V.D. Misra, J.
(1) This revision has been filed against the order of Sessions Judge, Mandi, whereby he allowed the petitioner to withdraw his complaint against the respondents.
(2) T.N. Bahl, petitioner, had filed a complaint under sections 406/420, 506/5 I of the Indian Penal Code against the respondents in the Court of Shri Hem Chand, Magistrate 1st Class, Mandi. After holding a preliminary enquiry as provided under Chapter Xvi of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate was satisfied that a prima-facie case under section 406/420 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code was established against the respondents. Accordingly, he issued summons against the respondents. Hari Kishan Joshi, one of the accused persons, filed an application for revision before the Sessions Judge, placing for quashing the proceedings initiated by the Magistrate. During the pendency of this revision the Sessions Judge recorded the statement of T.N. Bahl in which he stated that he was taking back his complaint against Hari Kishan Joshi. He also stated that he would take back all the suits and complaints made by him against them including the complaint under the Telegraph Act against Sahib Dayal and that he will be on friendly terms with Joshi in future. On the basis of this statement the Sessions Judge passed the impugned order to the effect that since the parties have patched up their differences and the complainant has withdrawn the complaint, the revision petition before him has become redundant, and it was accordingly rejected.
(3) The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure whereby a complainant can withdraw his complaint in the case of a warrant trial. He has also contended that offences under sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code could nto be compounded by the complainant without the permission of the Court in view of section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and since the Court has nto granted any such permission, the offences could nto be deemed to be compounded.
(4) Chapter Xx of the Cede of Criminal Procedure which deals with the trial of sommons- cases by Magistrate contains section 248 which enables a complainant to withdraw his complaint. Even this right of the complainant is nto absolute and he has to satisfy the Magistrate that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint and after the Magistrate has been so satisfied he may permit the complainant to withdraw it. In case the Magistrate is nto so satisfied the Magistrate naturally will nto allow him to withdraw the complaint and case will proceed on. There is another section in this Chapter which requires the Magistrate to acquit the accused because of non appearance of the complainant on the date fixed for the proceedings in the case unless for some reasons the Magistrate thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other date. Chapter Xxi of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the trial of warrant cases by Magistrate and section 252 onwards deals with the procedure which has to be adopted where the case is instituted on the basis of a private complaint. This Chapter has no provision equivalent to that of section 248, referred to above; though there is section 259 which deals with the consequences of the absence of the complainant on the date of hearing of the case. This section is also materially different from section 247. Under Section 259 the Magistrate has been given a discretion before the charge has been framed, to discharge the accused because of absence of complainant only in those cases where the offences charged against the accused may be lawfully compounded or is nto a cognizable offence.
(5) The absence of any provision inchapter Xxi of the Code of Criminal Proced are permitting the complainant to withdraw his complaint shows that the intention of the Legislature was nto to allow a complain int to withdraw the complaint after the proceedings under this Chapter have started. The only provision in this Chapter authorising the Magistrate to discharge the accused is under section 253 but this comes into play only when all the evidence sought to be produced by the compainant has been recorded. It is true that under sub-section (2) of this section the Magistrate may discharge the accused at any stage before the evidence sought to be produced by the complainant is complete but in that case the Magistrate has to record his reasons for holding the charge to be groundless.
(6) Admittedly, in this case the Magistrate or the learned Sessions Judge did nto record any reason for holding the charge as ground-less. It is true that the order of the learned Sessions Judge resulted in the dismissal of the revision filed by one of the accused persons but the effect has been that the Magistrate has nto proceeded with the case in view of the substance of that order. At this stage the order of the learned Magistrate may be re-produced:-
'THEfile has been put up to me to-day. In view of the order of learned D. J. Mandi dated 3rd August, 1968, no further action is required. The file be consigned to the record room.'
(7) The learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the statement made by T. N. Bahl before the learned Sessions Judge should be treated as compounding the offences. I am afraid, I cannto agree with this view To begin with, there is nto a word in his statement which shows that the offences have been compounded. Secondly, unless the Court had permitted the complainant to compound the offences under the provision of section 345(2) the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complainant could nto compound them. No permission was sought by the complainant to compound the offence, nor any was given.
(8) The result is that this revision is allowed and the order of the Sessions Judge, Mandi, dated 3rd August, 1968, is set aside. The case is remanded back to the Sessions Judge to dispose of the revision filed by Hari Kishan Joshi. Ha is directed to finally dispose of the matter as far as possible within one month from the date of receipt of the record by him. The parties are directed to appear before him on 3rd October, 1969.