I.D. Dua, C.J.
(1) This revision appears to be barred by time, The judgment of the learned District Judge is dated September 5, 1967. The revision was presented in this Court on February 27, 1968. After taking account of the time spent in securing certified copies the revision, according to the office calculation, is stated to be barred by limitation by 14 days. It may be pointed out that this Court was closed for winter vacation from January 15, 1968 to February 23. 1968. The Circuit Bench of the High Court reopened on February 24, 1968. When the attention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was drawn by the office to this fact, he recorded a note on the revision on February 28, 1968 that the period of limitation has expired during the vacation and that revision was presented in this Court on the day it reopened. When his attention was drawn to the fact that the Court had actually reopened on February 24, 1968 he replied that he bona fide believed that the Court was to reopen on February 26, 1968 and undertook to file an application for condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The revision was on this undertaking placed before a learned Judge of this Court for admission on March, 7, 1938. Unfortunately the Court Reader did nto draw the attention of the learned motion Judge to the office note which it was his duty to do The result, thereforee, was that the learned single Judge admitted the revision without noticing the fact that the revision prima facie was barred by limitation. Till today no application under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed. It has. however, been argued that there was an impression prevailing amongst the members of the Bar that the High Court would reopen of February 26, 1968 and nto on February 25, 1968. It may at this stage be pointed out that February 26, 1968, according to the statement at the Bar, was declared a holiday with the result that the revision was presented in this Court on February 27, 1968. In my opinion, there is nothing on the record which would Justify this Court in holding that there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The duration of the winter vacation if given the requisite publicity and the members of the Bir, in my opinion, must have known when the Court closed and as to when it was going to reopen. Normally speaking a few days before the Court actually reopens all causes in which time has expired during the vacation are presented in the Court well in advance so that on the last day there is no chance of any appeal or revision getting barred by time on account of much rush of work. But be that as it may, in this case it is nto possible to hold that there was any sufficient cause for nto filing the revision on February 24, 1968 which means a cause beyond reasonable control of the party after due diligence. Section 3 of the Limitation Act is mandatory and this Court cannto ignore that provision. The exception contained in section 5 has to be complied with for condoning the delay. Once an order, judgment or decree becomes final because of lapse of time a valuable right accrues to the opposite party and without snowing sufficient cause under section 5, it would nto be proper for this Court to condone the delay. I, however, must nto be understood to lay down that section 5 is nto to be liberally construed.
(2) The revision, for the foregoing reasons, must be dismissed.
(3) There are also cross objections presented on behalf of the respondents. I have nto been able to appreciate how cross-objections are competent in a revision. Order 21, Civil Procedure Code, is clearly inapplicable. This Court is certainly entitled to treat the cross-objections as an independent revision. But, here again, the respondents are faced with the period of limitation which has been prescribed for revisions. It is, thereforee, nto open to this Court to entertain cross-objections as if they were an independent revision. They also, thereforee, fail.
(4) As both sides have failed in their attempt to challenge the mpugned judgment against them, there would be no order as to costs.