M.M. Ismail, J.
(1) At the very outset, I must confess to a feeling that it will be difficult to come across a more frivolous case so tenaciously and vehemently argued. This Second Appeal under Section 09 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, has been filed against the orders of the Rent Contoller affilmed by the. Tribunal, rejecting the application of the appellant for eviction of the respondent.
(2) The application for eviction was filed by the appellant on the ground that the respondent had sub-let a portion of the premises to one Dr. Razdan. The Controller in paragraph 7 of his order observed as follows :-
'the premises were given on rent to the father of the respondent Inder Son in March, 1954. The landlord at that time was Shri J. N. Baluja father of the petitioner. The sub-letting is alleged to have been made to Dr. Razdan in May 1955. The petitioner became the landlord and the respondent became his tenant in 1958. These facts are nto disputed'
This observation of the Rent Controller makes it absolutely clear that the original tenancy was with the father of the respondent and it was that the father who sub-let a portion of the premises to Dr. Razdan in May 1955 and the present respondent himself never sub let the premises and he became a tenant in his own right only in 1958, by which time the present appellant also acquired title to the property from his father. This observation of the Rent Controller was nto challenged in the Grounds of Appeal filed to the Tribunal. On the toher hand, ground No. 3 was to the following effect :- 'Admittedly the tenant was Inder Sen Sethi, who had sublet the premises to Dl Razdan, but when the tenancy was transferred to the respondent the sub-tenant also became his tenant with effect from the date the tenancy was transferred in his name, and the premises would be deemed to have been let out to him on that date which was admittedly after the 9th day of June, 1952, and as such could only be with the written consent of the landlord petitioner-appellant, and which position of law was rightly admitted in the written statement but the learned Controller failed to appreciate the point that even if Dr. Razdan was a 'tenant under Inder Sen Sethi, he became tenant under M. R. Sethi the tenant, on the date the tenancy was transferred to his name and it amounted to subletting by him on that Thus, it will be seen that the facts were nto at all disputed bat only thing is the appellant pat forward the contention that the present respondent must be deemed to have sub-let the premises to Dr. Razdan. with effect from the date when he became the tenant of the premises, even though actually the present respondent did nto sub-let the premises and only the previous tenant sublet the premises to Dr. Razdan in 1955. There was one toher finding in the order of the Tribunal, viz., that the petitioner knew very well that Dr. Razdan was occupying the premises as a sub-tenant and he accepted the respondent as a tenant knowing fully well the alleged sub-tenancy. Even this finding was nto challenged in the Grounds of Appeal to the Tribunal. Under these circumstances the Tribunal in its order dated 5th December 1961 stated as follows :-
'INthis case, it is admitted that the tenancy started in March 1954 and at that time the landlord was Jagan Nath Baluja, the father of the appellant, and the tenant was Inder Sen Sethi, the father of the respondent and that on or about the year 1908 Jagan Nath gifted this property to the appellant and by operation of law, he became the landlord.'
Under these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the tenancy premises were let out to the respondent with a subtenant residing in a portion and it was obvious that no sub-letting was made by the respondent and the respondent was nto liable to eviction under the provisions of the rent Control Act.
(3) The learned counsel for the appellant inspire of these admissions and findings strenuously argued that the conclusions of the Tribunal are wrong because the respondent admitted that he sub-let the premises. There is absolutely no warrant for such a contention. On the ether hand, the father of the appellant who was the original landlord who let out the premises in 1954 admitted that when he was the landlord. Dr. Razdan came to occupy the portion of the premises in question. Under these circumstances, the factual position that emerges is that the respondent herein did nto sub-let the premises but the father of the respondent who was the previous tenant sub-let a portion of the premises in 1955. On these facts, the question that arises is whether the Respondent 1s liable to eviction on the ground that the previous tenant sub-let a portion of the premises. The learned counsel for the appellant could nto draw my attention to any principle of law or authority on the basis of which the respondent herein can be said to have incurred the liability for eviction. He referred to a decision of the Punjab High Court in Pruan Singh v. Raja Ram. In that case, it was held that a transferee from a landlord can seek ejectment of the tenant who sub-let the building without the consent of the previous landlord who had transferred the building. That decision has ntohing whatever to do with the point which arises in this particular case. The learned counsel for the appellant then referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pooran Chand v. Mtoi Lal In that case, the question whether a tenant can be evicted on the ground of a previous tenant having sub-let a portion of the premises never arose and so was nto decided and, consequently, that decision has no application whatever to the present case. In my opinion, the proper interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, will be that a tenant will be liable for eviction only if he sublets the premises without the consent of the landlord. If even at the time when he became a tenant, a portion of the premises had already been sub-let by a previous tenant, for that sub letting the present tenant does nto became liable for eviction. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that there are absolutely no merits in this Second Appeal and the said Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. The counsels fee is fixed at Rs. 250.00