P.S. Safeer, J.
(1) This petition is directed against the order made by Shri R. Narayan, S. D. M., Sadar Bazar, Delhi, on 15th Oct., 1973. The order was passed in exercise of jurisdiction provided by S. 145 of the code of Criminal Procedure. S. 145(1) of the code is :-(......)
(2) In order to exercise the jurisdiction the Magistrate in the first instance has to be satisfied that there is immediate apprehension of breach of peace in respect of any immovable property. If he is not satisfied, he may yet pass any order under the provision. If, on the other hand, he is satisfied that there is apprehension of breach of peace, he is to pass an order in writing and in that event the order is to contain a statement of the grounds on. which the satisfaction of the Magistrate is based. The requirement is imperative. Howsoever brief the grounds have to be stated. Apart from all case law concerned with the interpretation of section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I have come across a startling situation. In one of the cases it was asserted at the Bar before me that the Magistrate, who had stated in his order that he had perused the statements on account of which he was passing the order, did not know the language in which the statements were recorded. The Magistrate was called by me to my Chamber and when I requested him to read out the statements he confessed that he did not know the language and he was unable to read out the statements.
(3) In cases in which jurisdiction is to be exercised on the satisfaction of a court, the satisfaction must be the result of a judicial approach to the material on the record. Such a judicial approach will not be possible if the presiding officer does not know the language in which the material on the record is An order must by itself be satisfactory i in as much as it must make it evident that it has been passed on a judicial exercise of the jurisdiction given by a particular provision in a statute.
(4) I direct that on remand this matter may go back to the trial magistsate and that the parties should appear before him on the 22nd of May, 1974. On that date the magistrate will hear the counsel for the parties and then proceed to consider as to whether he is to pass or not, an order under section 145(1) of the code of Criminal Proceddre. The litigation is relegated to the stage at which it was on the 15th of October, 1973, before the impugned order was passed. On that date the court was acting within the statutory period prescribed by section 145(1) of the Code. The court will apply its mind afresh and pass an order which may be in accordance with the intendment that it should contain the grounds furnishing the satisfaction of passing the order. With these observations the petition is disposed of.