliged to take oral evidence.

(3) The only toher point which has been pressed before me is that the learned Competent Authority has committed some factual mistakes, one of them being the observation that Shri H. K. Gupta, has nto stated in his affidavit any relationship with the firm. Shri R. L. Aggarwal very eloquently contends that this assumption by the learned Competent Authority is wrong in fact and if once this consideration disappears, then there is practically no (vidence left on the basis of which the final conclusion of the Competent Authority can be supported.

(4) I have considered the petitioner's submission, but I am afraid this petition must be held to be wholly misconceived and devoid of merit. The order of the Competent Authority read as a whole seems to be very reasonable, amply supportable on the material on the record, and fully within the provisions of section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956. All that the Competent Authority is required to see is that in granting or refusing to grant permission under section 19(3), it has to take into account :-

(A)Whether alternative accomm)dation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted ; (b) Whether the eviction is in the interrst of improvement and clearance of the slum areas and (c) Such toher factors, if any, as may be prescribed.

It must nto be forgtoten that under the oridinary law, an order of eviction is to be granted by a competent Tribunal or the Court, as the case may be, and the Competent Authority under the Slum Act is only concerned with the removal of the slums consistently with the rights of the tenants, whose means are so meagre that they may have to create a slum elsewhere, if evicted from the premises in question. On the existing record, no infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel which would show that the impugned order travels outside the ambit of section 19, construed in the background of the object and purpose of the Act. Article 227 of the Constitution, it may be pointed out, is nto meant to serve as a substitute for or as an alternative to a provision for an appeal which the statute in question has declined to the aggrieved tenant. It is nto even intended to be a substitute for a second appeal. The right of appeal, for one thing, is by and large nto subject to the discretion A p'titoner under Article 227 is an extraordinary remedy by way of suprintendence given by the Constitution itself and is subject to th discretion of this Court, albeit judicial discretion, available in extraordinary circumstances where this Court feels. that the dictates of justice demand interference. Where the Legislature has in its wisdom considered it proper nto to provide for appeals and revisions, the constitutional overall control of superintendence over Judicial functions has, from its very nature to be sparingly exercised. The terms in which this jurisdiction is created is undoubtedly very wide, bat the Court have traditionally acted under a self-impased restriction and they interfere only in cases discloing jurisdictionl or serious legal infirmity causing injustice and nto remediable by any alternative legal proceedings. No such case fur interference has been made out by the petitioner. Indeed the impugned order is fust and fair and fully in accordance with the broad scheme of the Act Questions of fact and of appraisal of evidence ordinarily cannto be permitted to be canvassed under Article 227, for that is the function of the Court of Appeal. This application accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. The record lay be sent back to the Tilbunal immediatly.


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